Bolivia #

Status of CSOs, protection and transparency #

Bolivia formally guarantees freedom of association under Article 21.4 of its State Political Constitution, with the central government holding authority to register NGOs operating across multiple departments (Art. 298.II.15).

However, this constitutional protection is significantly constrained in practice. Law No. 351 on Legal Entities (2013) and Supreme Decree No. 1597 require civil society organisations to align their statutes with government-defined economic and social development policies. Failure to comply may result in the revocation of legal personality, effectively creating a form of forced alignment with governmental priorities. These provisions have been widely regarded as restrictive, and several international organisations have recommended their reform.¹

Since the adoption of this framework, the operational environment for CSOs has become progressively more restrictive. A series of implementing decrees (Supreme Decrees 1987/2014, 2650/2016, 3746/2018, and 4353/2020) have increased administrative requirements, adding layers of bureaucracy to registration and compliance. In practice, this has made it more difficult for organisations to obtain or maintain legal status, thereby limiting the effective exercise of freedom of association and assembly.

Implementation of the Escazú Agreement #

The Escazú Agreement, adopted in 2018 under the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, establishes binding obligations to strengthen environmental democracy through four pillars: access to environmental information, public participation, access to justice, and the protection of environmental defenders.

Bolivia, a party since 2019, demonstrates a mixed level of compliance across these pillars. While certain legal provisions exist, implementation remains uneven, and the absence of a formal national roadmap reflects broader gaps between formal commitments and institutional practice.

(i) Access to environmental information. Bolivia recognises the right to access information through Supreme Decree 28168 (2005). However, the absence of a comprehensive freedom of information law limits the practical enforceability of this right, as clear procedures, timelines and accountability mechanisms are lacking.²

(ii) Public participation in environmental decision-making. Public participation is relatively well established in Bolivia’s environmental framework. Environmental Law No. 1,333 (1992) provides for citizen involvement in the management of protected areas, sustainable development processes and the use of renewable natural resources. However, the extent to which participation effectively influences decision-making in practice remains variable.

(iii) Protection of environmental defenders. Bolivia lacks specific legal instruments designed to protect environmental defenders. In practice, defenders face ongoing risks, including intimidation, violence and criminalisation. Recent cases illustrate these dynamics: a park ranger who documented and reported forest fires allegedly linked to powerful economic and political actors was threatened, dismissed from his position, and subjected to legal proceedings. This reflects broader patterns of retaliation and highlights the State’s failure to ensure adequate protection.³

Institutional landscape for nature crime #

Bolivia’s environmental enforcement landscape is characterised by a multiplicity of agencies, which may cause overlapping and sometimes fragmented mandates. The principal bodies mandated with monitoring and enforcing against crimes concerning deforestation, environmental degradation and attacks on defenders are grouped below by function.

A. Monitoring, licensing, and administrative enforcement #

These bodies are responsible for compliance monitoring, inspections, licensing and administrative sanctions.

Authority for the Social Control and Inspection of Forests and Land (ABT). The principal administrative authority for forestry and land-use, responsible for regulating, supervising and controlling forestry production, transformation and transport; granting clearing authorisations; and issuing sanctions for violations. Its enforcement mandate is primarily administrative, conducting inspections, sanctioning proceedings, preventive measures and remedial orders. ABT also has powers to initiate or support criminal actions when conduct is linked to forestry and land-use change, and its data are considered pre-constituted expert evidence, which is frequently decisive for triggering and substantiating criminal proceedings.

Competent Environmental Authorities (AAC). The AAC sits at the national level (Ministry of Development Planning and Environment) and at the subnational level (Departmental Governments) as the central monitoring and enforcement body for environmental compliance, particularly under the environmental licensing and control regime. Through routine inspections, compliance monitoring, environmental audits and review of operational reporting, the AAC may identify conduct that evidences environmental offences or serious non-compliance. Where facts indicate potential criminality, the AAC can refer matters for prosecution and provide technical documentation and administrative records that support criminal investigations, while continuing administrative enforcement where applicable.

Jurisdictional Administrative Mining Authority (AJAM). AJAM is responsible for supervising the legality of mining operations and managing mining rights and the national mining registry, under the oversight of the AAC. In practice, AJAM may initiate administrative actions, verify the existence and scope of mining rights and authorisations, and generate institutional information and documentation that can support complaints, referrals, and coordination with the Public Prosecutor’s Office where the conduct may constitute a criminal offence.

National Protected Areas Service (SERNAP). A governmental body that plays a central role in regulating, supervising and controlling activities carried out inside national parks and protected territories. This includes administering the applicable authorisation regime and monitoring compliance with the conditions under which lawful activities may be permitted.

National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA). Responsible for land titling and distribution, defining land property regularisation procedures. Its mandate intersects with environmental enforcement where land-use changes require clearing authorisations.

B. Policy and strategic coordination #

These institutions define environmental policy, regulatory frameworks and overall governance strategies.

Ministry of Environment, Biodiversity, Climate Change and Forest Development and Management. Holds responsibility for national forest policy and the forestry regime through its Directorate General of Forests. It oversees the core environmental statute (Environmental Law 1,333) and its implementing regulations.

Plurinational Authority of Mother Earth. Created under Framework Law No. 300, this is a policy authority designed to steer climate and environmental governance. It is relevant for coordination, oversight and strategic engagement on environmental protection, although its operational capacity has been limited.

C. Criminal investigation and enforcement #

These institutions are responsible for investigating and prosecuting environmental crimes.

Public Prosecutor’s Office (Fiscalía). Receives and investigates criminal complaints for all illegal activity, including illegal deforestation, environmental crimes, and violence or threats against environmental defenders.

Bolivian National Police — Forest and Environmental Police (POFOMA). Performs specialised functions related to forest and environmental protection, including field interventions, controls, seizures and support to investigations in coordination with competent administrative authorities and the Public Prosecutor’s Office. POFOMA is often a key actor in operational deployments in remote areas and in securing evidence and material elements linked to illegal logging, unauthorised burning and other forms of environmental degradation.

D. Oversight and access to justice #

These institutions contribute to accountability by receiving complaints and facilitating access to justice.

Ombudsman’s Office (Defensoría del Pueblo). The Ombudsman has investigative and oversight functions, receiving complaints regarding environmental and human rights violations, conducting investigations, and issuing recommendations to other authorities. It may also act as a mediator with public authorities in cases involving environmental rights and attacks against environmental defenders.

Legal routes available for civil society #

A. Categories of nature crimes #

Environmental crimes in Bolivia are defined under Law No. 1,333 of 1992, specifying when environmental harm constitutes a criminal offence. These definitions provide the legal basis for civil society to report violations and engage with enforcement authorities. An illustrative selection:

Burning farmland or pasture and causing a fire on another’s property, by negligence or intentionally: 2 to 4 years imprisonment.

Unauthorised logging — cutting down forests without authorisation for purposes other than the domestic use of the landowner, causing damage and degradation to the environment⁴: 2 to 4 years imprisonment and a fine equal to 100% of the value of the forest that was cut down.

Illicit transit or deposit of hazardous waste — authorising or allowing the deposit, introduction or transport into national territory of toxic, hazardous, radioactive or other waste of external origin that poses a danger to public health and the environment; transferring or introducing polluting technology not accepted in the country of origin: up to 10 years imprisonment.

B. Routes for legal action #

The legal routes available to CSOs and indigenous communities to defend themselves against nature crimes fall into two broad categories: judicial mechanisms (agro-environmental jurisdiction, constitutional actions and criminal proceedings) and administrative mechanisms. In practice, these mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and are often used in combination, depending on the objective pursued (e.g. immediate suspension of activities, criminal accountability, or environmental restoration).

1. Judicial Mechanisms #

Judicial mechanisms provide formal avenues to seek accountability, reparation and the protection of environmental and constitutional rights. They allow CSOs and affected communities to escalate environmental harm beyond administrative processes, particularly in cases involving significant damage, rights violations or lack of effective governmental response.

a. Agro-Environmental Jurisdiction #

The Agro-Environmental Court is the highest instance in environmental matters. It is an elected body for which judges serve six-year terms and must have specialty knowledge of agricultural and environmental laws.

The Agro-Environmental Trial Courts play an essential role as courts of first instance. They directly hear disputes concerning, among others, the exploitation of natural resources, the validity of agrarian or forestry contracts, agro-environmental enforcement proceedings, and the protection of collective rights.

The Agro-Environmental Courts also have jurisdiction to determine liability for environmental harm and, accordingly, to order compensation, reparation or restoration of the damage caused. Under the Bolivian Civil Code and Law No. 1,333 of 1992 on the Environment, any person may file a claim to seek redress in the form of compensation and/or restoration for damages resulting from environmental harm.

b. Constitutional Mechanisms #

Bolivia’s Constitution provides two constitutional actions that can be used to defend environmental rights: the Popular Action and the Amparo Action.

Popular Action (Acción Popular). The Bolivian Constitution establishes popular actions, which allow any member of the public to bring a claim where authorities, individuals or collectives violate, or threaten to violate, rights and collective interests related to the environment. The Constitution expressly recognises that a popular action applies to the right to a healthy environment. Binding relief and interim measures are available under this action.

Check case box below on the Beni River in Mosetén Territory (2023) and Lomas de Arena (2023) for a detailed exemplification.

Legal standing. Any person, CSO, community or indigenous people may file a popular action. A popular action may be filed at any time while the violation or threat persists, and there is no requirement to exhaust administrative or judicial remedies beforehand.

Amparo Action (Acción de amparo constitucional). The Constitutional Amparo seeks to protect fundamental rights recognised in the Constitution. In practice, Amparo is frequently used to protect due process and related rights that have been threatened during ongoing civil, criminal or administrative proceedings.

Legal standing. The person whose rights have been restricted, suppressed or threatened, or someone acting on behalf of the injured person. A collective may also bring an Amparo Action if it appears as a legal person whose own rights are directly affected, or if it acts through duly authorised representatives on behalf of its members and shows a concrete, personal and certain impairment of protected rights with a causal link to the harm.

Time limit. The Amparo must be filed within 6 months of the alleged violation or of the date it became known. The petitioner must first exhaust ordinary and administrative remedies before filing, except where exhaustion would be untimely or where there is an imminent risk of irreparable harm. An Amparo is inadmissible against acts freely consented to by the injured party, when the effects of the challenged act have ceased, or when another constitutional action is more suitable.

c. Criminal Proceedings #

In Bolivia, environmental crimes are imprescriptible: they do not expire and the passage of time does not bar their prosecution. The Constitution also imposes liability for historical environmental damage and mandates that at all stages of production, actors must avoid, mitigate, remediate, repair and compensate for harm to the environment and to human health, linking the criminal component with administrative and civil restoration duties.

Environmental crime cases are adjudicated by the ordinary courts under the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Ex officio prosecutions (filed by the public prosecutor). In Bolivia, criminal investigations into environmental offences are primarily conducted ex officio by the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Fiscalía), meaning that once a potential crime is brought to its attention, the State assumes responsibility for investigating and prosecuting the case.

Any individual or entity, including civil society organisations, may trigger this process by filing a criminal complaint (denuncia). This mechanism does not require the complainant to demonstrate personal harm, making it particularly relevant for environmental matters involving collective or diffuse interests. It is sufficient to provide minimally verifiable information, such as the location, timing, description of the facts, and any available supporting materials (e.g. documents, photographs, coordinates, or preliminary technical reports).

Upon receipt, the Prosecutor’s Office is required to register the complaint, initiate preliminary investigative steps, or refer the case to the competent jurisdiction. These initial actions may include requesting information from administrative authorities, ordering inspections, or coordinating with specialised units such as the environmental police.

Private prosecutions. Those who qualify as a “victim” may file a private prosecution (querella) to participate actively in the criminal proceedings. In Bolivian criminal procedure, the concept of “victim” may include individuals, communities or legal entities that have suffered direct harm, and in certain cases may extend to collective or diffuse interests, particularly where environmental harm affects public or community rights.

Filing a querella grants the complainant formal standing as a party to the proceedings, allowing for active procedural participation alongside the Public Prosecutor. This includes the ability to submit and request the production of evidence, propose and follow investigative measures, participate in hearings, challenge prosecutorial inaction or decisions, and support the development of the case throughout its stages.

While the private prosecutor may play an active and strategic role, the direction of the criminal investigation remains under the authority of the Public Prosecutor’s Office. The effectiveness of this mechanism often depends on the level of coordination between the querellante and the prosecutor, as well as the strength and technical quality of the evidence presented.

2. Administrative Mechanisms #

Administrative actions include sanctioning procedures for environmental infractions, administrative appeals such as revocation and hierarchical remedies, and the possibility to challenge environmental licences, permits or authorisations issued by public authorities. These mechanisms allow for the suspension, modification or annulment of administrative decisions, and can serve both to halt ongoing environmental harm and to create an official record that may support further judicial or criminal action.

CSOs and affected parties can engage the relevant administrative bodies (described in Sections III.A and III.D) through the procedures summarised below.

Case examples of successful litigation #

Beni River – Mosetén Territory (2023)5 In 2016, a mining cooperative applied for a contract to extract minerals in the municipalities of Alto Beni and Palos Blancos, in the Bolivian Amazon. The Mining Administrative Jurisdiction Authority (AJAM) proceeded with a prior consultation process despite the fact that the Mosetén Indigenous people had been excluded from it, and despite both municipalities having enacted laws declaring themselves free from mining activity. Communities repeatedly and formally rejected mining operations, including through collective decisions, public statements from over 25 cooperatives, and a declaration of “zero mining” across Mosetén territory. The Ombudsman of the Plurinational State of Bolivia filed the acción popular on behalf of the affected communities. The Mosetén Indigenous People’s Organization (OPIM) and the Mosetén Indigenous Women’s Organization (OMIM) played a central role in documenting and expressing collective opposition. Agricultural cooperatives provided formal public statements of rejection that formed part of the evidentiary record. The Plurinational Constitutional Court granted protection in favour of the communities, the Mosetén people, and the Beni River. It set aside Administrative Order No. 547/2023 and conditioned any future consultation process on full compliance with constitutional standards of good-faith, prior, informed, and concerted consultation. It also granted preventive protection to the Beni River, ordering all necessary measures to preserve its system of life.

Lomas de Arena (2023)6 In late 2022, the Centro Turístico Kim, a 109-ha private property certified as an Ecological Easement (1995) that serves as the buffer and aquifer-recharge corridor of the Lomas de Arena Regional Park, was occupied for 52 days by more than 200 people linked to land trafficking, who opened roads, staked parcels for illegal loteamiento, set fires, and blocked water courses. Faced with municipal inaction, the Departmental Legislative Assembly filed an acción popular, and the Second Constitutional Chamber of the Departmental Court of Justice granted tutela of the rights to water and the environment, prohibiting future settlement and recognizing the environmental damage. A departmental Environmental Administrative Pause suspended all licensing in the recharge zone.

Use of remote sensing evidence in nature crime prosecution #

CSOs play a central role in generating and structuring evidence of environmental harm, particularly through remote sensing technologies such as satellite imagery, geospatial mapping and digital monitoring tools. This evidence is incorporated into legal proceedings through multiple evidentiary forms, although the degree to which it is accepted by public authorities depends on the evidentiary requirements and technical standards established within national legal and institutional frameworks.

In Bolivia, remote sensing evidence is accepted under general evidentiary rules, but its effectiveness depends on technical validation, expert interpretation and institutional capacity.

• Legal framework. Bolivia does not have a specific legal provision regulating the admissibility of remote sensing evidence. In practice, admissibility is assessed under the general evidentiary regime of the Bolivian Code of Criminal Procedure, grounded in freedom of proof (the possibility of using any lawful means capable of producing conviction) and judicial evaluation of evidence under rules of sound judgment. Any evidence acquired must satisfy the legality requirement under the Code: a piece of evidence has probative value only if it is obtained through lawful means and incorporated into the process in accordance with local laws.

• Court acceptance. Satellite data has been successfully presented in Bolivian courts to demonstrate illegal land clearing and other forms of environmental degradation. Bolivian agro-environmental jurisprudence, including decisions in criminal cases, confirms that remote sensing evidence such as satellite imagery is admissible, and that parties may expressly challenge its reliability or interpretation within the proceeding.

• Technical standards. Evidentiary integrity is safeguarded through general criminal procedure rules and through practical evidence-control protocols applied by the Bolivian Police and the Public Prosecutor’s Office, including documentation of collection, preservation, transfers and integrity measures for physical and digital items. For remote sensing evidence, the following practices reduce admissibility risks:

  • Source identification: clear identification of the platform or provider (state entity or recognised provider), date/time, area of interest and method of acquisition;

  • Metadata preservation: retaining original files and metadata where available, and documenting each processing step;

  • Reproducibility: preserving the workflow so an independent expert could reproduce the same outputs from the same source data;

  • Integrity documentation: an evidence log documenting who handled the digital files, where they were stored, how they were transferred, and what controls were used to prevent tampering.

Looking at court decisions that have accepted remote sensing evidence, this type of evidence is far more likely to be accepted, and to survive adversarial scrutiny, when it is (i) accompanied by a formal expert report, (ii) supported by institutional records, and (iii) corroborated by field verification or police inspection where feasible.

Case example — use of remote sensing evidence in litigation #

Chiquitanía, Chaco and Amazon v. Bolivia (2019)7 This case, brought by a coalition of CSOs and Indigenous communities before the International Rights of Nature Tribunal, relied extensively on remote sensing evidence to document the scale and causes of the 2019 forest fires. Satellite imagery, geospatial analyses, and environmental monitoring reports were used to demonstrate that approximately 6.4 million hectares had burned, particularly in the Chiquitanía region, and to map the extent of deforestation across multiple ecosystems. These data were combined with field testimonies and expert reports to establish patterns of land clearing, the expansion of the agricultural frontier, and the link between State policies and the fires. Based on this evidence, the Tribunal concluded that Bolivia had violated the Rights of Nature and that the events constituted ecocide, calling for legal and policy reforms, restoration measures, and stronger protections for affected ecosystems and Indigenous communities.

Challenges in engagement with authorities #

Engagement between CSOs and public authorities in Bolivia is constrained by structural, procedural and political barriers that weaken accountability efforts. Although formal channels exist, they often fail to produce timely or effective responses.

Limited institutional capacity is a central issue. Environmental agencies, prosecutors and courts frequently lack resources and technical expertise. Justice officials who lack security of tenure may be vulnerable to reprisals, including arbitrary dismissal, if they make decisions that displease those in power.These structural weaknesses are particularly acute in environmental matters: prosecution of environmental crime remains difficult because it requires specialised prosecutors; the presentation of evidence is always very complex in environmental matters; and the institutional support from the State is not yet sufficiently strong, exposing enforcement to neglect, cooptation and failure.⁸,⁹

Challenges in attribution further hinder enforcement. Environmental harm in Bolivia is frequently caused not by easily identifiable landholders but by organised networks operating across multiple tenure categories. Illegal deforestation is rarely penalised in Bolivia, and when it is, the fines are negligible, as low as US$0.2 per hectare, compared to US$200 per hectare in other neighbouring countries. The government has retrospectively approved deforestation of land cleared without permits, further undermining incentives for compliance. Between 2016 and 2021, approximately 70% of deforestation in Bolivia occurred on lands that were once public but were retitled as private property for agricultural use, making attribution of environmental liability to specific actors structurally difficult.¹⁰

Political interference and weak institutional integrity further undermine engagement. Bolivia’s government has fuelled destruction by weakening land-use laws, encouraging settlers and promoting agribusiness in the Amazon. According to Alcides Vadillo, regional director of Fundación Tierra, land in Bolivia’s Amazon is much more valuable after being cleared, which results in various actors using legal, semi-legal and illegal means to transform forests into land for farming or cattle-rearing. Mining cooperatives have been known to hold the government hostage, to corrupt and coerce mining agency officials, and to have shady dealings with foreign mining outfits. They operate in a near state of impunity, thanks to grey areas in Bolivian law and little oversight by AJAM.¹¹,¹²

Procedural barriers, including delays, opacity and limited access to information, restrict CSOs’ ability to follow cases and ensure continuity. Bolivia has no law guaranteeing access to public information, and elected officials’ asset declarations, while required by law, are unavailable to the public. Despite ratifying the Escazú Agreement in 2019, Bolivia has done very little to implement it. Little information is publicly available about the terms of major mining and extraction agreements and their likely social and environmental impact.

Weak enforcement outcomes reduce deterrence. In 2023, the loss of primary forests in Bolivia increased by 27% and reached its highest number on record for the third consecutive year — nearly 500,000 hectares. Behind this destruction are out-of-control fires, the expansion of the agricultural frontier, rampant gold mining, and the construction of airports and drug laboratories inside natural parks and protected areas. Recurring amnesties have systematically eroded accountability: in 2013, under pressure from the agribusiness lobby, the Bolivian government passed the perdonazo, a land use law enabling landowners who had illegally deforested prior to 2011 to pay nominal fines to legalise their farms.¹³,¹⁴

Conclusion & recommendations #

While Bolivia offers a broad range of legal mechanisms to address environmental harm, their effectiveness is limited by institutional fragility, political interference, evidentiary constraints and weak enforcement. In this context, CSOs play a crucial role in bridging gaps through evidence production, but their impact depends on institutional responsiveness, access to information and broader political dynamics. Engagement with authorities therefore goes beyond formal legal routes, requiring strategic, persistent and collective action. Strengthening environmental accountability therefore demands both institutional reforms and targeted support for civil society.

1. Strengthen institutional capacity and specialisation. Enhance the technical and operational capacity of environmental agencies, prosecutors and courts. This includes: developing specialised environmental units within the Public Prosecutor’s Office and judiciary; providing training on the use and evaluation of scientific and geospatial evidence; ensuring continuity of institutional functions during political transitions to avoid administrative paralysis; and strengthening inter-institutional coordination mechanisms to facilitate information sharing and enable more coherent responses across administrative and criminal pathways.

2. Strengthen protection and enabling environment for CSOs. CSOs operate under increasing constraints and risks. Reform restrictive provisions under Law 351 and related decrees; establish specific protections for environmental defenders in line with Escazú obligations; and support collective action mechanisms (e.g. platforms like GIT-OR) that reduce individual risk and enhance advocacy capacity.

3. Enhance access to environmental information. Adopt a comprehensive freedom of information framework aligned with the Escazú Agreement; ensure public access to key datasets such as mining cadastres and land-use authorisations; and standardise data systems to improve usability and interoperability.

4. Strengthen evidentiary frameworks for remote sensing. Develop formal guidelines or protocols for the admissibility of geospatial evidence; promote collaboration between CSOs, technical experts and public authorities; and encourage the institutionalisation of remote sensing within monitoring and enforcement systems.

5. Improve sanction effectiveness and deterrence. Revise sanction levels to reflect the scale and economic value of environmental damage; avoid policy measures that incentivise non-compliance, such as recurring amnesties; and link sanctions more effectively to restoration and remediation obligations.

Brazil #

Status of CSOs, protection and transparency #

Brazil maintains a regulatory framework that, in principle, allows civil society organizations (CSOs) to function and operate. This framework is anchored in the Federal Constitution (Art. 5, XVII), which guarantees freedom of association, and is further structured by Law 13.019/2014 – the Regulatory Framework for Civil Society Organizations (Marco Regulatório das Organizações da Sociedade Civil – MROSC) – along with its implementing Decree 8.726/2016. Together, these instruments define the legal basis for partnerships with the state, establish procedures for public calls for proposals, and affirm the autonomy of CSOs. However, variations in implementation and interpretation, particularly at the subnational level, continue to limit the practical effectiveness of these guarantees¹⁵.

Brazil has one of the most developed civil society ecosystems in the Amazon region, with a dense network of technical NGOs, research institutes and indigenous organisations active on environmental protection. Associations with at least one year of legal existence and whose statutory purposes include the defense of the environment or public interests enjoy standing to bring certain collective actions, including the public civil action (see Section IV).

Despite this comparatively favourable legal and civic environment, the operational conditions for environmental defenders are among the most dangerous globally. Global Witness has recorded 413 defenders killed or disappeared in Brazil since 2012, the second-highest figure globally after Colombia¹⁶. Violence, threats and intimidation, particularly in the Amazon¹⁷, remain a structural constraint on the effective exercise of environmental advocacy, leading many CSOs to avoid initiating legal procedures against companies conducting illegal activities.

Implementation of the Escazú Agreement #

The Escazú Agreement, adopted in 2018 under the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, establishes binding obligations to strengthen environmental democracy through four pillars: access to environmental information, public participation, access to justice, and the protection of environmental defenders.

Brazil signed the Escazú Agreement in 2018 but has not yet ratified it, meaning that the Agreement does not currently have legal effect in the domestic order. Despite this, the Agreement has been influential in practice and has been cited in judicial decisions as a normative parameter for procedural environmental rights¹⁸. Implementation of the four pillars relies on pre-existing domestic instruments.

(i) Access to environmental information: Brazil has a relatively robust legal framework for access to information, including Law No. 12,527 of 2011 (Access to Information Law) and specific environmental information obligations under CONAMA resolutions¹⁹ and the National Environmental Information System (SINIMA)²⁰. Federal environmental agencies such as IBAMA and ICMBio publish significant volumes of georeferenced data, embargo lists and enforcement records, which CSOs use extensively. Nevertheless, data quality and accessibility vary significantly at state and municipal level.

(ii) Public participation in environmental decision-making: Public participation is embedded in environmental licensing, protected-area management and the governance of the National Environmental System (SISNAMA), including through public hearings, participatory councils (e.g. CONAMA) and consultation mechanisms with indigenous peoples under ILO Convention 169. In practice, the effectiveness of these mechanisms varies, and CSOs frequently use judicial mechanisms to enforce participation rights.

(iii) Access to justice:. Brazilian law provides a comparatively rich set of mechanisms for environmental access to justice, including constitutional actions (mandado de segurança, ação popular)²¹, public civil actions (ação civil pública)²² and consent decrees (termos de ajustamento de conduta)²³, complemented by criminal proceedings under the Environmental Crimes Law²⁴. These mechanisms are further described in Section IV below.

(iv) Protection of environmental defenders: Brazil lacks a comprehensive, specific legal instrument for the protection of environmental defenders. The federal Programme for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, Communicators and Environmentalists (PPDDH) exists but has been criticised for limited coverage, funding and coordination.²⁵ The absence of Escazú ratification leaves an important normative gap on this fourth pillar.

Institutional landscape for nature crime #

Brazil’s environmental enforcement landscape combines a federal structure (with shared competences between the Union, States and Municipalities) with specialised federal agencies for monitoring, licensing and protected areas. The principal bodies mandated with monitoring and enforcing against crimes concerning deforestation, environmental degradation and attacks on defenders are grouped below by function.

A. Monitoring, licensing, and administrative enforcement #

These bodies are responsible for compliance monitoring, inspections, licensing and administrative sanctions.

Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis – IBAMA): The principal federal executive agency of the National Environmental System. IBAMA conducts inspections, issues infraction notices and applies administrative sanctions including fines, seizures, embargoes and suspensions. It operates rapid-response enforcement architecture that can halt ongoing harm (e.g. through embargoes on deforested areas) and is a key referrer of cases for criminal investigation. IBAMA data (e.g. embargo lists, satellite-based deforestation alerts from DETER/PRODES) are routinely used as pre-constituted evidence in judicial proceedings.

Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation (Instituto Chico Mendes de Conservação da Biodiversidade – ICMBio): Federal agency responsible for the management of federal protected areas. ICMBio conducts oversight within conservation units, issues sanctions for violations within these areas and coordinates with IBAMA and the police on enforcement actions.

State Environmental Secretariats (Secretarias Estaduais de Meio Ambiente — SEMA). State-level environmental authorities with competence for licensing, monitoring and sanctioning within their jurisdictions. Combined with IBAMA, SEMAs provide the core administrative enforcement structure and can issue embargoes, fines and equipment seizures.

National Indigenous People Foundation (Fundação Nacional dos Povos Indígenas – FUNAI): Federal indigenous affairs agency, competent for the demarcation and protection of indigenous lands. FUNAI plays a central role in the defence of indigenous territories, including supporting enforcement action against illegal mining, logging and invasions.

Rural Environmental Registry (Cadastro Ambiental Rural – CAR): A georeferenced national registry of rural properties that is essential for monitoring Forest Code compliance, environmental licensing and access to rural credit. It enables targeted inspections, embargoes and the attribution of environmental liabilities to specific properties.

B. Policy and strategic coordination #

These institutions define environmental policy, regulatory frameworks and overall governance strategies.

Ministry of Environment and Climate Change (Ministério do Meio Ambiente e Mudança do Clima – MMA): Sets national environmental policy, coordinates the National Environmental System (SISNAMA) and oversees the implementation of flagship plans such as the Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAm).

National Environmental Council (Conselho Nacional do Meio Ambiente – CONAMA): The main consultative and deliberative body of SISNAMA, which adopts resolutions and norms on environmental matters with participation of the federal government, states, municipalities and civil society.

C. Criminal investigation and enforcement #

These institutions are responsible for investigating and prosecuting environmental crimes.

Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministério Público). Acts as custodian of the law, conducts civil inquiries (an inquisitorial instrument for investigation), proposes Consent Decrees (Termo de Ajustamento de Conduta – TAC), and holds exclusive standing for criminal proceedings in environmental matters. The Public Prosecutor’s Office may be Federal (MPF) or State (MPE), with jurisdictional conflicts of competence being common. The Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPF) has competence for crimes affecting the Union, indigenous communities, or those transcending state boundaries.

Federal Police (Polícia Federal) and State Military/Civil Police, including Environmental Police units. Responsible for criminal investigations, field operations and coordination with environmental authorities. The Federal Police conducts large-scale operations against illegal gold mining, deforestation and organised environmental crime, often in coordination with IBAMA and the Brazilian Armed Forces.

D. Oversight and access to justice #

These institutions contribute to accountability by receiving complaints, conducting oversight and facilitating access to justice.

Public Defender’s Office (Defensoria Pública): Provides legal representation to vulnerable populations, including communities affected by environmental harm, and has standing to file certain collective actions, including public civil actions (ação civil pública).

Federal Court of Accounts (Tribunal de Contas da União — TCU): Exercises external oversight of the use of public resources, including audits of environmental policy and enforcement programmes.

Legal routes available for civil society #

A. Categories of nature crimes #

Two key legal instruments regulate nature crimes and environmental protection under Brazilian law:

Law No. 12,651 of 2012 — Forest Code²⁶. The Forest Code is the foundation of Brazil’s forest governance and is regarded as one of the most comprehensive forest laws in the world. It establishes strict requirements for the maintenance of Legal Reserves and Permanent Preservation Areas (APPs). Deforestation is illegal where it takes place outside those rules and limits. Compliance is monitored through the Rural Environmental Registry (CAR), a georeferenced database that links property boundaries to environmental liabilities and enables targeted inspections and embargoes. The 2012 revision of the Forest Code introduced significant amnesties for deforestation that occurred prior to 22 July 2008, reducing the area subject to mandatory restoration and fuelling ongoing debate about the balance between environmental protection and rural development. Restoration obligations apply where (i) the area was illegally cleared, (ii) the deforestation occurred after 22 July 2008, and (iii) the land has not been regularised through the Environmental Regularisation Programme (PRA).

Law No. 9,605 of 1998 – Environmental Crimes Law²⁷. The principal criminal statute for environmental protection. It establishes three categories of offences: crimes against fauna, crimes against flora, and pollution and other environmental crimes. The law provides for both administrative and criminal penalties, with liability extending to both individuals and legal entities. Penalties can be aggravated for crimes committed in protected areas and in cases of recidivism. Illustrative offences include:

• Destroying or damaging a forest within a Permanent Preservation Area — 1 to 3 years imprisonment and/or a fine.

• Causing pollution of any kind at levels resulting in harm to human health, death of animals or significant destruction of flora — imprisonment and/or fines, with aggravated penalties in serious cases.

• Crimes against fauna, including illegal hunting, fishing and trade in protected species.

The law is frequently applied in the Amazon context, where illegal deforestation and land grabbing are often linked to organised criminal networks that use document fraud, intimidation and violence.

B. Routes for legal action #

The legal routes available to CSOs and indigenous communities to defend against nature crimes fall into four broad categories: constitutional mechanisms, criminal proceedings, public civil actions, and administrative mechanisms, complemented by international mechanisms. In practice, these mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and are often used in combination, depending on the objective pursued (e.g. immediate suspension of activities, criminal accountability, or environmental restoration).

1. Judicial Mechanisms #

Judicial mechanisms provide formal avenues to seek accountability, reparation and the protection of environmental and constitutional rights. They allow CSOs and affected communities to escalate environmental harm beyond administrative processes, particularly in cases involving significant damage, rights violations or lack of effective governmental response.

a. Constitutional Mechanisms #

The Brazilian Constitution provides two constitutional actions of particular relevance to environmental protection: the writ of security (mandado de segurança) and the popular action (ação popular).

Writ of security (Mandado de segurança). The mandado de segurança is designed to protect constitutional rights against illegal acts or omissions by public authorities, and provides for expeditious interim relief. In the environmental context, it may be used, for example, to challenge an unlawful environmental licence issued by a public authority. Legal standing is granted to individuals, political parties represented in Congress, unions, class entities, and associations with at least one year of legal existence.

Popular action (Ação popular). Any citizen may file a popular action to challenge acts that are harmful to the environment, administrative morality or public assets. Standing is restricted to Brazilian citizens as individuals; legal entities and CSOs as such cannot bring popular actions, although they frequently support citizen-plaintiffs.

b. Criminal Proceedings #

Criminal proceedings are governed by the Criminal Code (Código Penal), the Criminal Procedure Code (Código de Processo Penal) and, for environmental offences, by the Environmental Crimes Law. Prosecutions are brought by the Ministério Público (Federal or State, depending on jurisdiction).

Individuals and CSOs may file criminal complaints to the Federal or State Police, the Ministério Público, or authorised agencies such as IBAMA (which has a mandate for administrative enforcement and referral of cases for criminal prosecution). Where administrative action is delayed or insufficient, cases can be escalated to the Federal or State Ministério Público, which may seek injunctive relief, criminal prosecution of perpetrators, court-ordered restoration and structural remedies.

Enforcement of environmental criminal law remains a key challenge. A study by Imazon of 3,551 lawsuits brought by the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office showed that although convictions increased from 2017 to 2020, only 5% of cases resulted in compensation being paid, and by December 2023 only 57% of the total had resulted in criminal sentences²⁸. These figures illustrate a persistent gap between formal accountability and effective reparation.

c. Public Civil Actions #

The public civil action (ação civil pública) is one of the most powerful tools for environmental protection in Brazil. It is a collective judicial action available for the protection of diffuse and collective rights, including environmental protection, consumer rights and public interests. Legal standing is limited to certain entities, including the Ministério Público, the Defensoria Pública, trade unions, and associations established at least one year before the lawsuit whose statutory purposes include the defence of public interests or the environment.

Remedies include injunctive relief and interlocutory measures, taking the form of mandatory orders compelling the defendant to perform an obligation (obrigação de fazer) or to refrain from engaging in unlawful or harmful conduct (obrigação de não fazer), as well as civil compensation for collective damages. Courts have consistently applied strict liability and propter rem liability (attaching environmental obligations to the property itself, binding on successive owners), particularly in cases involving protected areas and federal environmental assets. The public civil action is particularly effective for addressing large-scale or systemic environmental harm, such as illegal deforestation, illegal mining and environmental harm in protected areas.

2. Administrative Mechanisms #

Administrative actions include sanctioning procedures for environmental infractions, the issuance of embargoes and fines, and the possibility to challenge environmental licences, permits or authorisations issued by public authorities. A distinctive feature of the Brazilian system is the consent decree (termo de ajustamento de conduta — TAC), a formal and binding agreement proposed by the Ministério Público or other legitimate bodies, whereby responsible parties assume reparation obligations in an alternative, consensual dispute resolution framework within the administrative sphere.

CSOs and affected parties can engage the relevant administrative bodies (described in Sections III.A and III.D) through the procedures summarised below.

Case examples of successful litigation #

IBAMA v. Kruger (Amazonas Federal Court, 2024)29 A landmark public civil action brought by IBAMA, represented by the Attorney General of Brazil, against a cattle rancher previously fined for illegal deforestation using fire. The Attorney General argued that the defendant’s actions severely undermined the Amazon’s function as a carbon sink, thereby accelerating the climate crisis. The Amazonas Federal Court ruled in favour of IBAMA, ordering the defendant to pay R$292,118,400 (approximately US$53 million) in damages, equivalent to the cost of the carbon emitted by his illegal actions. The Court also ordered the defendant’s assets to be frozen, banned him from receiving government finance or tax benefits, and prohibited him from selling cattle and agricultural products and from purchasing machinery such as chainsaws and tractors.

Use of remote sensing evidence in nature crime prosecution #

CSOs play a central role in generating and structuring evidence of environmental harm, particularly through remote sensing technologies such as satellite imagery, geospatial mapping and digital monitoring tools. This evidence is incorporated into legal proceedings through multiple evidentiary forms, although the degree to which it is accepted by public authorities depends on the evidentiary requirements and technical standards established within national legal and institutional frameworks.

In Brazil, the use of satellite, drone, acoustic and even environmental DNA (eDNA) evidence is currently being contested through the legislative bodies. Although the formal recognition of remote sensing evidence was reinforced by CNJ Resolution No. 433/2021, issued by the National Council of Justice, encouraging the use of geotechnologies in environmental cases, this model is now contested by a bill (PL 2.564/2025) approved by the Chamber of Deputies. If approved, the new law would bar federal regulators from embargoing deforested areas on the basis of remote detection alone, requiring prior on-site verification and a right of reply. This marks legislative pressure against the satellite-based enforcement on which Brazil’s leading position partly rests.

• Legal framework: Admissibility is assessed under the general evidentiary regime of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Code of Criminal Procedure, grounded in the principle of freedom of proof and judicial evaluation of evidence under rules of sound judgment. CNJ Resolution No. 433/2021 consolidates the judicial acceptance of geotechnologies and encourages their use in environmental cases, provided the underlying data is validated by an expert.

• Court acceptance: Satellite imagery from governmental systems such as PRODES and DETER, operated by the National Institute for Space Research (INPE), as well as CSO-generated data (e.g. MapBiomas, Monitor da Fiscalização), have been successfully used in both public civil actions and criminal proceedings. Brazilian courts have applied strict liability when evaluating such evidence, particularly in cases affecting protected areas and federal environmental assets.

• Technical standards: Evidentiary integrity is safeguarded through general procedural rules and, in practice, through evidence-control protocols applied by IBAMA, ICMBio, the Federal Police and the Ministério Público. For remote sensing evidence, the following practices reduce admissibility risks:

  • Source identification: clear identification of the platform or provider (state entity or recognised provider), date/time, area of interest and method of acquisition;

  • Metadata preservation: retaining original files and metadata where available, and documenting each processing step;

  • Reproducibility: preserving the workflow so an independent expert could reproduce the same outputs from the same source data;

  • Integrity documentation: an evidence log documenting who handled the digital files, where they were stored, how they were transferred, and what controls were used to prevent tampering.

Remote sensing evidence is far more likely to be accepted, and to survive adversarial scrutiny, when it is (i) accompanied by a formal expert report, (ii) supported by institutional records (e.g. IBAMA or INPE data), and (iii) corroborated by field verification or police inspection where feasible.

Case example — use of remote sensing evidence in litigation #

Superior Court of Justice Acceptance (2019) # The Superior Court of Justice (STJ) confirmed that satellite imagery can be used to prove illegal deforestation. The decision stressed that, given the scale of Brazil’s ecosystems, monitoring them without tools like satellites and drones would be impossible. The court also recognised that satellite maps provide precise, geo-referenced evidence, showing exactly where and how much forest was cleared.30 The same approach has been taken by the Supreme Federal Court (STF).31

The Federal Attorney General’s Office – Public Civil Action (2025)32 The Federal Attorney has filed a lawsuit seeking R$725 million in compensation for environmental damage to the Pantanal (wetland), located in Mato Grosso. The public civil action seeks compensation from three offenders accused of using chain saws and setting forest fires to clear approximately 6,400 hectares. The lawsuit includes reports and photographs documenting the environmental damage inflicted since 2020. In addition to civil liability, the defendants are expected to be held accountable for damages in criminal and administrative proceedings. The AG’s office has also requested to freeze the defendant’s assets and mandate the development of a plan to restore the degraded areas.

Challenges in engagement with authorities #

Engagement between CSOs and public authorities in Brazil is constrained by structural, procedural and political barriers that weaken accountability efforts. Although formal channels are comparatively well developed, they often fail to translate into timely or proportionate enforcement outcomes.

Weak enforcement outcomes reduce deterrence. The Imazon analysis of 3,551 lawsuits brought by the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office found that only 5% of cases resulted in compensation being paid, and by December 2023 only 57% had resulted in criminal sentences. This persistent gap between investigation and effective accountability undermines the deterrent effect of the enforcement architecture.³³

Jurisdictional conflicts and institutional fragmentation. The division of competences between the Federal and State Ministérios Públicos, and between federal (IBAMA, ICMBio) and state authorities (SEMA), frequently gives rise to jurisdictional conflicts and coordination challenges. Variability in state-level capacity, combined with the sheer scale of the Legal Amazon, creates uneven enforcement outcomes across regions.³⁴

Policy reversals and Forest Code amnesties. The 2012 revision of the Forest Code introduced significant amnesties for deforestation occurring prior to 2008, reducing the area subject to mandatory restoration and signalling the possibility of future amnesties. Policy discontinuity between administrations (e.g. weakening and subsequent rebuilding of IBAMA’s enforcement capacity, and of PPCDAm implementation) has repeatedly disrupted the continuity of enforcement action.³⁵

Violence and threats against defenders. Brazil is the second-deadliest country in the world for environmental defenders, with 413 killings and disappearances since 2012.³⁶ Domestic monitoring by Terra de Direitos, Justiça Global, CPT and CIMI indicates that violence is particularly concentrated in the Legal Amazon and in rural conflict zones. This environment discourages CSOs from engaging in the most sensitive cases, raises the costs of advocacy, and constrains the willingness of witnesses and communities to provide evidence. The federal Programme for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders has limited coverage and funding.

Political interference and criminalisation. Powerful economic sectors linked to agribusiness, cattle ranching, logging and illegal mining exert significant political influence over environmental legislation and enforcement. CSOs engaged in sensitive cases, particularly at subnational level, face risks of strategic litigation against public participation (SLAPPs), administrative harassment and reputational attacks.³⁷

Procedural barriers and litigation timelines. Judicial proceedings, particularly public civil actions, can last many years, which weakens the deterrent effect of sanctions and complicates restoration. While interim measures (injunctions and embargoes) can effectively halt ongoing harm, their issuance and enforcement remain uneven across courts and regions.³⁸

Conclusion & recommendations #

Brazil has one of the most sophisticated legal and institutional frameworks in the Amazon region for civil society engagement on nature crime, combining a robust constitutional basis, a powerful public civil action, a well-resourced federal environmental enforcement architecture (IBAMA, ICMBio, Federal Police), and a dense ecosystem of technical CSOs capable of generating and institutionalising monitoring data. Landmark decisions such as IBAMA v. Kruger illustrate how these tools can, when properly combined, produce some of the most ambitious environmental accountability outcomes in the region. At the same time, persistent enforcement gaps, policy discontinuity, jurisdictional fragmentation and high levels of violence against defenders constrain the effectiveness of the system. The non-ratification of the Escazú Agreement leaves an important normative gap, particularly with respect to the protection of environmental defenders. Strengthening environmental accountability in Brazil therefore requires both the consolidation of institutional capacity and sustained investment in the security, technical capacity and legal support of civil society actors.

1. Strengthen institutional capacity and coordination. Consolidate the enforcement capacity of IBAMA, ICMBio and the Federal Police; reinforce specialised environmental units within the Federal and State Ministérios Públicos and the judiciary; address jurisdictional conflicts between federal and state competences through clearer protocols; and strengthen coordination between environmental, criminal and financial authorities to dismantle the economic chains behind illegal deforestation, mining and land grabbing.

2. Ratify the Escazú Agreement and strengthen defender protection. Ratify and implement the Escazú Agreement, with particular focus on the fourth pillar on environmental defenders. Expand and adequately fund the federal Programme for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, Communicators and Environmentalists, ensuring coverage in the Legal Amazon; and develop tailored protocols for defenders operating in high-risk contexts such as illegal gold mining, invasions of indigenous territories and land-grabbing frontiers.

3. Enhance access to environmental information and transparency. Build on Law 12,527 of 2011 and the Rural Environmental Registry (CAR) to strengthen the interoperability of environmental data systems at federal, state and municipal level; systematically publish sanction, embargo and licensing data in machine-readable formats; and support civil society transparency platforms such as Monitor da Fiscalização and MapBiomas as public goods for environmental accountability.

4. Strengthen evidentiary frameworks for remote sensing. Build on CNJ Resolution No. 433/2021 by developing detailed protocols for the admissibility and technical validation of geospatial evidence; institutionalise cooperation agreements between technical CSOs and public authorities (e.g. IBAMA, the Federal Police and the Ministério Público); and reinforce the capacity of judges, prosecutors and investigators to evaluate satellite, drone, acoustic and eDNA evidence.

5. Improve sanction effectiveness and target enforcement on key economic actors. Ensure that enforcement under the Environmental Crimes Law and the Forest Code targets the financial and organisational chains behind large-scale deforestation and illegal mining, rather than focusing disproportionately on small-scale actors; expand the use of public civil actions and consent decrees to combine criminal sanctions with effective restoration and monetary compensation tied to climate harm; and avoid policy measures that undermine accountability through recurring amnesties.

Colombia #

Status of CSOs, protection and transparency #

As of 2025, CSOs in Colombia operate within a formally stable legal framework that recognizes fundamental rights such as freedom of association, expression, and participation, as established in the 1991 Constitution. However, this formal recognition coexists with a complex and often restrictive operational environment that limits their autonomy and effectiveness in practice.

On the regulatory side, the framework remains fragmented and, in some respects, underdeveloped. A key concern is Article 77 of the 2022–2026 National Development Plan, which introduces registration and reporting obligations that may lead to the automatic dissolution of organizations that fail to comply. Although this provision has not yet been fully regulated, its potential implementation continues to generate uncertainty, particularly due to the risk of disproportionate administrative burdens and discretionary enforcement. These concerns are especially acute for grassroots, territorial, and ethnic organizations, which often lack the technical and financial capacity to meet such requirements.³⁹

At the same time, there have been selective institutional advances. Notably, Decree 1229 of 2025 reformed the National Planning System following a participatory process involving civil society and territorial actors. This reform aims to strengthen citizen participation in public planning processes and improve coordination across different levels of government, opening new opportunities for CSO engagement in decision-making.

Despite these developments, significant barriers persist. Administrative requirements are inconsistently applied, and limited institutional capacity further complicates compliance, particularly for smaller organizations. Moreover, the broader political context, marked by polarization and the approach of the 2026 elections, has constrained progress on deeper structural reforms to enhance civic space.⁴⁰

Implementation of the Escazú Agreement #

The Escazú Agreement, adopted in 2018 under the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, establishes binding obligations to strengthen environmental democracy through four pillars: access to environmental information, public participation, access to justice, and the protection of environmental defenders.

Colombia ratified the Escazú Agreement and incorporated it into domestic law in 2022, marking a significant normative commitment. Implementation across the four pillars is uneven, reflecting both Colombia’s pre-existing legal architecture and persistent operational gaps.

(i) Access to environmental information. Colombia has a relatively well-developed information access regime, including Law 1712 of 2014 on Transparency and Access to Public Information. Environmental authorities such as the National Authority of Environmental Licences (ANLA) maintain online portals for complaints and licence tracking⁴¹. However, uneven local enforcement, resource constraints and fragmented data systems limit the practical usability of this framework, particularly at subnational level.

(ii) Public participation in environmental decision-making. Participation mechanisms are embedded in Colombian environmental law, including through prior consultation rights for indigenous and Afro-descendent communities under ILO Convention 169 and domestic jurisprudence. Recent judicial decisions, such as the 2024 ruling suspending the Uchuva-2 gas well for lack of prior consultation, confirm the justiciability of these participation rights.

Check box below about the case example of Uchuva-2 Gas Well in Colombia for more details on the obligation of community participation.

(iii) Access to justice. The Colombian legal system offers a particularly rich set of mechanisms for CSOs and communities to seek environmental justice, including constitutional actions (tutela, acción popular, acción de cumplimiento), civil class actions (acción de grupo), contentious administrative litigation, and criminal complaints. These are further described in Section IV below.

(iv) Protection of environmental defenders. While Colombia has adopted several protection programmes, including the National Protection Unit (UNP)⁴², their reach and effectiveness remain limited given the scale of violence. With 501 killings from 2012 to 2024, Colombia has the highest number of reported environmental defender killings globally on record⁴³. The country’s persistently high toll of murdered defenders underscores the gap between formal protection frameworks and on-the-ground realities, making this the most fragile Escazú pillar in practice.

Institutional landscape for nature crime #

Colombia’s environmental enforcement landscape is characterised by a multi-level institutional architecture combining national, regional and local bodies, with specialised criminal investigation capacity at the Attorney General’s Office. The principal bodies mandated with monitoring and enforcing against crimes concerning deforestation, environmental degradation and attacks on defenders are grouped below by function.

A. Monitoring, licensing, and administrative enforcement #

These bodies are responsible for compliance monitoring, inspections, licensing and administrative sanctions.

National Authority of Environmental Licences (Autoridad Nacional de Licencias Ambientales – ANLA). The ANLA is the licensing authority for projects and activities of national environmental relevance (e.g. large infrastructure, hydrocarbons, energy and mining projects). It processes licence applications, conducts compliance monitoring and handles sanctioning procedures. CSOs can file complaints and reports of violations through its online forms, making it a key administrative entry point for environmental accountability.

Regional Autonomous Corporations (Corporaciones Autónomas Regionales – CARs). Decentralised public agencies responsible for environmental management and enforcement at the regional level. CARs issue environmental permits and licences for projects within their jurisdictions, conduct inspections, adopt precautionary measures and impose administrative sanctions. Their proximity to local realities makes them strategic interlocutors for CSOs, although capacity and enforcement effectiveness vary considerably across regions.

Local Environmental Authorities. Municipal-level authorities handle local enforcement and inspections, complementing the action of the CARs in urban and peri-urban contexts.

National Natural Parks of Colombia (Parques Nacionales Naturales de Colombia). Responsible for administering, supervising and protecting the national protected-area system. It monitors activities inside national parks and other protected territories, adopts management plans and supports enforcement against illegal deforestation, mining and other activities occurring within these areas.

B. Policy and strategic coordination #

These institutions define environmental policy, regulatory frameworks and overall governance strategies.

Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible). Sets national environmental policy, coordinates the National Environmental System (SINA), and oversees regulation of key areas such as forests, biodiversity, water resources and climate change. It provides the policy framework within which ANLA, CARs and other environmental authorities operate.

C. Criminal investigation and enforcement #

These institutions are responsible for investigating and prosecuting environmental crimes.

Attorney General’s Office (Fiscalía General de la Nación). Investigates and prosecutes environmental crimes. Following the 2021 Environmental Crimes Law, a Specialised Directorate for Crimes against Natural Resources and the Environment was established within the Fiscalía, providing a dedicated unit for the investigation of complex environmental cases. Any individual, CSO or community may file a criminal complaint for environmental offences, including illegal deforestation, environmental pollution, illegal mining and crimes against environmental defenders.

Environmental Police and specialised enforcement units. Colombian enforcement relies on a combination of environmental police and multi-agency operational deployments, including, in recent years, military operations targeting deforestation and illegal mining. These operations have produced mixed results and have drawn criticism where they have focused on smallholder farmers rather than the larger economic actors financing deforestation.

D. Oversight and access to justice #

These institutions contribute to accountability by receiving complaints, conducting oversight and facilitating access to justice.

Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo). Receives complaints concerning environmental and human rights violations, monitors compliance with environmental rulings, and may file acciones populares on behalf of communities. The Ombudsman has played a significant role in cases involving environmental defenders and communities affected by extractive activities.

Office of the Inspector General (Procuraduría General de la Nación). Exercises disciplinary and preventive oversight over public officials and has used administrative non-compliance mechanisms to compel State compliance with environmental mandates, including under the 2018 climate action framework.

Legal routes available for civil society #

A. Categories of nature crimes #

Environmental crimes in Colombia are principally defined under Law 2111 of 2021 (the Environmental Crimes Law), which replaced Title XI of the Criminal Code and amended the Criminal Procedure Code, making penalties and sanctions more severe for crimes affecting the environment. The law establishes, among others, the following standalone offences:

Illegal deforestation – the clearing of forests in violation of applicable authorisations and environmental regulations – 5 years to 12 years

Ecocide – large-scale, systematic or massive destruction of ecosystems causing serious and lasting environmental harm – 5 years to 11 years and a fine

Illegal mining – the exploitation of mineral resources without the required authorisations or in protected areas – 2 years and a half to 12 years and a fine

Wildlife trafficking – the illegal capture, trade and transport of protected species.

Environmental pollution – acts of contamination of air, water and soil causing significant damage to ecosystems and public health – 5 years to 12 years and a fine

Financing of environmental crimes – promotion, financing or facilitating the burning, cutting, uprooting or destruction of areas equal or bigger than one hectare of natural forest – 12 years to 15 years and a fine

A 2024 report published by Colombia’s Ministry of Justice⁴⁴ identified the three most frequently reported environmental crimes as: (i) illegal exploitation of renewable natural resources (823 records), (ii) environmental pollution (237 records), and (iii) environmental pollution caused by mining or hydrocarbon exploitation. Between 2018 and 2024, the Attorney General’s Office reported 2,376 criminal investigations related to environmental crimes in the Amazon region, of which only 147 resulted in a conviction, underscoring a significant enforcement gap.

B. Routes for legal action #

The legal routes available to CSOs and indigenous communities to defend against nature crimes fall into four broad categories: constitutional mechanisms, criminal proceedings, civil actions, and administrative mechanisms, complemented by international mechanisms. In practice, these mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and are often used in combination, depending on the objective pursued (e.g. immediate suspension of activities, criminal accountability, or environmental restoration).

1. Judicial Mechanisms #

Judicial mechanisms provide formal avenues to seek accountability, reparation and the protection of environmental and constitutional rights. They allow CSOs and affected communities to escalate environmental harm beyond administrative processes, particularly in cases involving significant damage, rights violations or lack of effective governmental response.

a. Constitutional Mechanisms #

The Colombian Constitution establishes three constitutional actions of particular relevance to environmental protection: the acción de tutela, the acción popular and the acción de cumplimiento.

Constitutional action for the protection of fundamental rights (Acción de tutela). The tutela is designed to provide urgent protection of fundamental rights threatened by State or private actors, including in cases where nature crime or environmental harm endangers rights to life, health, water or a healthy environment. It is available to any person or representative, including entities and communities, and Colombian jurisprudence has recognised standing for guardianship on behalf of nature itself. Judges are required to decide on a tutela swiftly, typically within 10 days. The tutela is particularly effective where environmental harm presents an urgent threat to human rights, as it enables rapid precautionary and structural measures.

See case box below on the case “Future Generations v. Ministry of Environment (2018)” for an exemplification.

Popular action (Acción popular). The acción popular is a legal action for the protection of collective rights and interests, including the right to a healthy environment. CSOs and indigenous communities may seek precautionary measures against activities that threaten collective rights, orders to cease harmful activities (e.g. illegal mining or deforestation), restorative measures and collective reparation. Colombian law provides broad standing: any person, CSO, community or the Public Ministry may file a popular action, without having to demonstrate personal harm.

Compliance action (Acción de cumplimiento). The acción de cumplimiento is designed to compel public authorities to enforce laws and comply with their administrative duties (e.g. enforcement of forest, mining and water rules, or climate and deforestation plans). Legal standing is broad, allowing any individual or entity with a legitimate interest to demand compliance. Filing a request or complaint with the relevant authority is typically a prerequisite.

b. Criminal Proceedings #

Following the adoption of the 2021 Environmental Crimes Law and the creation of the Specialised Directorate for Crimes against Natural Resources and the Environment within the Attorney General’s Office, any individual, CSO or community may file a criminal complaint (denuncia) regarding environmental crimes such as illegal deforestation, pollution, illegal mining, environmental damage and crimes against environmental activists (e.g. personal injuries or homicide).

Despite these normative advances, enforcement of the law faces significant practical obstacles. Prosecutors and judges frequently lack specialised expertise in investigating environmental crimes. Civil society organisations and human rights groups have also raised concerns about corruption and selective enforcement, noting that the law may be applied disproportionately against smallholder farmers along the agricultural frontier rather than against the economic and financial actors driving large-scale deforestation.⁴⁵

c. Civil Actions #

Class actions (Acción de grupo). Class action lawsuits have long been available in Colombia to groups of at least 20 persons seeking collective redress for damages suffered. This action may be used to seek reparation for harms caused by environmental crimes, such as pollution and deforestation, where the claimant group can demonstrate that its members were similarly affected by the same harmful event.

d. Contentious Administrative Litigation #

Administrative mechanisms are available for disputes involving public entities and challenges to administrative acts. CSOs and indigenous communities may file legal challenges before Colombian administrative courts against unlawful licences and permits, as well as sanctions issued by environmental authorities. Applicants may request the nullification of unlawful licences, the suspension of extractive projects that breach environmental norms or bypass consultation, and orders requiring public authorities to adopt precautionary measures. Legal standing is broad and CSOs are commonly admitted as claimants. A recent successful example is the 2024 ruling suspending operations at the Uchuva-2 gas well, where the court held that the project had been developed without prior consultation with affected indigenous peoples.

2. Administrative Mechanisms #

Administrative actions include complaints to environmental authorities, requests for initiation of sanctioning procedures, and challenges to environmental licences, permits or authorisations. These mechanisms allow for the suspension, modification or annulment of administrative decisions, and can both halt ongoing environmental harm and create an official record to support further judicial or criminal action.

CSOs and affected parties can engage the relevant administrative bodies (described in Sections III.A and III.D) through the procedures summarised below.

Case examples of successful litigation #

Future Generations v. Ministry of Environment (2018)46 A tutela action brought by 25 young claimants challenged the Colombian government’s failure to protect the Amazon rainforest from deforestation, alleging that their fundamental rights were threatened as a result. The Supreme Court of Justice ruled in favour of the claimants, recognising the direct link between deforestation, climate change and the fundamental rights to life, health and a healthy environment for present and future generations. The Court further declared the Colombian Amazon a “subject of rights,” entitled to protection, conservation, maintenance and restoration, and ordered the government to design and implement action plans to reduce deforestation and to develop an Intergenerational Pact for the Life of the Colombian Amazon.

Uchuva-2 gas well (2024)47 On September 11, 2024, a Colombian court ordered the immediate suspension of all exploration and exploitation activities at the Uchuva-2 offshore gas well, operated jointly by Ecopetrol and Petrobras in the Caribbean Sea, after finding that the project had been developed without proper prior consultation with the Indigenous community of Taganga. The ruling explicitly acknowledged the fundamental rights of the Taganga community to prior consultation, due process, and the protection of their intellectual, cultural, and environmental heritage, and ordered the Ministry of Culture to collaborate with the Taganga Indigenous Council to create a plan to safeguard cultural practices and traditional knowledge related to maritime environments. The suspension was subsequently partially overturned on appeal, with the Santa Marta Tribunal ordering the Ministry of Interior to assess the necessity of a prior consultation process within one month.

Use of remote sensing evidence in nature crime prosecution #

CSOs play a central role in generating and structuring evidence of environmental harm, particularly through remote sensing technologies such as satellite imagery, geospatial mapping and digital monitoring tools. This evidence is incorporated into legal proceedings through multiple evidentiary forms, although the degree to which it is accepted by public authorities depends on the evidentiary requirements and technical standards established within national legal and institutional frameworks.

In Colombia, remote sensing evidence is accepted under general evidentiary rules and has been used successfully to support both administrative and judicial actions, particularly in cases involving illegal mining, deforestation and permitting irregularities affecting protected areas, water sources and indigenous territories.

• Legal framework. Colombia does not have a specific legal provision regulating the admissibility of remote sensing evidence. In practice, admissibility is assessed under the general evidentiary regime of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Code of Administrative Procedure, grounded in freedom of proof and judicial evaluation of evidence under rules of sound judgment. Any evidence must satisfy legality requirements and be incorporated into the process in accordance with applicable procedural rules.

• Court acceptance. Colombian courts accept geospatial and scientific data when properly authenticated. Illegal mining, illegal deforestation and permitting irregularities endangering protected areas, water sources and community health are commonly addressed with success when supported by strong technical records, including satellite monitoring, drone imagery and expert analyses. This strengthens requests for interim relief and restoration orders and is particularly effective in cases affecting indigenous territories, rivers and forests.

• Technical standards. Evidentiary integrity is safeguarded through general criminal and administrative procedure rules, and through practical evidence-control protocols. For remote sensing evidence, the following practices reduce admissibility risks:

  • Source identification: clear identification of the platform or provider (state entity or recognised provider), date/time, area of interest and method of acquisition;

  • Metadata preservation: retaining original files and metadata where available, and documenting each processing step;

  • Reproducibility: preserving the workflow so an independent expert could reproduce the same outputs from the same source data;

  • Integrity documentation: an evidence log documenting who handled the digital files, where they were stored, how they were transferred, and what controls were used to prevent tampering.

Colombian jurisprudence confirms that remote sensing evidence is far more likely to be accepted, and to survive adversarial scrutiny, when it is (i) accompanied by a formal expert report, (ii) supported by institutional records, and (iii) corroborated by field verification or police inspection where feasible. The assembly of community mandates, administrative files and expert reports early in a case has been identified as a key factor in obtaining robust judicial responses.

Case example – use of remote sensing evidence in litigation #

Centro de Estudios para la Justicia Social Tierra Digna and others v. Colombia (T-622/2016, Constitutional Court, 10 November 2016)48 In January 2015, Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities living alongside the Atrato River, represented by Tierra Digna, filed an acción de tutela against the Presidency and more than two dozen state institutions, arguing that by allowing illegal mechanised gold mining to continue the government was violating their rights to life, health, water, food security, and cultural and territorial integrity. Satellite imagery produced by University of Portsmouth researchers working with ABColombia documented that since 2014 some 17 km² of rainforest on the Río Quito tributary had been destroyed by illegal mining, providing spatially explicit evidence of the rate and geographic extent of the destruction. In November 2016, the Constitutional Court declared the Atrato River a legal subject with rights to protection, conservation, maintenance and restoration, finding that the state had failed to take effective measures to stop illegal mining and had thereby caused a serious humanitarian and environmental crisis. The case’s contribution to remote sensing extends beyond the initial ruling: during the pandemic, satellite mapping data was transmitted to the Court’s own Comité de Seguimiento, enabling it to question the Ministry of Defence directly on actions to dismantle mining operations and documenting a rapid increase in mining activity. The case demonstrates that satellite evidence can serve both as a litigation instrument and as a tool for ongoing judicial compliance monitoring.

Challenges in engagement with authorities #

Engagement between CSOs and public authorities in Colombia is constrained by structural, procedural and security-related barriers that weaken accountability efforts. Although formal legal channels are comparatively well developed, they often fail to translate into timely or effective enforcement.

Weak enforcement outcomes reduce deterrence. There is a marked gap between the scale of environmental harm and the number of effective sanctions. Between 2018 and 2024, only 147 convictions were recorded out of 2,376 criminal investigations relating to environmental crimes in the Amazon region⁴⁹. Limited specialised capacity within prosecutors’ offices and courts, combined with the complexity of environmental cases, contributes to this enforcement gap.

Limited institutional capacity and fragmentation. Environmental authorities, prosecutors and courts frequently lack the technical expertise required to investigate and adjudicate complex environmental crimes, particularly those involving geospatial evidence and organised criminal networks. Responsibility is distributed across national, regional and local bodies (ANLA, CARs, Parques Nacionales, municipal authorities), with uneven coordination and significant variation in enforcement effectiveness across regions.

Security risks and violence against defenders are a defining feature of the Colombian context. Colombia remains the deadliest country in the world for environmental defenders, with hundreds of killings recorded since 2012. This environment of violence discourages CSOs from engaging in sensitive cases, increases the costs of advocacy, and constrains the willingness of witnesses and communities to provide evidence. Existing protection schemes, such as the National Protection Unit (UNP), have struggled to keep pace with the scale of the threat.

Political interference, corruption and selective enforcement further undermine engagement. Powerful sectors linked to illegal mining, agribusiness, logging and armed groups exercise significant influence over local authorities and enforcement bodies. CSOs and human rights groups have raised concerns that the 2021 Environmental Crimes Law may in practice be used against small-scale actors along the agricultural frontier rather than against the financiers and beneficiaries of large-scale deforestation.

Militarised enforcement with mixed results. In response to international pressure, the Colombian government has launched military operations (e.g. from 2019 onward)⁵⁰ to combat deforestation, illegal mining and wildlife trafficking in the Amazon.⁵¹ These operations have produced some tangible enforcement outcomes but have also drawn criticism for disproportionately targeting smallholder farmers and failing to dismantle the economic chains behind environmental crime.

Procedural barriers, including delays, fragmented data systems and uneven transparency at subnational level, restrict CSOs’ ability to follow cases and sustain engagement over time. Although Colombia has a relatively robust information access regime, in practice access to specific data such as environmental licensing files, mining cadastres and sanctioning records can be slow and uneven, with significant variation between CARs and other authorities.

Conclusion & recommendations #

Colombia has one of the most developed legal frameworks in the Amazon region for civil society engagement on nature crime, combining constitutional actions, criminal mechanisms, civil and administrative avenues with domestic incorporation of the Escazú Agreement. Landmark judicial decisions – recognising the Colombian Amazon and the Atrato River as subjects of rights – have set regionally and internationally significant precedents. At the same time, the gap between formal rights and effective enforcement remains wide, shaped by weak conviction rates, institutional fragmentation, corruption and, critically, by a persistent pattern of violence against environmental defenders. Strengthening environmental accountability in Colombia therefore requires not only institutional reform but also a sustained investment in the security, technical capacity and legal support of civil society actors.

1. Strengthen institutional capacity and specialisation. Build on the creation of the Specialised Directorate for Crimes against Natural Resources and the Environment within the Fiscalía by expanding specialised environmental units in the judiciary and CARs; providing systematic training on the evaluation of scientific and geospatial evidence; and reinforcing inter-institutional coordination between ANLA, CARs, Parques Nacionales, the Fiscalía and environmental police to ensure coherent administrative and criminal responses.

2. Strengthen protection and enabling environment for defenders and CSOs. Reinforce and adequately resource the National Protection Unit and related programmes; develop tailored protection measures for environmental defenders in Amazonian regions and territories affected by illegal economies; and consolidate mechanisms for rapid response to threats, in line with Colombia’s obligations under the Escazú Agreement.

3. Enhance access to environmental information. Build on Law 1712 of 2014 to ensure that environmental licensing files, sanctioning records, mining cadastres and monitoring data are systematically published in machine-readable formats; harmonise information systems across national and regional authorities; and reduce inconsistencies between CARs in the disclosure of environmental information.

4. Strengthen evidentiary frameworks for remote sensing. Institutionalise the FCDS – Fiscalía model by encouraging formal cooperation agreements between technical CSOs and public authorities; develop guidelines or protocols for the admissibility of geospatial evidence; and support the development of in-house capacity within enforcement bodies to interpret and validate satellite and drone data.

5. Improve sanction effectiveness and target enforcement on key economic actors. Ensure that the 2021 Environmental Crimes Law is applied to the financial and organisational chains behind large-scale deforestation and illegal mining, rather than disproportionately to smallholders; strengthen the pursuit of financing offences; and link criminal sanctions more effectively to restoration and remediation obligations in coordination with administrative authorities.

Ecuador #

Status of CSOs, protection and transparency #

Ecuador formally guarantees freedom of association under Article 66(13) of the 2008 Constitution, which recognises the right of persons to associate, gather and demonstrate freely and peacefully. Article 96 further recognises all forms of social organisation as expressions of popular sovereignty and assigns the State the duty to guarantee their legal recognition.⁵²

The regulatory environment for civil society, however, has varied significantly over the last decade. Executive Decree No. 16 of 2013 and Decree No. 739 of 2015 subjected NGOs to a centralised registration regime and granted the Executive broad discretionary powers to dissolve organisations on vague grounds, including interference with public policy. These provisions were criticised internationally and were applied in 2013 to dissolve the environmental organisation Fundación Pachamama shortly after it supported protests against oil expansion in the southern Amazon.⁵³

Executive Decree No. 193 of 2017 and its 2023 reform (Decree No. 648) replaced Decrees 16 and 739, narrowing (although not eliminating) the grounds for administrative de-registration and simplifying registration. CIVICUS Monitor nonetheless continues to classify Ecuador’s civic space as “obstructed”, reflecting ongoing concerns about discretionary oversight and shrinking space for contentious advocacy.⁵⁴

Ecuador also presents a demanding operational context for environmental defenders. Global Witness data identify Ecuador among the countries with the highest per-capita rates of lethal attacks against land and environmental defenders in Latin America, with 5 documented killings in 2023 and further cases in previous years.⁵⁵ High-profile cases include the killing of Shuar leader José Tendetza Antún in December 2014, shortly before he was to testify at the International Tribunal on the Rights of Nature in Lima; the assassination of Cofán leader Eduardo Mendúa in February 2023; and the killing of anti-mining defender Andrés Durazno in April 2024 in Molleturo (Azuay).⁵⁶

Implementation of the Escazú Agreement #

The Escazú Agreement, adopted in 2018 under the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, establishes binding obligations to strengthen environmental democracy through four pillars: access to environmental information, public participation, access to justice, and the protection of environmental defenders.

Ecuador signed the Escazú Agreement on 27 September 2018 and deposited its instrument of ratification on 21 May 2020, making it one of the early Amazonian States Parties. The Agreement is self-executing in the Ecuadorian legal order and has been incorporated as a normative reference in administrative practice and judicial reasoning on environmental matters.⁵⁷

(i) Access to environmental information. Ecuador adopted the Organic Law on Transparency and Access to Public Information (LOTAIP) in 2004, which requires all public entities to disseminate institutional information proactively and to respond to requests within fixed deadlines. Environmental information held by MAATE, ARCERNNR and the Fiscalía is partially available online, but coverage is uneven and data on environmental licensing, sanctions and mining concessions is often difficult to obtain in practice.⁵⁸

(ii) Public participation in environmental decision-making. Article 57(7) of the Constitution recognises the right of Indigenous communes, communities, peoples and nationalities to free, prior and informed consultation on plans and programmes affecting their territories. Article 398 guarantees environmental consultation with the community in decisions affecting the environment. The Organic Environmental Code (CODA) of 2017 and its 2019 regulations further develop participation rights within environmental licensing, protected area management and strategic environmental assessment, although their implementation remains uneven.⁵⁹

(iii) Access to justice. Ecuador has a particularly rich constitutional framework for access to environmental justice, combining the constitutional guarantees contained in LOGJCC (acción de protección, acción por incumplimiento, acción de acceso a la información, hábeas data and acción extraordinaria de protección) with a broad legal standing to defend the Rights of Nature under Articles 71 and 397 of the Constitution. These mechanisms are described in Section IV below.

(iv) Protection of environmental defenders. Ecuador does not yet have a dedicated national protection programme for environmental defenders comparable to Colombia’s National Protection Unit. The Defensoría del Pueblo operates an early-warning system and occasionally issues precautionary measures, but Amnesty International and other organisations have documented significant gaps in institutional response, follow-up and risk prevention. Ecuador co-sponsored the 2024 Escazú Action Plan on Human Rights Defenders in Environmental Matters, providing a regional normative anchor for future reforms.⁶⁰,⁶¹

Institutional landscape for nature crime #

Ecuador’s environmental enforcement landscape combines a unitary national structure with specialised sub-units within the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the National Police. The principal bodies mandated with monitoring and enforcing against crimes concerning deforestation, environmental degradation and attacks on defenders are grouped below by function.

A. Monitoring, licensing, and administrative enforcement #

These bodies are responsible for compliance monitoring, inspections, licensing and administrative sanctions.

Ministry of Environment, Water and Ecological Transition (MAATE). MAATE, created by Executive Decree No. 59 of 2021 through the merger of the former Ministry of Environment and the Secretariat of Water, is the principal national environmental authority. It grants environmental licences, administers the National System of Protected Areas (SNAP), conducts inspections and imposes administrative sanctions under the CODA. It is also the designated focal point for the Escazú Agreement.⁶²

Agency for the Regulation and Control of Energy and Non-Renewable Natural Resources (ARCERNNR). ARCERNNR, successor to ARCOM, is the mining and energy regulator. It is responsible for granting and overseeing mining rights, verifying compliance with concession terms, and coordinating with MAATE and the Fiscalía in cases of illegal mining or non-compliance with environmental obligations.⁶³

Sectoral authorities and subnational governments. Decentralised Autonomous Governments (GADs) exercise environmental competences for land use, solid waste and local environmental management under the Organic Code of Territorial Organisation (COOTAD). MAATE may accredit GADs as environmental control authorities for specific competences.

B. Policy and strategic coordination #

Ministry of Environment, Water and Ecological Transition (MAATE) also acts as the national policy authority, coordinating the National Environmental System and articulating biodiversity, climate and forest policy with sectoral ministries. Strategic coordination is reinforced by the National Planning Secretariat (Secretaría Nacional de Planificación).

C. Criminal investigation and enforcement #

Fiscalía General del Estado. The Fiscalía investigates and prosecutes environmental crimes under the COIP. Following reforms in 2022–2023, specialised environmental crime fiscalías have been established in Amazonian provinces (including Sucumbíos, Orellana, Napo and Morona Santiago), and the Directorate of Specialised Organised Crime (FEDOTI) handles environmental offences committed in the context of transnational criminal organisations.⁶⁴

National Police – Environmental Protection Unit (UPMA). UPMA is the operational arm of the National Police specialised in the prevention, investigation and control of environmental offences, including illegal logging, wildlife trafficking and illegal mining. It supports the Fiscalía with field interventions, seizures and technical reports and increasingly deploys geospatial tools for targeting operations in the Amazon.⁶⁵

Armed Forces. Following the declaration of an internal armed conflict in January 2024, the Armed Forces have been deployed to support the control of illegal mining and other illegal economies in remote areas, particularly in the Napo and Zamora-Chinchipe provinces, often jointly with the Police and Fiscalía.⁶⁶

D. Oversight and access to justice #

Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo). The Defensoría del Pueblo is a constitutionally autonomous body with a mandate to promote, protect and ensure human rights and rights of nature, to receive complaints, to issue non-binding recommendations and, notably, to file constitutional actions on behalf of affected persons, communities and nature itself.⁶⁷

Office of the Comptroller General (Contraloría General del Estado). The Comptroller carries out environmental audits of public entities, oversees the legality of public contracts with environmental implications and can refer cases of administrative and criminal responsibility to the competent authorities.⁶⁸

Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court is the highest authority on the rights of nature and constitutional environmental rights. It hears the acción extraordinaria de protección and selects emblematic cases (including from the acción de protección) for precedent-setting jurisprudence; it has developed a consolidated rights-of-nature doctrine since 2021.

National System of Protected Areas (SNAP). SNAP, administered by MAATE, manages 59 protected areas covering approximately 20 per cent of national territory, including iconic Amazonian areas such as Yasuní, Cuyabeno and Limoncocha. Protected-area status triggers aggravated penalties under the COIP for a range of environmental offences.⁶⁹

Legal routes available for civil society #

A. Categories of nature crimes #

Environmental crimes in Ecuador are principally defined in Book II, Title IV, Chapter IV of the Integral Organic Criminal Code (COIP, 2014), titled “Offences against the Environment and Nature or Pacha Mama”. The catalogue of offences includes, among others:⁷⁰

• Invasion of protected areas or areas of environmental importance (Art. 245), causing serious damage to biodiversity and natural resources – imprisonment of3 years or 13 to 16 years if the invasion causes the death of a person.

• Offences against wild flora and fauna (Arts. 246–248), including illegal deforestation, trafficking and unlawful management of wild species – imprisonment for 1 to 3 years.

• Offences against water resources, soil and air (Arts. 251–253) – imprisonment for 3 to 5 years.

• Hazardous waste management (Art. 254) and false environmental information (Art. 255) – imprisonment for 1 to 3 years or 16 to 19 years if the illegal management of a hazardous substance causes the death of a person.

• Omission by public servants (Art. 257), where the failure to prevent or report environmental crimes becomes itself a criminal offence – imprisonment for 1 to 3 years.

• Illegal mining (Art. 260), including extraction without authorisation or in protected areas, with aggravating circumstances for activities on Indigenous lands or in the National System of Protected Areas – imprisonment for 5 to 7 years, or 1 to 3 years if it is artisanal mining. If the illegal mining causes environmental degradation, the sentence could go up to 7 to 10 years.

Article 258 of the Integral Organic Criminal Code establishes sanctions for legal entities, providing for fines that range from 100 minimum wages to 500,000.

Article 396 of the Constitution establishes the imprescriptibility of environmental liability, and Article 397(2) reverses the burden of proof in environmental matters, requiring defendants to demonstrate that no harm was caused. These principles substantially lower the evidentiary threshold for CSOs in environmental litigation.⁷¹

B. Routes for legal action #

The legal routes available to CSOs and Indigenous communities to defend against nature crimes fall into four broad categories: constitutional mechanisms, criminal proceedings, administrative mechanisms and international mechanisms. In practice these mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and are often used in combination, depending on the objective pursued (e.g. immediate suspension of activities, criminal accountability, or environmental restoration).

1. Judicial Mechanisms #

Judicial mechanisms provide formal avenues to seek accountability, reparation and the protection of environmental and constitutional rights. They allow CSOs and affected communities to escalate environmental harm beyond administrative processes, particularly in cases involving significant damage, rights violations or lack of effective governmental response.

a. Constitutional Mechanisms #

The Constitution and the Organic Law of Jurisdictional Guarantees and Constitutional Control (LOGJCC, 2009) establish a coordinated set of constitutional actions directly relevant to the defence of the environment and the rights of nature.⁷²,⁷³

Constitutional protection action (Acción de protección). The acción de protección (Art. 88 of the Constitution) is the general-purpose constitutional action against any act or omission by a public authority or private actor that violates constitutional rights, including the right to a healthy environment and the rights of nature. It is available to any person, group or community, without the need to exhaust administrative remedies where there is a risk of irreparable harm. It was the procedural vehicle of both the Vilcabamba River and Los Cedros decisions.

Compliance action (Acción por incumplimiento). The acción por incumplimiento (Art. 93) may be used to compel public authorities to enforce environmental laws, regulations or international obligations, including those arising under the Escazú Agreement. It is heard directly by the Constitutional Court.

Public information action (Acción de acceso a la información pública). Provided in Article 91 of the Constitution and developed by LOTAIP and LOGJCC, this action is widely used by CSOs to obtain environmental licensing files, inspection records and enforcement data.

Extraordinary protection action (Acción extraordinaria de protección). The acción extraordinaria de protección (Art. 94) lies against judicial decisions that violate constitutional rights. In environmental cases it has been used to challenge rulings that dismissed environmental claims on procedural grounds and, conversely, has been filed by public authorities and concessionaires seeking to overturn Rights of Nature rulings at first instance.

Precautionary measures (Medidas cautelares). LOGJCC Articles 26–39 allow the Court to adopt precautionary measures independently or jointly with a constitutional action, in order to prevent or cease the imminent violation of rights. These measures have been instrumental in securing the immediate suspension of extractive projects pending substantive adjudication.

Legal standing for the defence of nature. Ecuador’s Constitution grants one of the broadest standing regimes in the world in environmental matters. Article 71 entitles any person, community, people or nationality to demand compliance with the rights of nature, while Article 397(1) grants legal standing to any natural or legal person to pursue environmental protection actions, without needing to demonstrate direct personal interest.

b. Criminal Proceedings #

Any individual, CSO or community may file a criminal complaint (denuncia) with the Fiscalía in respect of the environmental offences defined in Articles 245 to 260 of the COIP. Upon receipt of a denuncia, the Fiscalía is required to open preliminary investigative steps, including requesting information from MAATE and ARCERNNR, coordinating with UPMA, and ordering expert inspections. Victims, including communities and CSOs with a direct interest in the protection of affected ecosystems, may lodge a private prosecution (acusación particular) to participate actively in the proceedings, propose evidence and challenge prosecutorial decisions.

The establishment of specialised environmental fiscalías in Amazonian provinces from 2022–2023 has created a more accessible interface for CSO complaints, although convictions remain disproportionately low relative to the volume of reports received. Conviction rates for environmental offences are reported irregularly by the Fiscalía; civil-society estimates suggest that successful prosecutions under Articles 245 to 260 remain in the low single digits as a proportion of reported cases.⁷⁴

c. Civil and Contentious Administrative Litigation #

Civil and contentious administrative proceedings are governed by the Organic General Code of Processes (COGEP) of 2015. CSOs and affected communities may bring civil claims for environmental damages — including compensation and restoration orders — and may challenge administrative acts such as environmental licences, mining concessions, sanctioning decisions and decisions affecting protected areas before the contentious administrative courts. The reversal of the burden of proof provided in Article 397(2) of the Constitution applies in these proceedings, significantly strengthening the position of claimants.⁷⁵

The Intag / Llurimagua litigation, in which the Provincial Court of Imbabura suspended mining operations of ENAMI and Codelco in March 2023 on the basis of inadequate consultation and violation of the rights of nature, illustrates the combined use of contentious administrative and constitutional routes.⁷⁶

d. Indigenous Jurisdiction #

Article 171 of the Constitution recognises the jurisdiction of the authorities of Indigenous communities, peoples and nationalities to resolve disputes within their territories on the basis of their own traditions and customary law, subject to respect for constitutional rights and the rights of women. The Constitutional Court has clarified the scope of Indigenous jurisdiction in decisions such as La Cocha II. While Indigenous jurisdiction rarely substitutes for ordinary jurisdiction in serious environmental crime, its recognition reinforces the role of Indigenous authorities in protecting their territories and in coordinating with State authorities in cases of illegal mining, logging and trafficking.⁷⁷

2. Administrative Mechanisms #

Administrative actions before MAATE and ARCERNNR include complaints, requests for the initiation of sanctioning proceedings, challenges to environmental licences or mining titles, and requests for precautionary measures under the CODA. These mechanisms allow for the suspension, modification or annulment of administrative decisions, and can serve both to halt ongoing environmental harm and to create an official record that may support further judicial or criminal action.⁷⁸

CSOs and affected parties can engage the relevant administrative bodies (described in Section IV.A and IV.D above) through the procedures summarised below.

Case examples of successful litigation #

Los Cedros (Constitutional Court, 2021)79 In Sentencia No. 1149-19-JP/21, the Constitutional Court annulled environmental authorisations for metallic mining in the Los Cedros Protective Forest, holding that mining was incompatible with the rights of nature, the right to water and the right to a healthy environment. The Court ordered MAATE and ARCERNNR to comply with environmental consultation obligations and developed detailed reasoning on the application of the precautionary principle to biodiversity hotspots.

Piatúa River Case (Provincial Court of Pastaza, 2019)80 In 2017, Ecuador’s Ministry of the Environment granted a 40-year concession to the private company GENEFRAN S.A. to build a hydroelectric dam on the Piatúa River in the Pastaza province of the Ecuadorian Amazon, without following the processes of free, prior, and informed consultation and without the consent of the Kichwa People of Santa Clara. The project authorized the intake of 90% of the river’s ecological flow and its relocation to the Jandayacu River, seriously affecting the environmental balance of both rivers. In 2019, an acción de protección was filed jointly by the Kichwa communities of Santa Clara, Fundación Pachamama, the Pastaza Ombudsman’s Office, the PUCE Human Rights Center, and the Río Napo Foundation, invoking the communities’ collective rights and the rights of nature of the Piatúa River. A coalition of civil society organizations and law professors also submitted an amicus curiae brief before Ecuador’s Constitutional Court calling for the protection of the river based on the Rights of Nature and Indigenous rights. The Provincial Court of Pastaza accepted the action and declared the violation of the rights of the communities and the river. As a comprehensive reparation measure, it suspended the hydroelectric project and withdrew the authorization affecting the river flow, and revoked the environmental license authorized by the Ministry of the Environment. In June 2020, Ecuador’s Constitutional Court selected the case to generate binding jurisprudence on the rights of nature and collective rights.

Use of remote sensing evidence in nature crime prosecution #

CSOs play a central role in generating and structuring evidence of environmental harm, particularly through remote sensing technologies such as satellite imagery, geospatial mapping and digital monitoring tools. This evidence is incorporated into legal proceedings through multiple evidentiary forms, although the degree to which it is accepted by public authorities depends on the evidentiary requirements and technical standards established within national legal and institutional frameworks.

In Ecuador, remote sensing evidence is accepted under general evidentiary rules, and has been used successfully to support constitutional, criminal and administrative actions, particularly in cases involving illegal mining, illegal deforestation and permitting irregularities affecting protected areas and Indigenous territories.

• Legal framework. Ecuador does not have a specific legal provision regulating the admissibility of remote sensing evidence. In practice, admissibility is assessed under the general evidentiary regime of the Organic General Code of Processes (COGEP)⁸¹ for civil and contentious administrative proceedings, and under the Integral Organic Criminal Code (COIP) for criminal proceedings⁸². These codes admit documentary evidence (Arts. 159–166 COGEP), expert evidence (Arts. 193 COGEP and 511 COIP) and judicial inspection (Art. 228 COGEP). Article 397(2) of the Constitution reverses the burden of proof in environmental matters, which increases the practical weight of well-documented satellite evidence.⁸³

• Court acceptance. Satellite imagery and geospatial data have been accepted as evidence in emblematic rights-of-nature and environmental cases, including Los Cedros, the Coca River oil spill case and the Intag / Llurimagua litigation. Courts have tended to give greater weight to satellite evidence that is accompanied by a formal expert report, linked to institutional records (MAATE, ARCERNNR, national geographic institutes) and corroborated by field verification or UPMA inspection.

• Technical standards. Evidentiary integrity is safeguarded through general criminal and civil procedure rules and through practical evidence-control protocols applied by the National Police and the Fiscalía, including documentation of collection, preservation, transfers and integrity measures for digital items. For remote sensing evidence, the following practices reduce admissibility risks:

• Source identification: clear identification of the platform or provider (state entity, recognised international provider, or accredited CSO), date/time, area of interest and method of acquisition;

• Metadata preservation: retaining original files and metadata where available, and documenting each processing step;

• Reproducibility: preserving the workflow so an independent expert could reproduce the same outputs from the same source data;

• Integrity documentation: an evidence log documenting who handled the digital files, where they were stored, how they were transferred, and what controls were used to prevent tampering.

Case example — use of remote sensing evidence in litigation #

Sinangoe Case (2018)84 The case concerned illegal and authorized gold mining activities affecting the ancestral territory of the A’L Cofán community of Sinangoe in the Ecuadorian Amazon. The mining concessions threatened rivers, biodiversity, Indigenous territory, and the community’s way of life. In response, the Sinangoe Indigenous Guard conducted community-led monitoring and surveillance of mining activities over several months, collecting photographs, drone footage, satellite images, GPS data, and audiovisual evidence documenting illegal mining operations and their environmental impacts. Supported by the Ombudsman’s Office, the community subsequently brought legal action against state authorities. Plaintiffs filed a constitutional “Action for Protection” under Articles 86 and 88 of the Ecuadorian Constitution, arguing that the State had violated Indigenous rights to prior consultation, water, health, territory, and a healthy environment by granting mining concessions without consultation. The Provincial Court of Justice of Sucumbíos ultimately upheld the finding that constitutional rights had been violated. As a result, the court annulled active and pending mining concessions in the area, ordered environmental restoration measures, required investigations into illegal mining activities, and mandated an audit of the mining concession process.

Challenges in engagement with authorities #

Engagement between CSOs and public authorities in Ecuador is constrained by structural, procedural and security-related barriers that weaken accountability efforts. Although the formal legal framework — in particular the rights-of-nature framework — is exceptionally developed, these rights do not always translate into timely or effective enforcement on the ground.

Deteriorating security environment. The declaration of an internal armed conflict in January 2024⁸⁵ and the expansion of organised crime in the coastal and Amazonian provinces⁸⁶ have substantially changed the operational context for CSOs. Illegal mining, land trafficking and coca-related economies are increasingly controlled by armed actors, restricting CSO field access, increasing risks to defenders and complicating evidence gathering.

Violence and threats against defenders. Ecuador has recorded some of the highest per-capita rates of lethal attacks against environmental defenders in the Amazon basin.⁸⁷ Existing protection instruments, concentrated in the Defensoría del Pueblo and in ad-hoc responses by the Executive, have struggled to keep pace with the scale of the threat, and a dedicated national protection programme for environmental defenders remains absent despite Ecuador’s commitments under the Escazú Agreement.

Limited institutional capacity and fragmentation. Specialised environmental fiscalías in Amazonian provinces are relatively new and face capacity constraints, including limited forensic and geospatial expertise and high caseloads. Coordination between MAATE, ARCERNNR, the Fiscalía and UPMA is uneven, and responsibility for environmental oversight is distributed among national, provincial and municipal actors under the CODA and the COOTAD, with variable enforcement effectiveness.

Weak enforcement outcomes reduce deterrence. There is a marked gap between the scale of environmental harm, the volume of denuncias received by the Fiscalía and the number of effective sanctions or convictions. Conviction rates for offences under Articles 245 to 260 of the COIP remain low, reflecting both the complexity of environmental cases and the limited specialised capacity of prosecutors and courts.

Pressure on civic space. Despite the reform of Decrees 16 and 739, CSOs continue to operate under regulatory uncertainty, with discretionary elements remaining in the registration regime. CIVICUS continues to classify Ecuador’s civic space as “obstructed”, and environmental CSOs report difficulties in accessing sensitive administrative files such as mining cadastres, licensing records and inspection reports.⁸⁸

Procedural barriers. Delays in the processing of constitutional actions, fragmented data systems and uneven transparency at subnational level restrict CSOs’ ability to follow cases and sustain engagement over time. Although the LOTAIP provides a formal right of access to information, in practice access to environmental licensing files, mining cadastres and sanctioning records is often slow and uneven across authorities.

Tension between extractive policy and rights-of-nature jurisprudence. Successive governments have continued to promote mining expansion, including in sensitive Amazonian and Andean ecosystems,⁸⁹ creating recurring tension with the rights-of-nature jurisprudence developed by the Constitutional Court. The implementation of the Yasuní-ITT referendum and of rulings such as Los Cedros and Intag / Llurimagua has been contested in practice, illustrating the enduring gap between formal constitutional protection and policy execution.

Conclusion & recommendations #

Ecuador offers one of the most advanced constitutional frameworks in the world for environmental protection and civil society engagement in the fight against nature crime. Its recognition of the rights of nature, its broad legal standing for environmental actions, its robust portfolio of constitutional remedies and its ratification of the Escazú Agreement together create a uniquely favourable normative platform. However, the gap between formal rights and effective enforcement remains wide, shaped by weak conviction rates, institutional fragmentation, a demanding security context and pressure on civic space. Strengthening environmental accountability in Ecuador therefore requires not only institutional reform but also sustained investment in the security, technical capacity and legal support of civil society actors.

1. Strengthen institutional capacity and specialisation. Consolidate the specialised environmental fiscalías created in Amazonian provinces, expand their forensic and geospatial capacity, and provide systematic training to prosecutors, judges and police on the application of the rights of nature and on the evaluation of satellite and expert evidence. Strengthen inter-institutional coordination between MAATE, ARCERNNR, the Fiscalía, UPMA and the Armed Forces to ensure coherent administrative, criminal and operational responses.

2. Adopt a dedicated national framework for the protection of defenders. Building on Ecuador’s commitments under the Escazú Agreement and the 2024 Action Plan, establish a dedicated national protection mechanism for environmental and human rights defenders, with specific protocols for Amazonian contexts, Indigenous defenders and CSOs operating in areas dominated by illegal economies. Reinforce the Defensoría del Pueblo’s early-warning and precautionary measures functions.

3. Strengthen the enabling environment for CSOs. Complete the reform of the centralised registration regime to remove remaining discretionary grounds for de-registration; simplify administrative requirements for environmental CSOs; and protect the independence of CSO action in accordance with the Constitution and Ecuador’s international obligations.

4. Enhance access to environmental information. Operationalise LOTAIP and the Escazú access-to-information pillar by ensuring that environmental licensing files, sanctioning records, mining cadastres and monitoring data are systematically published in machine-readable formats, and by harmonising information systems across MAATE, ARCERNNR and the Fiscalía.

5. Institutionalise remote sensing evidence and technical cooperation with CSOs. Develop formal guidelines for the admissibility and evaluation of geospatial evidence; support cooperation agreements between technical CSOs (including EcoCiencia, MAAP and RAISG partners) and public authorities on the lines of the Colombian FCDS–Fiscalía model; and develop in-house capacity within enforcement bodies to interpret and validate satellite and drone data.

6. Implement rights-of-nature rulings and popular mandates. Ensure effective implementation of landmark decisions such as Los Cedros, Intag / Llurimagua and the Yasuní-ITT popular consultation, including through binding restoration plans, independent compliance monitoring and transparent reporting to the Constitutional Court and to the public.

Guyana #

Status of CSOs, protection and transparency #

Guyana recognises freedoms of conscience, expression, peaceful assembly and association in Articles 145 to 147 of its Constitution, together with the constitutional right to a healthy environment (Article 149J) and the broader constitutional commitment to the well-being of the nation through the preservation of clean air, fertile soils, pure water and biodiversity (Article 36).⁹⁰

CSOs typically operate as non-profit companies under the Companies Act, as friendly societies, or as unincorporated common-law associations and trusts. There is no equivalent in Guyana to the restrictive NGO regimes in some neighbouring countries, and civic space is generally considered open, although CIVICUS notes pressure points relating to media, indigenous rights and emerging litigation around oil and gas governance.⁹¹,⁹²

Guyanese civil society plays a particularly active role in litigation. Organisations and individual public-interest litigants have led recent constitutional and administrative challenges to the licensing of oil and gas activities in the Stabroek Block, to the adequacy of financial guarantees against oil spills, and to the recognition of Indigenous land rights. In the Caribbean Court of Justice judgment in Ramon Gaskin v Minister of Natural Resources & Others (2024), the Court underlined that costs should not be awarded against “public spirited citizens intent on advancing the constitutional protection of the environment”, reinforcing the legitimacy of public-interest environmental litigation.⁹³

Compared to several other Amazonian countries, Guyana has not been characterised by lethal violence against environmental defenders. Civil society reports, however, document increasing pressure on activists challenging oil and gas projects and on Indigenous leaders defending customary lands against mining and logging concessions. The absence of a dedicated national protection mechanism for defenders is a recognised gap, in particular in the context of Guyana’s ratification of the Escazú Agreement and of its 2024 endorsement of the Escazú Action Plan on Human Rights Defenders in Environmental Matters.^94,95

Implementation of the Escazú Agreement #

The Escazú Agreement, adopted in 2018 under the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, establishes binding obligations to strengthen environmental democracy through four pillars: access to environmental information, public participation, access to justice, and the protection of environmental defenders.

Guyana deposited its instrument of ratification on 18 April 2019, becoming the first State Party to the Escazú Agreement. Since then, the Government has consistently positioned Escazú as a central element of its sustainability and democratic governance discourse, including in interventions by President Irfaan Ali on the importance of the Agreement for the region. Guyana hosted the second extraordinary meeting of the Conference of the Parties in 2025, the first Escazú COP held in the Caribbean.⁹⁶

(i) Access to environmental information. Guyana relies on a combination of general administrative-law principles, sectoral statutes (notably the Environmental Protection Act, the Mining Act, the Forests Act and the Amerindian Act) and the EPA’s public notices and authorisations register to operationalise access to environmental information. The Access to Information Act of 2011 provides the general framework, although CSOs have flagged practical limitations in its implementation, particularly around documents relating to oil and gas operations.^97,98

(ii) Public participation in environmental decision-making. Public participation is anchored in the Environmental Protection Act and its Environmental Impact Assessment regulations, which provide for public notice, public consultation and submission of comments on major projects. Indigenous consultation rights are addressed under the Amerindian Act of 2006 and through emerging case-law on Indigenous title; both are partial implementations of the international standard of free, prior and informed consent.^,99

(iii) Access to justice. Guyana has a developed framework for environmental and constitutional litigation, with the High Court of the Supreme Court of Judicature, the Court of Appeal and, ultimately, the Caribbean Court of Justice. Recent oil-and-gas litigation has consolidated public-interest standing in environmental cases, including by way of constitutional motion and judicial review. These mechanisms are described in Section IV below.¹⁰⁰

(iv) Protection of environmental defenders. Guyana has not adopted a dedicated statutory mechanism for the protection of environmental defenders. The general criminal law and police protection apply, and the Office of the Ombudsman and the Constitutional Court provide complementary avenues. The Escazú Agreement and the 2024 Action Plan on Human Rights Defenders provide the most concrete international framework for further institutional development.

Institutional landscape for nature crime #

Guyana’s environmental enforcement landscape combines a relatively well-established Environmental Protection Agency with sectoral regulators for mining, forests, protected areas and Indigenous affairs, and an ordinary criminal-justice apparatus. The principal bodies mandated with monitoring and enforcing against crimes concerning deforestation, environmental degradation and attacks on defenders are grouped below by function.

A. Monitoring, licensing, and administrative enforcement #

These bodies are responsible for compliance monitoring, inspections, licensing and administrative sanctions.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA, established under the Environmental Protection Act of 1996 (Cap. 20:05), is the principal environmental authority. It is responsible for environmental impact assessment, the issuance of environmental authorisations, compliance monitoring and the enforcement of environmental obligations. EPA officers have statutory powers of entry, inspection, the issuance of enforcement and prohibition notices, the detention of articles causing or likely to cause pollution and the initiation of administrative and criminal action.¹⁰¹

Guyana Geology and Mines Commission (GGMC). The GGMC, established by Cap. 65:09 and operating under the Mining Act, regulates and supervises the mining sector, grants mining and exploration rights and monitors compliance with environmental and safety obligations. The GGMC plays a central role in the supervision of artisanal and small-scale gold mining, including the implementation of mercury-reduction measures under the Minamata Convention.^102,103

Guyana Forestry Commission (GFC). The GFC, established under Cap. 67:02 and operating under the Forests Act of 2009, regulates and supervises forestry activities, grants forest concessions and community forest agreements, and operates the national forest monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) system that supports the Norway–Guyana REDD+ partnership.^104,105

Protected Areas Commission (PAC). The PAC, established under the Protected Areas Act of 2011, administers the national system of protected areas, including the Kanuku Mountains, Shell Beach, Iwokrama and the Kaieteur National Park. The Wildlife Conservation and Management Act of 2016 governs wildlife management and trade in species.¹⁰⁶

Guyana Lands and Surveys Commission (GL&SC). The GL&SC administers State lands, including the demarcation of land titles, with a key role in Indigenous land titling and forest mapping under the Hinterland and Amerindian Land Titling Project.¹⁰⁷

B. Policy and strategic coordination #

Ministry of Natural Resources. The Ministry of Natural Resources articulates policy on petroleum, mining and forests and supervises the GGMC and the GFC.

Ministry of Agriculture and the Office of Climate Change. These bodies coordinate environmental policy across sectors, including the implementation of the Low Carbon Development Strategy (LCDS 2030).¹⁰⁸

Ministry of Amerindian Affairs. The Ministry of Amerindian Affairs administers policy on Indigenous peoples and coordinates with the National Toshaos Council (NTC), the national body of village leaders established under the Amerindian Act of 2006.¹⁰⁹

C. Criminal investigation and enforcement #

Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). The DPP exercises responsibility for criminal prosecution, including environmental offences. Guyana has not established a dedicated environmental crime division within the prosecutorial system, although environmental cases may be referred by the EPA, the GGMC and the GFC for criminal action.¹¹⁰

Guyana Police Force. The Guyana Police Force conducts investigations and operational deployments in support of environmental enforcement, including jointly with the EPA, the GGMC, the GFC and, when relevant, the Guyana Defence Force, particularly in remote interior areas affected by illegal mining and logging.

D. Oversight and access to justice #

High Court of the Supreme Court of Judicature and Court of Appeal. The High Court has constitutional jurisdiction to hear motions for the protection of fundamental rights and judicial review of administrative action; the Court of Appeal hears appeals from the High Court. The High Court has been the primary forum for recent oil-and-gas litigation, including in Whyte v EPA & Esso, Quadad de Freitas & Others v Ministry of Natural Resources and related cases.¹¹¹

Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ). Since 2005, the CCJ has acted as Guyana’s apex court in its appellate jurisdiction, and its 2024 judgment in Ramon Gaskin v Minister of Natural Resources & Others sets a regionally significant precedent on public-interest environmental litigation and the integration of Escazú and Rio principles in domestic constitutional reasoning.

Office of the Ombudsman and Audit Office. The Ombudsman receives complaints regarding administrative action and the Audit Office conducts external financial and performance audits, including in relation to natural-resources management.¹¹²

Legal routes available for civil society #

A. Categories of nature crimes #

Guyana’s framework of environmental offences combines the Environmental Protection Act (Cap. 20:05) with sector-specific statutes, including the Mining Act, the Forests Act, the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act and the Protected Areas Act, supplemented by the general provisions of the Criminal Law (Offences) Act. Conduct constituting nature crime in Guyana includes, in particular:¹¹³

Offences under the Environmental Protection Act -including operating without a required environmental authorisation, breaching the conditions of an authorisation, releasing contaminants in breach of standards and obstructing EPA officers (Part V of the Act).

Mining offences -including conducting mining or quarrying activities without the required rights or authorisations under the Mining Act and Regulations, breaching environmental conditions of mining titles and the unauthorised use of mercury contrary to applicable regulations.

Forestry offences -including unauthorised cutting, transport and commercialisation of timber, breach of the terms of forest concessions or community forest agreements, and offences relating to State forest reserves under the Forests Act.

Wildlife and protected-area offences -including illegal capture, possession or trade of protected species under the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act and violations of the Protected Areas Act.

Indigenous land and consultation offences -including the breach of Amerindian Act provisions on village council consent for non-Amerindian activities on titled Amerindian lands.

B. Routes for legal action #

The legal routes available to CSOs and Indigenous (Amerindian) communities to defend against nature crimes fall into four broad categories: constitutional motions, judicial review, criminal proceedings, and international mechanisms. In practice these mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and are often used in combination, depending on the objective pursued (e.g. immediate suspension of activities, criminal accountability, or environmental restoration).

1. Judicial Mechanisms #

a. Constitutional motions and judicial review #

Article 153 of the Constitution allows any person to apply to the High Court for redress where any of the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution, including the right to a healthy environment (Article 149J), has been, is being or is likely to be contravened. Judicial review of administrative action is available under the Civil Procedure Rules and general administrative-law principles, allowing CSOs and individuals to challenge environmental authorisations, mining concessions, forest concessions and other administrative acts. The Caribbean Court of Justice, in Ramon Gaskin v Minister of Natural Resources, has confirmed the importance of facilitating public-interest standing in environmental cases.

b. Criminal Proceedings #

Criminal investigations into environmental offences may be triggered by complaints made to the EPA, the GGMC, the GFC, the police or directly to the DPP. The DPP retains discretion over prosecution. Victims may, in limited circumstances, initiate private prosecutions under the Criminal Procedure Act.

c. Civil Actions #

Civil actions are available under the Civil Procedure Rules for damages arising from environmental harm (in tort and nuisance) and for declaratory and injunctive relief. CSOs and individual claimants may obtain interim injunctions against ongoing activities pending substantive adjudication.

d. Indigenous (Amerindian) governance and consultation #

The Amerindian Act of 2006 recognises the legal personality of Amerindian villages, governed by their Village and District Councils, and the role of the National Toshaos Council. The Act requires non-Amerindian persons to seek the consent of the Village Council for certain activities, including mining, on titled Amerindian lands. Civil society and Indigenous federations have documented that, while the Act is a significant step, its FPIC standards do not fully meet international human rights requirements and that practice falls short of statutory requirements, in particular in relation to consultation by the GGMC.

2. Administrative Mechanisms #

Administrative actions include complaints to the EPA, the GGMC, the GFC and the Protected Areas Commission, requests for the initiation of administrative procedures and the use of EPA enforcement and prohibition notices. EPA officers have wide investigative powers under the Environmental Protection Act, and their notices can compel the suspension or modification of polluting activities.

Case examples of successful litigation #

Production Guyana Ltda # (Supreme Court of Guyana, October 2020)114 Guyanese scientist Dr. Troy Thomas filed a case as an individual litigant against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of Guyana in the Supreme Court, alleging that the 23-year permits the EPA had issued to Esso Exploration, a subsidiary of ExxonMobil, for oil exploration violated Regulation 19 of the Environmental Protection Act, which expressly limits environmental permits to five years. The case marks the first time a litigant relied on climate change and the Paris Agreement in support of a claim for a judicial remedy in a Guyanese court. Although Dr. Thomas filed in his personal capacity, the litigation was supported by lawyer Melinda Janki of the Justice Institute of the Americas, an organisation that has played a central role in environmental public interest litigation in Guyana, alongside Senior Counsel Seenath Jairam. On 7 October 2020, the Supreme Court issued a consent order accepting a settlement between Thomas, the EPA, and Esso. The EPA agreed to reduce the term of the permits to five years, so that they would expire in 2022 and 2024, and was ordered to pay Thomas’ court costs. This forced ExxonMobil’s subsidiary to apply for new permits and gave the public an opportunity to demand better environmental terms for Guyana. The case illustrates both the potential and the current limitations of civil society engagement in Guyana’s environmental enforcement landscape: while CSO-supported public interest litigation can produce concrete legal outcomes, formal CSO standing before Guyanese courts in environmental proceedings has not yet been established, and effective litigation has so far depended on the initiative of individual litigants with institutional backing.

Use of remote sensing evidence in nature crime prosecution #

CSOs play a central role in generating and structuring evidence of environmental harm, particularly through remote sensing technologies such as satellite imagery, geospatial mapping and digital monitoring tools. This evidence is incorporated into legal proceedings through multiple evidentiary forms, although the degree to which it is accepted by public authorities depends on the evidentiary requirements and technical standards established within national legal and institutional frameworks.

In Guyana, remote sensing evidence is admissible under general evidentiary rules and is supported by relatively well-developed national monitoring systems, notably those operated by the Guyana Forestry Commission and the GL&SC under the Norway–Guyana REDD+ partnership.

Legal framework. Guyana does not have a specific statutory provision on the admissibility of remote sensing evidence. In practice, admissibility is assessed under the general evidentiary rules of the Civil Procedure Rules of the High Court (2016) and the Criminal Procedure Act, which admit documentary, expert and inspection evidence. The Environmental Protection Act provides for the use of technical and scientific evidence in environmental impact assessment and enforcement.

Court acceptance. Satellite imagery and geospatial data are increasingly accepted in environmental litigation and administrative proceedings, in particular when supported by formal expert reports and corroborated by institutional records (EPA, GFC, GL&SC, GGMC). Guyana’s LCDS-related MRV infrastructure provides robust state-generated geospatial data that complement CSO-led monitoring.

Technical standards. In the absence of dedicated protocols, the same general practices observed across the region apply to reduce admissibility risks:

Source identification: clear identification of the platform or provider (state entity, recognised international provider, or accredited CSO), date/time, area of interest and method of acquisition;

Metadata preservation: retaining original files and metadata where available, and documenting each processing step;

Reproducibility: preserving the workflow so an independent expert could reproduce the same outputs from the same source data;

Integrity documentation: an evidence log documenting who handled the digital files, where they were stored, how they were transferred, and what controls were used to prevent tampering.

Case example – use of remote sensing evidence #

Indigenous Community Monitoring — Rupununi, Upper Mazaruni and surrounding regions (ongoing)115 Indigenous communities in the Rupununi, the upper Mazaruni, and surrounding regions have developed community-based monitoring programmes that combine satellite-based forest loss alerts with field verification by trained Indigenous monitors. These programmes have been supported by partners including Rainforest Foundation US and the South Rupununi District Council. The monitoring model mirrors approaches used in Peru’s ACOMAT programme: satellite alerts are used to identify suspected deforestation or mining incursions, and community monitors conduct ground-truthing patrols to confirm and document findings. The resulting data have been used in advocacy submissions to the EPA and the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission (GGMC), and have been presented at international fora as evidence of the scale and location of mining-driven environmental harm in Indigenous territories. As with the MRV system, these community-generated datasets have not yet formed the evidential basis of a concluded criminal or administrative proceeding, but they demonstrate the practical capacity of Indigenous communities and their CSO partners to generate technically credible remote sensing evidence and deploy it in institutional and advocacy contexts. The absence of a formal legal pathway for community-generated evidence to be admitted in Guyanese proceedings represents a structural gap in the enabling conditions for nature crime enforcement.

Henry, Nageer and Thorington v EPA & Esso (High Court of Guyana, 2022–2023)116 Sherlina Nageer was one of three plaintiffs in a lawsuit against flaring on platforms operated by Esso. The trio of activists gathered evidence of what they say are illegal activities using satellite images. In April 2021, they alerted the Guyana Environmental Protection Agency, which oversees and licenses the nation’s oil industry. In January 2022, the three women, Sinikka Henry, Sherlina Nageer and Andriska Thorington, filed a case against the EPA to put a stop to flaring by ExxonMobil, arguing that the agency had acted unlawfully when it modified Esso’s environmental permit to allow flaring in exchange for a fee. The case record notes that satellite imagery showed Esso continuing to flare gas, and Esso’s own affidavit in defence admitted in paragraph 29 that Esso was flaring as a result of mechanical failure. The High Court ultimately dismissed the case in October 2023, finding that the EPA’s permit modification was not unlawful.

Challenges in engagement with authorities #

Engagement between CSOs and public authorities in Guyana is constrained by structural, procedural and political barriers that weaken accountability efforts. While the legal framework is relatively well developed and civic space is comparatively open, important gaps remain in the enforcement of environmental obligations, in the protection of Indigenous land rights and in the oversight of the rapidly expanding oil and gas sector.

Oversight of the oil and gas sector. The rapid expansion of offshore oil production in the Stabroek Block has generated intense litigation on the adequacy of environmental authorisations, financial guarantees against oil spills and the consultation obligations of regulatory authorities. The reversal at the Court of Appeal of the High Court’s ruling in Whyte v EPA & Esso in 2026 illustrates the contested nature of this terrain.¹¹⁷

Limited recognition of Indigenous land rights. Significant portions of customary Indigenous territories remain untitled or only partially demarcated, and the Amerindian Act of 2006 contains acknowledged gaps relative to the international standard of free, prior and informed consent. Indigenous leaders report that mining concessions are granted on or near titled Amerindian lands without the consultation and consent procedures required by the Act.¹¹⁸

Persistence of mercury use in artisanal and small-scale gold mining. Despite Guyana’s accession to the Minamata Convention on Mercury in 2014 and successive policy initiatives, mercury continues to be widely used in artisanal and small-scale gold mining, with documented contamination of rivers such as the Mazaruni. Small-scale miners’ pushback against alternatives remains a significant challenge for the GGMC and the EPA.¹¹⁹

Limited institutional capacity and prosecutorial specialisation. The EPA, the GGMC and the GFC face capacity constraints relative to the scale of the sectors they regulate, and there is no dedicated environmental crime division within the prosecutorial system. Coordination between agencies and with the police is improving in operational contexts but remains uneven in the investigation and prosecution phases.

Procedural barriers. Limited transparency in concession allocation and inconsistent access to environmental and forestry data restrict CSOs’ ability to follow specific cases and sustain engagement over time. Although Guyana has an Access to Information Act, CSOs have flagged practical limitations in its implementation, in particular around oil-and-gas documents and Indigenous-territory data.¹²⁰

Conclusion & recommendations #

Guyana combines a developed common-law legal framework, an active public-interest litigation culture, leadership in Escazú ratification and one of the most robust national forest monitoring systems in the Amazon basin, with significant challenges relating to oil and gas oversight, mercury use in artisanal and small-scale gold mining, Indigenous land rights and prosecutorial capacity. Strengthening environmental accountability in Guyana therefore requires consolidation of the institutional architecture, refinement of legal protections for defenders and Indigenous peoples, and sustained investment in the technical capacity of civil society and public authorities.

1. Operationalise the Escazú Agreement at the domestic level. Use Guyana’s leadership position as the first ratifying State to develop a national implementation framework covering access to environmental information, public participation, access to justice and the protection of defenders, including in the oil-and-gas sector.

2. Establish a dedicated mechanism for the protection of environmental and human rights defenders. Building on the 2024 Escazú Action Plan, design a national protection mechanism tailored to Guyanese realities, with specific protocols for Indigenous defenders and for litigants engaged in oil-and-gas accountability cases.

3. Reinforce regulatory oversight of the oil and gas sector. Consolidate the EPA’s technical capacity for monitoring offshore oil and gas operations; clarify and operationalise rules on environmental authorisations, financial guarantees against oil spills and consultation; and align licensing processes with the standards of Article 149J and with Escazú.

4. Modernise the Amerindian Act and accelerate Indigenous land titling. Reform the Amerindian Act to bring its consultation, consent and land-use provisions into line with international human rights standards on FPIC; accelerate the Amerindian Land Titling Project to recognise all eligible customary territories; and reinforce the National Toshaos Council’s role in environmental governance.

5. Accelerate the phase-out of mercury in artisanal and small-scale gold mining. Implement Guyana’s commitments under the Minamata Convention with measurable targets, dedicated resources and effective coordination between the GGMC, the EPA, the GFC and the Ministry of Health, with particular attention to mercury monitoring in Indigenous territories along the Mazaruni and other affected rivers.

6. Develop dedicated capacity for environmental prosecution. Establish a specialised environmental unit within the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions; develop joint protocols with the EPA, the GGMC, the GFC and the police on the investigation and prosecution of environmental offences; and invest in specialised forensic and geospatial capacity.

7. Institutionalise remote sensing evidence and technical cooperation with CSOs. Build on the existing MRV system and the LCDS framework to develop formal guidelines for the admissibility and evaluation of geospatial evidence; integrate Indigenous and CSO monitoring data into national environmental monitoring frameworks; and ensure that monitoring data are systematically published in machine-readable formats.

Peru #

Status of CSOs, protection and transparency #

Peru’s legal framework for civil society organisations is rooted in private law and traditionally limits direct executive intervention. The Civil Code recognises three forms of non-profit legal entities through which civil society operates: associations, foundations, and committees, as regulated respectively under Articles 80, 99, and 111.¹²¹ Oversight of non-governmental organisations that receive international cooperation funding is entrusted to the Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation (APCI), pursuant to Article 3 of Law No. 27692,¹²² whose mandate is formally limited to control, supervision, and monitoring functions related to the use of international funds.

This legal balance has been increasingly challenged by recent legislative initiatives. In 2024, the Congressional Foreign Relations Committee issued a report examining six bills introduced in 2023 that aimed to “strengthen oversight of NGOs”. These proposals would significantly expand APCI’s powers, allowing it to impose far-reaching administrative sanctions, while also granting the Executive Branch authority to dissolve civil society organisations through administrative acts, a clear departure from the existing legal order, under which the Civil Code (Articles 94, 95, and 96) reserves the power to dissolve associations exclusively to the Judiciary. Civil society actors have warned that these changes could discourage critical or dissenting voices and disproportionately affect organisations reliant on international cooperation funding, thereby weakening both the autonomy and sustainability of Peru’s civil society sector.

The legislative pressure on civil society intensified further in April 2025 with the enactment of Law No. 32301, which amends the APCI framework. The law establishes as a very serious infraction the use of international technical cooperation resources to advise, assist, or finance any type of administrative, judicial, or other action against the Peruvian State.¹²³ Although this provision does not formally nullify CSOs’ legal standing, it creates a significant practical barrier to access to justice for communities and organisations that depend on international cooperation funding for legal support, particularly in the defence of collective rights in the Amazon.

Peru’s civil society ecosystem includes a network of technical NGOs, research institutes, and indigenous organisations active on environmental protection. Indigenous and native communities enjoy constitutional recognition and legal personality without the need for formal registration, a protection rooted in Article 89 of the Constitution.

Despite this framework, the operational conditions for environmental defenders are dangerous. Over the past decade, 33 Indigenous leaders have been murdered in the Peruvian Amazon,¹²⁴ with the majority of these cases remaining unresolved. Violence and intimidation against defenders are concentrated in the Amazon, particularly around illegal logging, illegal mining, and land-trafficking frontiers, and represent a structural constraint on the effective exercise of environmental advocacy.

Implementation of the Escazú Agreement #

The Escazú Agreement, adopted in 2018 under the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, establishes binding obligations to strengthen environmental democracy through four pillars: access to environmental information, public participation, access to justice, and the protection of environmental defenders.

Peru signed the Escazú Agreement but has not ratified it, meaning the Agreement does not currently have legal effect in the domestic order. The absence of ratification represents a significant normative gap, particularly with respect to the protection of environmental defenders, and weakens Peru’s engagement with regional accountability mechanisms. Implementation of the four pillars relies on pre-existing domestic instruments.

(i) Access to environmental information: Peru’s transparency framework includes Law No. 27806¹²⁵ (Transparency and Access to Public Information Law), which establishes enforceable rights to access information held by public bodies. Specialised environmental information can be obtained from the Ministry of Environment (MINAM) via its Transparencia MINAM portal and from OEFA via its online access form. These requests are processed within defined timeframes and do not require justification of motive. Nevertheless, data quality and accessibility vary significantly at regional and local level, and environmental information systems such as the MC-SNIFFS timber traceability platform remain only partially operational.

(ii) Public participation in environmental decision-making: Public participation is embedded in environmental licensing and in the governance of the National Environmental System. ILO Convention 169, in force in Peru since 1995, and Law No. 29785 (Prior Consultation Law) establish the right of Indigenous and native peoples to be consulted before legislative or administrative measures that may directly affect their territories. In practice, the effectiveness of these mechanisms varies, and critics have noted that the 2024 amendments to the Forestry and Wildlife Law (Law No. 31973) were adopted without consulting Indigenous communities.

(iii) Access to justice: Peruvian law provides a range of mechanisms for environmental access to justice, including constitutional actions (amparo, compliance proceedings, acción popular), civil collective actions, administrative proceedings, and criminal proceedings under the Criminal Code. These mechanisms are further described in Section IV below.

(iv) Protection of environmental defenders: Peru lacks a comprehensive legal instrument for the protection of environmental defenders. Supreme Decree 004-2021-JUS¹²⁶ provides a risk-based protection mechanism for defenders, but implementation has been limited in practice. The enactment of Law No. 32301 in April 2025 has further restricted the ability of CSOs to provide legal support to defenders. The non-ratification of the Escazú Agreement leaves an important normative gap on this fourth pillar, with Peru being one of the top three countries with the highest number of documented killings and forced disappearances of land and environmental defenders since the Agreement entered into force in April 2021.¹²⁷

Institutional landscape for nature crime #

Peru’s environmental enforcement landscape combines a decentralised governance structure with specialised national agencies for monitoring, licensing, and protected areas. The principal bodies mandated with monitoring and enforcing against crimes concerning deforestation, environmental degradation, and attacks on defenders are grouped below by function.

A. Monitoring, licensing, and administrative enforcement #

These bodies are responsible for compliance monitoring, inspections, licensing, and administrative sanctions.

Environmental Assessment and Enforcement Agency (Organismo de Evaluación y Fiscalización Ambiental – OEFA): The principal federal technical agency for environmental supervision, inspections, and sanctions.¹²⁸ OEFA carries out surveillance and monitoring to ensure compliance with environmental regulations, investigates administrative violations, and imposes sanctions for non-compliance with environmental management instruments. It operates the National Environmental Complaints Information Service (SINADA), a free nationwide platform for citizen reporting of environmental harm, which between January 2024 and July 2025 processed 6,468 environmental complaints.

Agency for Supervision of Forest Resources and Wildlife (Organismo de Supervisión de los Recursos Forestales y de Fauna Silvestre – OSINFOR): The agency responsible for monitoring and overseeing the sustainable use and conservation of forest resources and wildlife, independent of SERFOR. OSINFOR independently supervises compliance with forest management plans and has deployed remote sensing technology to detect illegal timber, identifying over 41,000 m³ of illegal timber valued at US$19 million in 2023 through satellite-based monitoring.¹²⁹

National Forestry and Wildlife Service (Servicio Nacional Forestal y de Fauna Silvestre – SERFOR): The national authority in charge of forestry and wildlife management,¹³⁰ overseeing the administration, conservation, protection, monitoring, and sustainable use of the nation’s forest and wildlife heritage. SERFOR operates the ‘Alerta Serfor’ complaint channel for forestry and wildlife violations and coordinates with FEMA on enforcement operations.

National Service of Natural Protected Areas by the State (Servicio Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas por el Estado – SERNANP): The agency responsible for managing and protecting nationally designated protected areas.

National Water Authority (Autoridad Nacional del Agua – ANA): The technical body responsible for governing water resources at the national level. ANA has the authority to declare emergency states, protected zones, and states of contamination of natural water sources. It receives complaints related to contamination of water bodies and non-compliance with water management regulations.

Director General of Captaincies and Coast Guard of the Peruvian Navy (Dirección General de Capitanías y Guardacostas de la Marina de Guerra del Perú – DICAPI): Responsible for preventing and combating pollution and protecting the aquatic environment,¹³¹ including by evaluating and approving environmental management instruments. DICAPI acts as a strategic ally of FEMA and other public entities in investigations involving maritime and riverine environmental damage.

B. Policy and strategic coordination #

These institutions define environmental policy, regulatory frameworks, and overall governance strategies.

Ministry of the Environment (Ministerio del Ambiente – MINAM): The national authority for environmental policy and governance,¹³² responsible for ensuring compliance with environmental regulations and coordinating the National Environmental System. MINAM sets national environmental policy and oversees the broader framework within which enforcement agencies operate. Specialised agencies such as OEFA are technically attached to MINAM.

C. Criminal investigation and enforcement #

These institutions are responsible for investigating and prosecuting environmental crimes.

Specialized Environmental Prosecutors’ Offices (Fiscalías Especializadas en Materia Ambiental – FEMA): Specialised prosecutorial units for environmental offences,¹³³ with jurisdiction to investigate crimes classified under Title XIII of the Penal Code (crimes against the environment and natural resources) and related offences, including those committed by criminal organisations. There are currently 32 FEMA offices and 15 Crime Prevention Prosecutors’ Offices with environmental jurisdiction operating nationwide. FEMA has secured over 1,300 convictions for environmental crimes between 2024 and early 2025.¹³⁴

National Police of Peru – Environment/Investigation Units: Law enforcement units tasked with investigating and addressing environmental crimes. The National Police works alongside FEMA, OEFA, and SERFOR in joint operations and field investigations.

Office of Satellite Georeferenced Monitoring Units for Environmental Crimes (UMGSDA) / National Commission for Aerospace Research and Development (CONIDA): UMGSDA, housed within the Public Prosecutor’s Office, produces early warning reports on deforestation and illegal mining and issues official expert reports for FEMA. CONIDA operates Peru’s satellite systems (including PeruSat-1, Sentinel, and Landsat) and provides satellite imagery to enforcement agencies. The technical and scientific reports produced by UMGSDA and issued by CONIDA constitute admissible evidence in criminal proceedings.

National Environmental Management Commission (CNGA): The CNGA is the permanent governing body and highest authority on environmental management within the Judiciary. It has an organic and functional structure responsible for formulating, designing, promoting, and overseeing the implementation of the institution’s environmental policy and Environmental Management Plan, fostering the incorporation of sustainability criteria and the strengthening of environmentally responsible institutional management.

Judiciary (PJ): The Judiciary, through its judicial bodies, hears, adjudicates, and, where applicable, sanctions individuals and legal entities involved in the commission of environmental crimes, as defined in Articles 304 through 314-D of Title XIII of the Criminal Code, within the framework of the powers assigned to the Judiciary by the Constitution and the law.

D. Oversight and access to justice #

These institutions contribute to accountability by receiving complaints, conducting oversight, and facilitating access to justice.

Defensoría del Pueblo (Ombudsman): Provides access to justice and legal representation for vulnerable populations, and has broad standing to file compliance proceedings on behalf of diffuse interests, including environmental rights. The Ombudsman may investigate complaints, issue non-binding but influential recommendations to public agencies, and intervene as an amicus curiae in constitutional proceedings.

Constitutional Court: The ultimate arbiter of constitutional rights in Peru. The Constitutional Court has developed important case law on environmental rights, recognising diffuse environmental interests and applying a flexible approach to standing requirements in cases involving indigenous communities and rights of nature.

Legal routes available for civil society #

A. Categories of nature crimes #

Two key legal instruments regulate nature crimes and environmental protection under Peruvian law:

Forestry and Wildlife Law (Law No. 29763 of 2011, as amended).¹³⁵ The foundational statute for Peru’s forest governance, requiring that all commercial or industrial forest activities be conducted under approved management plans. It mandates that any person or company involved in the harvest, processing, or trade of timber and forest products must prove the legal origin of those products through the Control Module of the National Forestry and Wildlife Information System (MC-SNIFFS), a national traceability system. Legislative Decrees No. 1319 (2017) and No. 1517 (2021)¹³⁶ further strengthened these requirements, introducing digital recordkeeping and expanding traceability obligations.

A critical turning point in Peru’s legal history came in 2024 with the enactment of Law No. 31973,¹³⁷ which amended the Forestry and Wildlife Law by: (i) suspending the requirement for forest zoning prior to granting enabling titles; (ii) transferring zoning authority from the Ministry of the Environment to the Ministry of Agrarian Development and Irrigation; (iii) eliminating the need for state authorisation before converting forested land to other uses; and (iv) retroactively legalising past illegal deforestation. Although the Constitutional Court struck down some aspects of this amendment, it upheld the retroactive validation of land-use changes – a decision widely viewed as a significant setback for environmental governance and the rule of law.

Criminal Code – Title XIII (Legislative Decree No. 635, Arts. 304–314C).¹³⁸ The principal criminal statute for environmental protection, establishing pollution crimes and crimes against natural resources. Penalties range from two to twelve years of imprisonment depending on the offence and aggravating circumstances. Illustrative offences include:

Environmental pollution (Art. 304): imprisonment of four to six years and a fine.

Illegal mining (Art. 307-A): imprisonment of four to eight years and a fine; aggravated to eight to ten years in protected areas or indigenous communities.

Financing illegal mining (Art. 307-C): imprisonment of four to twelve years and 100 to 600 day-fine.

Offences against forests or forest formations (Art. 310): imprisonment of four to six years and community service of 40 to 80 days.

Illegal trafficking of timber forest products (Art. 310-A): imprisonment of four to seven years.

B. Routes for legal action #

The legal routes available to CSOs and indigenous communities to defend against nature crimes in Peru fall into three broad categories: judicial mechanisms (constitutional, civil, and criminal), administrative mechanisms, and international mechanisms. In practice, these mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and are often used in combination.

1. Judicial Mechanisms #

Judicial mechanisms provide formal avenues to seek accountability, reparation, and the protection of environmental and constitutional rights.

a. Constitutional Mechanisms #

The Peruvian Constitution¹³⁹ recognises the right to ‘enjoy a balanced and adequate environment for the development of life’ as a fundamental right. Two constitutional processes are of particular relevance to environmental protection.

Protection Action (Acción de amparo). The amparo is the constitutional process used to protect fundamental rights against acts or omissions by authorities or individuals that violate or imminently threaten those rights.¹⁴⁰ In the environmental context, it may be used to challenge unlawful actions affecting the right to a healthy environment, the right to water, or the rights of indigenous communities. Standing is currently limited under the New Constitutional Procedural Code to the “affected party”,¹⁴¹ departing from the broader ‘any person’ standard of the previous code. However, the Constitutional Court has consistently interpreted standing flexibly in cases involving diffuse or collective environmental interests.¹⁴² CSOs have been permitted to participate as amicus curiae or as representatives in cases involving indigenous communities and peoples in isolation or initial contact. Courts have also adopted a relaxed approach to procedural requirements – including the exhaustion of administrative remedies – where the nature of the environmental claim warrants it. The landmark 2024 Marañón River case¹⁴³ illustrates this approach: a federation of Kukama-Kukamiria women filed a successful amparo action recognising the Marañón River as a subject of rights, with the court explicitly declining to insist on exhaustion of remedies in light of the constitutional significance of the claim.

Compliance Proceedings (Proceso de cumplimiento). The compliance action may be filed to ensure that reluctant authorities enforce the provisions of legal regulations or final administrative acts, or issue rulings they are required to issue. Standing is broad: any person may initiate compliance proceedings in defence of rights involving diffuse or collective interests.¹⁴⁴ The process is well suited to situations where enforcement agencies have clear legal obligations but have failed to act. Unlike the amparo, compliance proceedings do not provide compensation for environmental harm.

b. Civil Actions #

At the civil procedural level, individual civil actions are available for compensation and restoration of environmental harm.¹⁴⁵ Natural or legal persons that can prove harm, causation, and damages may file a civil action.

Collective proceedings are the mechanism for protecting diffuse interests such as the environment.¹⁴⁶ Those permitted to bring or intervene in collective proceedings include the Public Prosecutor’s Office, regional and local governments, peasant communities and/or native communities in whose jurisdiction the environmental damage occurred, and certain non-profit associations meeting judicial criteria. A significant limitation of the current system is that compensation awarded in collective proceedings is directed to district or provincial municipalities rather than the affected parties – a provision that may discourage litigation. Draft updates to the Civil Procedure Code¹⁴⁷ would extend standing to non-profit legal entities incorporated for at least one year with relevant statutory purposes, enable affected parties to benefit from compensation directly, and allow indigenous communities and their representative organisations to participate. However, four years after the Draft’s publication in 2021, it remains unapproved and unimplemented.

c. Criminal Proceedings #

Environmental and forest crimes (environmental pollution, crimes against natural resources, and illegal granting of rights) are prosecuted under the Criminal Code and Peru’s Forestry Law.¹⁴⁸ Environmental defenders also have the opportunity to request risk-based protection.¹⁴⁹

A victim, a legal entity, or a private individual who considers themselves to have been harmed by a nature crime may file a complaint and drive a prosecution, although FEMA oversees and brings the vast majority of criminal cases. Precautionary measures and reparations are available. The Public Prosecutor’s Office secured over 1,300 convictions for environmental crimes, including illegal mining and logging, between 2024 and early 2025.¹⁵⁰ A notable case is the Saweto trial, in which individuals responsible for the murder of four Indigenous environmental defenders received 28-year prison sentences.¹⁵¹

Despite these results, criminal enforcement remains substantially below the scale of illegal activities. In practice, prosecutions for forest-related crimes remain limited and insufficient relative to the scale of illegal clearing and land trafficking, with sanctions more often administrative than criminal. Between 2012 and 2021, at least 13,000 hectares were illegally cleared by companies in Loreto and Ucayali, with nearly 100% of the deforestation in those regions from 2012–2018 lacking required permits.

2. Administrative Mechanisms #

Administrative actions include filing complaints with enforcement agencies, participating in administrative sanctioning proceedings, and challenging environmental licences, permits, or authorisations issued by public authorities. Any person, natural or legal, may file administrative complaints that lead to inspections and sanctions.¹⁵² However, complainants act as informants and are not parties to the ensuing administrative proceedings, nor do they benefit from financial penalties imposed on offenders.

CSOs and affected parties can engage the relevant administrative bodies through the procedures summarised in the table below.

Case examples of successful litigation #

Repsol La Pampilla Oil Spill (Ventanilla, Lima, 2022)153 On 15 January 2022, approximately 10,704 barrels of crude oil spilled from Repsol’s La Pampilla Refinery off the coast of Ventanilla, Lima, the largest spill ever recorded on the Peruvian coast, spreading across 11,061 hectares and affecting two protected natural areas and the livelihoods of at least 5,000 fishers and small business owners. Artisanal fishermen and local residents were the first to detect and report the disaster, alerting authorities and the press, while the NGO CooperAcción, with Oxfam support, produced a technical report documenting the inadequacy of Repsol’s remediation efforts, providing an independent evidentiary basis for subsequent proceedings. OEFA initiated 22 administrative proceedings against Repsol, establishing liability in 13 concluded cases and imposing total penalties of approximately USD 72 million. All 18 of Repsol’s rehabilitation plans were rejected by the Ministry of Energy and Mines, and a civil lawsuit for USD 4.5 billion in damages was filed on behalf of affected individuals and the environment.

Saweto Trial (Criminal proceedings, confirmed 2025)154 In September 2014, four Asháninka Indigenous leaders of the Alto Tamaya-Saweto community — Edwin Chota, Jorge Ríos, Leoncio Quintísima, and Francisco Pinedo — were murdered by illegal loggers in a remote area of the Ucayali region near the Brazilian border. The four leaders had spent years documenting and denouncing illegal logging in the Amazon’s Ucayali region, filing repeated complaints with regional and national governments showing how timber mafias were encroaching on their ancestral lands. CSOs played a sustained and decisive role throughout the decade-long pursuit of justice. Rainforest Foundation US lobbied to ensure the murders were tried as organised crime, urged courts to dismiss a lead prosecutor with undisclosed conflicts of interest, pressed for an out-of-jurisdiction prosecutor to avoid further conflicts, and provided safe housing to victim family members during trial. SPDA, Amazon Watch, and Rainforest Foundation US supported Indigenous leaders in bringing international attention to the case, including during advocacy at the United Nations Climate Week in New York. Global Witness and AIDESEP, the national Indigenous organisation, maintained sustained pressure on the judiciary throughout proceedings155. In February 2023, more than eight years after the murders, five defendants received 28-year prison sentences following relentless advocacy from the Saweto community and their support network. After an unexpected reversal and retrial, an appeals court in Pucallpa upheld convictions for aggravated homicide against four loggers, each receiving sentences of 28 years and three months in prison — a rare and landmark outcome for crimes against environmental defenders in Peru.

Use of remote sensing evidence in nature crime prosecution #

CSOs and enforcement agencies play a central role in generating and structuring evidence of environmental harm through remote sensing technologies – including satellite imagery, drone overflights, geospatial mapping, and acoustic monitoring. In Peru, this evidence is admitted and used in both administrative and criminal proceedings, although the degree of formal recognition is more developed for government-produced reports than for CSO-generated data.¹⁵⁶

Legal framework: Peru has not enacted specific legislation or regulations addressing the admissibility of remote sensing evidence. Instead, admissibility is governed by general evidentiary principles applicable to documentary and technical evidence. In criminal proceedings, technical and scientific reports prepared by UMGSDA and issued by CONIDA constitute admissible official expert evidence under the general rules of the New Criminal Procedure Code. In administrative proceedings, satellite images and UMGSDA/CONIDA reports are considered adequate evidence for decision-making under the General Administrative Procedure Law.¹⁵⁷ The key standard across both contexts is that evidence must satisfy criteria of authenticity, traceability, integrity, and adequate technical support.¹⁵⁸

Court acceptance: Remote sensing evidence, including data from satellites, drones, acoustic monitoring, and eDNA, is permitted and accepted by Peruvian courts when validated by an expert. In the case of Ministerio Público v. Cacao del Perú Norte SAC (Tamshiyacu Deforestation Case, 2019), prosecutors used satellite imagery to prove the illegal deforestation of nearly 2,000 hectares of primary forest – a precedent for the use of satellite evidence in criminal environmental prosecutions. Remote sensing evidence is also used in practice by enforcement agencies: in 2023, OSINFOR deployed remote sensing technology to detect over 41,000 m³ of illegal timber valued at US$19 million.¹⁵⁹

Technical standards: No formal technical standards for evidence authentication or chain of custody specific to remote sensing have been identified in Peru beyond the general evidentiary requirements (authenticity, traceability, integrity, and expert support). Remote sensing evidence is typically used to supplement, rather than replace, field verification and other official documentation. The platforms most commonly used include the national GeoBosques system, global tools such as Global Forest Watch, and Peru’s state satellite infrastructure (PeruSat-1, Sentinel, Landsat).

Training and capacity: No specific established training programmes for prosecutors or judges on the use or validation of remote sensing evidence have been identified in Peru, representing a significant capacity gap. UMGSDA provides some institutional capacity within the prosecutorial system, but CSO-generated satellite evidence faces higher admissibility scrutiny than government-produced reports.

Case example – use of remote sensing evidence #

Ministerio Público v. Cacao del Perú Norte SAC (Tamshiyacu Deforestation Case, 2019)160 Prosecutors brought criminal charges against Cacao del Perú Norte SAC (later renamed Tamshi SAC) for the illegal clearance of nearly 2,000 hectares of primary Amazon rainforest near the town of Tamshiyacu, in the Loreto region, without the required environmental permits or authorisation from the Ministry of Agriculture. The court ruled in favour of the prosecution, sentencing the general manager to eight years in prison and imposing fines and reparations exceeding 15 million soles. Satellite imagery played a central role in the outcome, directly contradicting the company’s claim that no primary forest had been cleared. The case illustrates how remote sensing evidence, when combined with field verification and expert testimony, can sustain successful criminal prosecutions for large-scale deforestation and establish a precedent for the evidentiary use of satellite data in Peruvian environmental litigation.

Challenges in engagement with authorities #

Engagement between CSOs and public authorities in Peru is constrained by structural, procedural, legislative, and political barriers that weaken accountability efforts. Although formal channels exist, they frequently fail to produce timely or proportionate enforcement outcomes.

Weakened legal protections and retroactive amnesties. The 2024 amendments to the Forestry and Forestry and Wildlife Law (Law No. 31973) represent the most significant recent setback for environmental governance. The law retroactively legalised past illegal deforestation, transferred forest zoning authority from conservation-focused to agriculture-oriented bodies, and decriminalised illegal logging in certain contexts. Although the Constitutional Court struck down some aspects, the retroactive validation of land-use changes was upheld. This follows a pattern of legislative rollback that undermines the deterrent effect of enforcement and signals potential impunity for future violations.¹⁶¹

Institutional fragmentation and weak coordination. Forest governance in Peru is divided between national and regional authorities, with multiple agencies – including SERFOR (under the Ministry of Agriculture) and SERNANP (under MINAM) – operating with conflicting priorities that frequently place economic development in tension with conservation objectives. Coordination mechanisms such as the National Multi-Sectoral Strategy to Fight Against Illegal Logging exist but remain weak in practice. The MC-SNIFFS timber traceability platform remains only partially operational. The decentralisation of enforcement to regional authorities, combined with stalled progress in that process, has produced inconsistent enforcement and regulatory gaps.¹⁶²

Corruption, political influence, and impunity. Powerful agricultural and mining lobbies have shaped legislation in ways that favour economic interests and generate impunity, while organised criminal networks involved in illegal logging, illegal mining, and wildlife trafficking operate with limited risk of prosecution. Enforcement agencies – including FEMA, the National Police, MINAM, OEFA, and SERFOR – often lack the resources, specialised personnel, and coordination needed to investigate and prosecute complex environmental crimes effectively.¹⁶³

Violence and threats against defenders. Peru ranks among the most dangerous countries in the world for environmental defenders. Over the past decade, 33 Indigenous leaders have been murdered in the Peruvian Amazon, with the majority of cases remaining unresolved. Perpetrators are frequently members of criminal organisations engaged in illegal logging, illegal mining, land trafficking, and drug trafficking. This climate of impunity discourages the reporting and prosecution of nature crimes and leaves ecosystems and communities inadequately protected. Institutional protection mechanisms, such as Supreme Decree 004-2021-JUS, have had limited practical impact in the most exposed areas.¹⁶⁴

Restrictions on civil society. The enactment of Law No. 32301, APCI Law, in April 2025 represents a new structural constraint on CSO engagement. By classifying as a very serious infraction the use of international cooperation funds to advise, assist, or finance any action against the Peruvian State – including in environmental cases – the law creates a chilling effect on legally available mechanisms and limits the technical and legal support that organisations can provide to indigenous communities and defenders, which largely depend on international cooperation funding.¹⁶⁵

Procedural barriers and litigation timelines. Judicial proceedings are often slow: the Saweto case took nearly eight years from the murders to confirmed convictions. While interim measures (including precautionary injunctions before FEMA and OEFA) can effectively halt ongoing harm, administrative decisions and judicial verdicts often arrive after irreversible damage has occurred. The absence of formal legal representation for complainants in administrative proceedings further limits the depth of civil society engagement in enforcement processes.

Conclusion & recommendations #

Peru has a formally robust constitutional and legislative framework for environmental protection, combining constitutional guarantees, a General Environmental Law, a network of specialised enforcement agencies, dedicated environmental prosecutors (FEMA), and a growing body of case law on environmental and indigenous rights. Landmark decisions such as the Marañón River rights case illustrate how these tools can be combined to produce ambitious accountability outcomes. At the same time, persistent enforcement gaps, legislative rollback, institutional fragmentation, corruption, high levels of violence against defenders, and new restrictions on civil society undermine the effectiveness of the system in practice. The non-ratification of the Escazú Agreement and the enactment of Law No. 32301 leave important normative and practical gaps that urgently need to be addressed.

1. Ratify the Escazú Agreement and strengthen defender protection. Ratify and implement the Escazú Agreement, with particular focus on the fourth pillar on environmental defenders. Develop a comprehensive, well-resourced programme for the protection of environmental defenders, including tailored protocols for defenders operating in high-risk contexts such as illegal gold mining zones, areas subject to land trafficking, and indigenous territories under threat.

2. Repeal or substantially reform the restrictive provisions of Law No. 31973 (AntiForestry Law), and Law No. 32301 (APCI Law). Restore effective forest zoning requirements, repeal the retroactive legalisation of illegal deforestation, and revoke the provisions of Law No. 32301 that criminalise the use of international cooperation resources for legal assistance in environmental cases. These reforms are necessary to restore the rule of law and enable civil society to fulfil its legitimate role in environmental accountability.

3. Strengthen institutional capacity and inter-agency coordination. Consolidate the enforcement capacity of OEFA, FEMA, SERFOR, and the National Police; reinforce specialised environmental units and address jurisdictional overlaps and conflicting mandates through clearer protocols. Fully operationalise the MC-SNIFFS timber traceability platform and establish real-time information-sharing mechanisms between enforcement agencies.

4. Reform civil collective proceedings. Expedite passage of the Draft New Civil Procedure Code to enable non-profit organisations with relevant statutory purposes to initiate collective environmental actions, ensure affected communities can benefit directly from compensation awards, and remove the requirement that compensation be channelled exclusively to municipal authorities.

5. Strengthen evidentiary frameworks for remote sensing. Develop formal technical standards and protocols for the admissibility, authentication, and chain of custody of remote sensing evidence in both administrative and criminal proceedings. Establish training programmes for FEMA prosecutors and judges on the evaluation of satellite, drone, and other geospatial evidence. Institutionalise cooperation agreements between technical CSOs and public authorities to enable CSO-generated monitoring data to be used as formally recognised evidence.

6. Improve sanction effectiveness and target enforcement on key economic actors. Ensure that enforcement under the Criminal Code and the Forestry and Wildlife Law targets the financial and organisational chains behind large-scale deforestation and illegal mining. Strengthen asset recovery and financial investigation in environmental cases, and ensure that administrative fines (such as the Petroperú fines arising from the La Pampilla oil spill) are collected and effectively implemented.

Suriname #

Status of CSOs, protection and transparency #

Suriname recognises freedom of association, assembly and demonstration in Chapter V of its 1987 Constitution (revised in 1992), together with freedom of expression and the freedom to form political organisations. CSOs are organised as associations (verenigingen) or foundations (stichtingen) under Book 2 of the Suriname Civil Code, and are generally able to operate without prior authorisation, subject to ordinary registration and reporting requirements.¹⁶⁶,¹⁶⁷

Suriname’s civic space is more open than that of several other Amazonian countries, although CIVICUS classifies it as “narrowed”, reflecting concerns about pressure on journalists, gaps in transparency and emerging tensions over land and resource governance.¹⁶⁸

Suriname’s rights landscape is fundamentally shaped by the case-law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In the Saramaka People v. Suriname judgment of 28 November 2007, the Court held the State internationally responsible for violating the right to property and to judicial protection of the Saramaka people through the granting of logging and mining concessions on their traditional lands without prior consultation and benefit-sharing. The Court ordered Suriname to delimit, demarcate and grant collective title to the Saramaka territory and to guarantee meaningful consultation and shared benefits in future projects.¹⁶⁹

In the Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname judgment of 25 November 2015, the Court extended this doctrine to the Indigenous Kaliña and Lokono peoples of Lower Marowijne, finding violations of the rights to recognition of juridical personality, collective property, political participation and access to information. The Court ordered, inter alia, the establishment of an effective domestic mechanism for the delimitation, demarcation and titling of Indigenous and tribal territories, and meaningful consultation in protected area and concession decisions.¹⁷⁰

Implementation of these judgments has been uneven. At the 188th session of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in November 2023, the Association of Saamaka Authorities (VSG) and the Association of Indigenous Village Leaders in Suriname (VIDS) reported that Suriname had still not adopted the legal framework for Indigenous and tribal land recognition required by the rulings, and that new logging and mining concessions continued to be issued in collective territories.¹⁷¹

In April 2024, the Government of Suriname approved a gold-mining concession, a substantial part of which overlaps with Saamaka traditional territory. Saamaka leaders, including Hugo Jabini, recipient of the Goldman Environmental Prize together with Wanze Eduards in 2009 for their role in the Saramaka case, reported serious threats following their opposition to the concession. In June 2024, more than 125 Saamaka community members issued the Goejaba Declaration, peacefully rejecting the concession and demanding the cessation of mining on their land.^172,173,174

Implementation of the Escazú Agreement #

The Escazú Agreement, adopted in 2018 under the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, establishes binding obligations to strengthen environmental democracy through four pillars: access to environmental information, public participation, access to justice, and the protection of environmental defenders.

Suriname has neither signed nor ratified the Escazú Agreement. Although the Government has indicated, including in early 2024, that the question is under examination by the responsible department, no formal commitment to sign or ratify has been adopted. Suriname is therefore the only Amazonian country that remains outside the Agreement entirely.¹⁷⁵

Despite the absence of formal accession, the four pillars of the Escazú Agreement provide a useful analytical framework for assessing the strengths and gaps of Suriname’s domestic regime.

(i) Access to environmental information. Suriname does not yet have a comprehensive freedom of information law. Article 9 of the Environmental Framework Act of 2020 introduces obligations of public participation and consultation in environmental decision-making and provides for environmental information to be made available, but the practical operationalisation of these obligations remains limited and an institutional culture of proactive disclosure is still nascent.¹⁷⁶,¹⁷⁷

(ii) Public participation in environmental decision-making. Public participation in environmental and social impact assessment is regulated under the Environmental Framework Act and its supporting guidelines administered by the National Environmental Authority (NMA), the successor to NIMOS as of mid-2024. The legal recognition of free, prior and informed consultation of Indigenous and tribal peoples derives from the Inter-American Court’s case-law and remains incomplete in domestic law.¹⁷⁸

(iii) Access to justice. Judicial protection of environmental rights is exercised through the ordinary courts and, since 2019, the Constitutional Court. Tort actions under the Civil Code provide for environmental damages claims. These mechanisms are described in Section IV below.

(iv) Protection of environmental defenders. Suriname does not have a dedicated legal framework or institutional mechanism for the protection of environmental and human rights defenders. The Saamaka context illustrates the operational gap, with leaders reporting threats and intimidation following their opposition to logging and mining concessions.¹⁷⁹

Institutional landscape for nature crime #

Suriname’s environmental enforcement landscape combines a comparatively recent environmental ministry and an environmental authority with a long-standing forestry foundation and a mining regulator. The principal bodies mandated with monitoring and enforcing against crimes concerning deforestation, environmental degradation and attacks on defenders are grouped below by function.

A. Monitoring, licensing, and administrative enforcement #

These bodies are responsible for compliance monitoring, inspections, licensing and administrative sanctions.

National Environmental Authority (NMA). The NMA, successor to the National Institute for Environment and Development (NIMOS) and operational from July 2024, is the central environmental authority for environmental and social impact assessment, environmental enforcement and oversight of compliance with the Environmental Framework Act. It is administratively attached to the Ministry of Spatial Planning and Environment (ROM).¹⁸⁰

Ministry of Spatial Planning and Environment (ROM). ROM, created in 2020, is responsible for environmental policy, spatial planning and climate policy coordination. It coordinates the work of the NMA and serves as the national focal point for the UNFCCC, the CBD and the Minamata Convention on Mercury.

Ministry of Natural Resources (NH) and Geological and Mining Department (GMD). The Ministry of Natural Resources oversees mining, energy and water resources. The Geological and Mining Department within NH is responsible for granting and supervising mining and exploration rights under the 1986 Mining Decree.

Foundation for Forest Management and Forest Supervision (SBB). SBB is the principal body responsible for the supervision of forestry activities under the 1992 Forest Management Act. It administers concessions, conducts inspections and operates the national forest monitoring system, which feeds into deforestation monitoring and audit processes.

Ministry of Land and Forest Management (GBB). GBB is responsible for land allocation, forestry policy and the strategic supervision of the SBB. It articulates land use and forestry policy with broader spatial planning and economic development objectives.

Nature Conservation Division (Ministry of Land and Forest Management). The Nature Conservation Division administers Suriname’s system of nature reserves and protected areas under the 1954 Nature Conservation Act, including iconic protected areas such as the Central Suriname Nature Reserve.

B. Policy and strategic coordination #

Ministry of Spatial Planning and Environment (ROM) coordinates environmental policy and the implementation of multilateral environmental agreements, including the Minamata Convention on Mercury (Suriname acceded in 2018) and the country’s climate commitments.

C. Criminal investigation and enforcement #

Public Prosecutor’s Office (Openbaar Ministerie). The Public Prosecutor’s Office is responsible for the criminal investigation and prosecution of environmental offences, including offences under the Environmental Framework Act, the Forest Management Act and the Mining Decree. Suriname has not yet established a dedicated environmental crime division within the Public Prosecutor’s Office.

Police Force (Korps Politie Suriname). The Suriname Police, including its environmental and nature unit, conducts investigations and joint operational deployments with SBB, the GMD and, when relevant, the National Army of Suriname, particularly against illegal gold mining and illegal logging in the interior.

D. Oversight and access to justice #

Court of Justice (Hof van Justitie) and Cantonal Courts. Civil and criminal claims are adjudicated by the Cantonal Courts at first instance, with appellate review by the Court of Justice. The Court of Justice also exercises functions equivalent to administrative review for certain governmental decisions.

Constitutional Court (Constitutioneel Hof). The Constitutional Court, established under Articles 137–144 of the Constitution and the 2019 implementing Act, has competence to test the constitutionality of statutes and the conformity of governmental measures with fundamental rights and treaty obligations. It is a relatively recent institution whose environmental case-law is still in formation.

Audit Office (Rekenkamer van Suriname). The Audit Office exercises external financial and performance control over the State and can identify administrative, civil and criminal liabilities, including in the management of natural resources.

Indigenous and Maroon (tribal) governance authorities. Indigenous and Maroon peoples in Suriname maintain their own customary governance authorities (e.g. Gaaman, Captains and Basia among Maroon peoples, and traditional village authorities among Indigenous peoples), which play a central role in territorial governance and in the operationalisation of consultation processes derived from the Inter-American Court’s rulings.

Legal routes available for civil society #

A. Categories of nature crimes #

Two key legal instruments regulate nature crimes and environmental protection under Surinamese law: #

Forest Management Act of 1992. The Forest Management Act is the principal statute governing forest exploitation and timber production in Suriname. It vests regulatory authority over all logging activities in the Foundation for Forest Management and Production Control (SBB, Stichting voor Bosbeheer en Bostoezicht), an autonomous body operating under the Ministry of Natural Resources. The Act establishes a permit-based system under which timber harvesting may only take place in areas where a formal cutting licence has been issued, whether a commercial forest concession, a community forest permit, or an incidental cutting licence. Compliance is tracked through a mandatory cutting register (kapregister), which is verified by SBB forest guards and uploaded to the SBB’s LogPro database, enabling traceability of extracted timber from stump to export. Logging outside the terms of an issued permit, or without any permit at all, constitutes illegal exploitation under the Act.

Environmental Framework Act (No. 97 of 2020). The Environmental Framework Act is the overarching statute for environmental governance and represents the most significant legislative development in Suriname’s environmental law in recent decades. It establishes the National Environmental Authority (NMA) as the competent authority for environmental regulation, replacing the former NIMOS. Criminal penalties apply to violations: intentional breach of statutory obligations under the Act is punishable by up to six years of imprisonment and a fine at the fifth category of the Criminal Code; non-intentional violations may attract a fine at the same level.

In addition to these two primary instruments, two older statutes remain operative and are relevant to nature crime prosecutions:

Nature Conservation Act (No. 26 of 1954) governs Suriname’s protected areas network, currently covering over 2 million hectares and approximately 12 per cent of national territory, including the UNESCO World Heritage-listed Central Suriname Nature Reserve. The Act prohibits any activity that would negatively affect the integrity of a nature reserve. Management of protected areas and wildlife is the responsibility of the Nature Conservation Division (NCD), operating within the State Forest Management Service (LBB).

Game Act (1954), as amended, establishes a general prohibition on the capture, killing, possession, purchase, trade, transport, import or export of protected wildlife species and any parts or products derived from them. Categories of wildlife, that is, protected species, game species, cage species and predominantly harmful species, are defined by regulation. Enforcement of the Game Act falls primarily to game wardens under the LBB. Practical enforcement is acknowledged to be limited in the vast interior of the country, though it is more consistently applied at export control points in the capital.

B. Routes for legal action #

The legal routes available to CSOs and Indigenous and Maroon (tribal) communities to defend against nature crimes fall into four broad categories: constitutional and judicial mechanisms, criminal proceedings, civil actions, and international mechanisms. In practice these mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and are often used in combination, depending on the objective pursued (e.g. immediate suspension of activities, criminal accountability, or environmental restoration).

1. Judicial Mechanisms #

Judicial mechanisms provide formal avenues to seek accountability, reparation and the protection of environmental and constitutional rights.

a. Constitutional Review #

Since the entry into force of the Act on the Constitutional Court in 2019, the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of statutes and the conformity of governmental measures with fundamental rights and with Suriname’s international obligations, including under the American Convention on Human Rights. While its environmental jurisprudence is still emerging, the Court provides a potential domestic route to enforce the rights to property and to a healthy environment, in particular for Indigenous and tribal communities relying on the Saramaka and Kaliña and Lokono judgments.

b. Ordinary judicial review and civil actions #

Civil litigation in Suriname is governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. The Civil Code (Book 6, Title 3) provides for tort claims (onrechtmatige daad) for environmental damages, including against the State and private parties. The Cantonal Courts hear such claims at first instance, with appeal to the Court of Justice. CSOs and communities have used civil tort claims and provisional measures (kort geding) to seek injunctions against the implementation of logging and mining concessions, including in support of the implementation of the Inter-American Court rulings.

c. Criminal Proceedings #

Any individual, CSO or community may file a criminal complaint (aangifte) with the Public Prosecutor’s Office in respect of environmental offences. Article 11 of the Environmental Framework Act and the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code and of the Mining Decree, Forest Management Act and Nature Conservation Act provide the substantive basis for prosecution. Victims may also intervene in criminal proceedings to claim civil reparation under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

d. Indigenous and tribal authorities #

Indigenous and Maroon traditional authorities exercise governance functions in their territories, including the operationalisation of consultation processes and the management of customary land. While not part of the formal judicial structure, these authorities are recognised as legitimate interlocutors by the Inter-American Court and by emerging Surinamese practice, and they play a central role in the design and implementation of consultation procedures, environmental monitoring and dispute resolution.

2. Administrative Mechanisms #

Administrative actions before the NMA, SBB, the Geological and Mining Department and the Nature Conservation Division include complaints, requests for inspection, requests for the initiation of sanctioning procedures and challenges to authorisations. The Environmental Framework Act provides specific procedures for environmental and social impact assessment, including for public participation and observations. CSOs and affected parties can engage the relevant administrative bodies through the procedures summarised below.

Case examples of successful litigation #

Twelve Indigenous and Maroon communities v. State of Suriname (2024)181 Twelve Indigenous and Maroon groups, supported by Climate Change Advisory Services, filed a civil injunction before a Surinamese court. Communities argued that the concession grants had been carried out dishonestly and would cause enormous environmental damage, and that the government had no legal authority to grant land for economic activities affecting their residential and hunting areas without first obtaining free, prior and informed consent. The court granted the injunction, halting development across approximately 535,000 hectares. In its ruling, the court held that the government does not have the right to grant land without FPIC, and that, absent such a process, burial grounds, hunting areas and other elements of traditional life were at risk. The ruling was subsequently cited by VIDS (the Association of Indigenous Village Leaders) in demanding FPIC for a proposed Chinese bauxite mining concession, illustrating the precedential reach of the decision. Despite the ruling, agricultural development pressure continued, with new private operators entering the same areas in late 2024 and 2025.

Use of remote sensing evidence in nature crime prosecution #

In Suriname, remote sensing evidence is admissible under the general evidentiary rules of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Code of Civil Procedure, although the development of dedicated procedures and standards for geospatial evidence remains nascent. In 2023, Surinamese government provided training in geospatial analysis, certifying 19 government ministries and institutes to be able to conduct their own analysis of remote sensing data.¹⁸²

Saamaka community mapping and the Goejaba Declaration # Faced with continued logging and mining concessions on their territory in violation of the 2007 Saramaka People v. Suriname Inter-American Court judgment, the Saamaka community deployed remote sensing as a primary documentation tool. In July 2023, EOS Data Analytics applied satellite imagery to track road construction by logging company Palmera N.V. through Saamaka forest. In June 2024, the International Land Coalition, LandMark and CIRAD released a formal geospatial analysis establishing that 32% of Saamaka territory, 447,000 hectares, had been granted in concessions without FPIC, causing over 60,000 hectares of forest degradation. This evidence underpinned the Goejaba Declaration, signed by over 125 community members rejecting a gold-mining concession, which was subsequently placed on hold. The data was presented to the President, Vice-President and Parliament in June 2024 and to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in November 2023. The same month, a Surinamese court granted an injunction protecting 535,000 hectares from agricultural development, ruling that land cannot be granted without FPIC. The case demonstrates that community-generated geospatial evidence can support simultaneous domestic, executive and international human rights proceedings.183 184 185

Challenges in engagement with authorities #

Engagement between CSOs and public authorities in Suriname is constrained by structural, procedural and political barriers that weaken accountability efforts. Although the country has not been characterised by the levels of lethal violence against defenders observed in other Amazonian countries, recurring patterns of pressure on Maroon and Indigenous leaders, weak implementation of international rulings and limited institutional capacity all affect the operating environment for environmental civil society.

Non-implementation of Inter-American Court rulings. Almost two decades after the Saramaka ruling, Suriname has still not adopted the legal framework on Indigenous and tribal land recognition required by the Court. New logging and mining concessions continue to be issued in collective territories without proper consultation, generating recurring conflicts and undermining the legitimacy of environmental governance.¹⁸⁶

Pressure on environmental and Indigenous defenders. Saamaka, Indigenous and environmental defenders report threats, intimidation and pressure following their opposition to logging and mining concessions in their territories, particularly in connection with the gold-mining concession approved in April 2024. The absence of a dedicated national protection mechanism for defenders heightens these risks.¹⁸⁷

Limited institutional capacity. The National Environmental Authority is a very recent institution and is still building its operational, technical and human capacity. Coordination with SBB, the GMD and the Public Prosecutor’s Office is uneven, and the absence of a dedicated environmental crime division within the prosecutorial system limits the effective investigation and prosecution of organised environmental crime, including illegal gold mining networks operating across the interior.¹⁸⁸

Persistence of illegal and informal gold mining. Artisanal and small-scale gold mining represents a substantial share of Suriname’s gold production and is a major source of mercury contamination and deforestation. While the National Action Plan adopted in 2024 under the Minamata Convention provides a structured roadmap to reduce mercury use, implementation requires sustained political commitment, investment and coordination with affected communities.¹⁸⁹

Legislative drift and agricultural expansion. Recent announcements of large-scale agricultural development plans, including in areas with high forest value, and persistent gaps in the Indigenous and tribal land rights framework risk consolidating a pattern of forest loss and territorial conflict, despite Suriname’s commitments to protect a substantial share of its forests.¹⁹⁰

Procedural barriers. Limited transparency in concession allocation and inconsistent access to environmental and forestry data restrict CSOs’ ability to follow specific cases and sustain engagement over time. The absence of a comprehensive freedom-of-information law and the early stage of NMA operations leave significant gaps in proactive disclosure.¹⁹¹

Conclusion & recommendations #

Suriname combines a relatively open civic space and a strong regional human rights record -anchored in two landmark Inter-American Court rulings on Indigenous and tribal land rights -with a recent and partially built environmental governance architecture, persistent gaps in the protection of Indigenous and Maroon territories, and a structural reliance on artisanal gold mining that drives mercury pollution and deforestation. Strengthening environmental accountability in Suriname therefore requires not only continued institutional reform but also targeted action to implement the Inter-American Court rulings, to consolidate the protection of defenders, and to invest in the technical capacity of civil society and public authorities.

1. Implement the Saramaka and Kaliña and Lokono judgments. Adopt a legal framework on the recognition, delimitation, demarcation and titling of Indigenous and tribal territories that gives full effect to the Inter-American Court rulings; establish a dedicated mechanism with the meaningful participation of Indigenous and Maroon peoples, and align the issuance of logging and mining concessions with the obligations of prior consultation and benefit-sharing.

2. Sign and ratify the Escazú Agreement. Initiate the formal process to sign and ratify the Escazú Agreement; use the four-pillar framework to consolidate Suriname’s instruments on environmental information, public participation, access to justice and protection of defenders.

3. Strengthen the protection of defenders. Establish a dedicated national mechanism for the protection of environmental and human rights defenders, with specific protocols for Indigenous and Maroon defenders, and clear obligations on the police, the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Constitutional Court.

4. Consolidate the National Environmental Authority. Reinforce the operational, technical and human resources of the NMA, finalise the regulatory framework under the Environmental Framework Act, and develop joint protocols with SBB, the GMD, the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the police on the prevention, investigation and prosecution of environmental offences.

5. Implement the Minamata National Action Plan. Ensure the effective implementation of the 2024 National Action Plan on Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining, with measurable targets, resources and clear coordination with the Saamaka, Indigenous and other affected communities.

6. Enhance access to environmental information. Adopt a comprehensive freedom of information law aligned with the Escazú framework, and ensure that environmental licensing files, sanctioning records, forest concessions, mining cadastres and monitoring data are systematically published in machine-readable formats.

7. Institutionalise remote sensing evidence and technical cooperation with CSOs. Support cooperation agreements between technical CSOs (Forest Peoples Programme, WRI, MAAP, RAISG partners) and public authorities; develop in-house capacity within enforcement bodies to interpret and validate satellite and drone data; and integrate Indigenous and Maroon community monitoring systems into national environmental monitoring frameworks.

Venezuela #

Status of CSOs, protection and transparency #

Venezuela formally guarantees freedom of association, peaceful assembly and political organisation in Articles 52, 53 and 67 of the 1999 Constitution. CSOs are organised as civil associations, foundations or non-profit civil companies under the Civil Code and may operate at national, regional and local level.¹⁹²

In practice, the operational space for civil society has narrowed dramatically since the early 2010s, and even more so following the adoption of the Anti-Solidarity Law (Ley contra el Fascismo, el Neofascismo y Expresiones Similares) in August 2024 and the Law on Oversight, Regularisation, Operation and Financing of Non-Governmental and Non-Profit Social Organisations – known as the Anti-NGO Law – enacted on 15 November 2024. The Anti-NGO Law requires NGOs to obtain government authorisation to operate, channels international cooperation through a State fund and grants authorities broad discretion to deny or revoke authorisation on political or security grounds. UN human rights mechanisms and a wide coalition of regional and international organisations have warned that the framework is incompatible with international standards on freedom of association and access to information, and that it places Venezuela’s civic space on a trajectory of effective closure.^193,194

Venezuela’s civic space is classified as “closed” by CIVICUS.¹⁹⁵ Provea, the FIDH–OMCT Observatory, Amnesty International and the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela have documented hundreds of attacks, threats, detentions and judicial harassment cases against human rights and environmental defenders in 2023–2025. The Centro para Defensores y Justicia recorded¹⁹⁶ approximately 979 attacks and security incidents against defenders during 2024 – almost double the figure for 2023 – and high-profile cases including the detention of Carlos Correa, director of Espacio Público, and the judicial harassment of Oscar Murillo, coordinator of Provea, illustrate a pattern of selective persecution against organisations exposing rights violations.^197,198

Indigenous defenders in the Amazon basin – in particular Yanomami, Pemón, Ye’kwana, Kariña and Sanöma leaders – face a distinct and severe pattern of risk linked to the expansion of illegal mining in the Arco Minero del Orinoco. The IACHR and its Office of the Special Rapporteur on Economic, Social, Cultural and Environmental Rights (REDESCA) issued a joint statement in November 2024 calling on Venezuela to protect the Yanomami people from the advance of illegal mining and other illicit activities, including violence, sexual exploitation and forced labour associated with illegal mining camps. UN and NGO investigations document hundreds of preventable deaths in Yanomami territory in 2023–2024, attributed to disease, mercury contamination and violence linked to mining.^199,200

Position with respect to the Escazú Agreement #

The Escazú Agreement, adopted in 2018 under the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, establishes binding obligations to strengthen environmental democracy through four pillars: access to environmental information, public participation, access to justice, and the protection of environmental defenders.

Venezuela has neither signed nor ratified the Escazú Agreement. The absence of accession leaves the country outside the regional framework on environmental democracy, although the four pillars of the Agreement provide a useful diagnostic tool for examining the strengths and gaps of the Venezuelan regime.²⁰¹

(i) Access to environmental information. Venezuela has no comprehensive law on access to public information. The 1999 Constitution recognises a right to access information held by public authorities (Article 28 and Article 143), but in practice obtaining environmental data on mining concessions, environmental impact assessments and enforcement actions in the Arco Minero del Orinoco is extremely difficult, and several official datasets that were previously public are no longer accessible.²⁰²

(ii) Public participation in environmental decision-making. The Constitution and the Ley Orgánica de Pueblos y Comunidades Indígenas establish far-reaching obligations of prior consultation, including for the exploitation of natural resources in indigenous habitats (Article 120 of the Constitution). However, the establishment of the Arco Minero by Presidential Decree in 2016, without prior consultation with affected indigenous peoples, is widely regarded by domestic and international observers as a paradigmatic violation of these obligations.^203,204

(iii) Access to justice. Venezuelan law provides a developed catalogue of constitutional and administrative remedies – including the acción de amparo and contentious administrative review – supplemented by criminal proceedings under the Ley Penal del Ambiente. These mechanisms are described in Section IV below. However, their independence and effectiveness have been severely affected by the political and institutional crisis affecting the judiciary.^205,206

(iv) Protection of environmental defenders. Venezuela does not have a dedicated mechanism for the protection of environmental defenders. The Anti-NGO Law, the Anti-Solidarity Law and the pattern of harassment and detention documented by international human rights mechanisms in 2024–2025 illustrate the severity of the gap on this pillar.^207,208

Institutional landscape for nature crime #

Venezuela’s formal environmental enforcement landscape is built around a national environmental ministry, sector-specific authorities for mining and indigenous peoples, an environmental prosecutorial mandate and ordinary criminal-justice institutions. The functional independence and capacity of these bodies has, however, been significantly affected by the political and institutional context of the past decade.

A. Monitoring, licensing, and administrative enforcement #

These bodies are responsible for compliance monitoring, inspections, licensing and administrative sanctions.

Ministry of People’s Power for Ecosocialism (MinEC). MinEC, established by Decreto N° 1.378 of 2014, is the national environmental authority. It is responsible for environmental policy, the issuance of environmental authorisations, supervision of compliance with the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente (LOA) and the Ley Penal del Ambiente (LPA) and oversight of administrative sanctioning procedures.^209,210

Ministry of People’s Power for Ecological Mining Development. Created in 2016 alongside the Arco Minero del Orinoco, this ministry is responsible for mining policy and the granting and supervision of mining rights. Its mandate has been the subject of intense controversy because of the lack of effective environmental supervision in the Arco Minero and the documented expansion of illegal mining in the Amazon basin.²¹¹

Ministry of People’s Power for Indigenous Peoples. Established in 2007, the Ministry of Indigenous Peoples is responsible for the coordination of policies on indigenous communities, including the implementation of the constitutional duty to demarcate and guarantee collective property over ancestrally occupied lands. Land titling has progressed only partially, and substantial portions of indigenous territories in the Amazon remain without legally recognised collective title.^212,213

Instituto Nacional de Parques (Inparques). Inparques administers the national system of protected areas, including iconic Amazonian protected areas such as the Canaima National Park, the Yapacana National Park and the Parima-Tapirapecó Biosphere Reserve. Inparques’ operational capacity has been substantially eroded over the last decade.²¹⁴

B. Policy and strategic coordination #

Ministry of People’s Power for Ecosocialism (MinEC) also acts as the national policy authority on biodiversity, climate change and ecological transition, in coordination with the National Planning Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the implementation of multilateral environmental agreements.

C. Criminal investigation and enforcement #

Ministerio Público (Public Prosecutor’s Office). The Public Prosecutor’s Office is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of environmental offences under the Ley Penal del Ambiente. Pursuant to the LPA and successive resolutions of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, specialised environmental prosecutors have been designated at national and regional level. Discussions on the establishment of a fully autonomous Jurisdicción Especial Penal Ambiental have not yet translated into a consolidated specialised criminal jurisdiction.²¹⁵,²¹⁶

CICPC, Guardia Nacional Bolivariana and other security bodies. The Cuerpo de Investigaciones Científicas, Penales y Criminalísticas (CICPC) is responsible for criminal investigations, including environmental offences. The Guardia Nacional Bolivariana plays an operational role in the protection of natural resources and the control of illegal mining, particularly in border areas and in the Arco Minero del Orinoco, though its conduct in this area has been criticised in reports by international human rights mechanisms and CSOs.²¹⁷

D. Oversight and access to justice #

Defensoría del Pueblo. The Defensoría del Pueblo is a constitutionally autonomous body (Constitution, Arts. 280–283) with the mandate to promote, defend and guarantee human rights. Its independence has been the subject of recurrent criticism by international human rights bodies and by Venezuelan civil society, and its effectiveness in addressing environmental and indigenous rights issues is, in practice, limited.²¹⁸

Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (TSJ) and Constitutional Chamber. The TSJ is the highest judicial authority. Its Sala Constitucional has competence to review the constitutionality of statutes and acts, including environmental matters, and to act as the appellate jurisdiction for the acción de amparo. The Sala Político-Administrativa hears contentious administrative cases of national scope, including challenges to environmental authorisations and to the acts of national authorities such as MinEC.

Indigenous traditional authorities and the Special Indigenous Jurisdiction. The Constitution and the Ley Orgánica de Pueblos y Comunidades Indígenas recognise indigenous traditional authorities and a Special Indigenous Jurisdiction within their territories. While this jurisdiction rarely substitutes for ordinary jurisdiction in serious environmental crime, it provides an additional avenue for community-level governance and dispute resolution, and a basis for the legitimate participation of indigenous peoples in environmental decision-making.

Legal routes available for civil society #

A. Categories of nature crimes #

Environmental crimes in Venezuela are principally defined in the Ley Penal del Ambiente (LPA) of 2012. The LPA introduces objective criminal responsibility for environmental crimes – criminal liability arising from the violation of administrative norms protecting the environment, without need to demonstrate culpa or dolo – and a broad catalogue of sanctions including imprisonment, fines, dissolution of legal entities and closure of facilities. The catalogue of offences includes, in particular:²¹⁹

• Pollution of air, water and soil – including the discharge of contaminants in violation of environmental regulations, with aggravating circumstances in protected areas or in indigenous territories. Sentence: 2 to 4 years imprisonment (natural persons); 2,000–4,000 UT fine (legal entities).

• Damage to flora, fauna and natural environment – including illegal deforestation, illicit trade in protected species, illegal hunting and fishing, and damage to natural habitats. Sentence: 1 to 4 years for natural persons and 1,000–4,000 UT fines for legal entities.

• Damage to protected areas – including unauthorised activities in national parks, monuments, biosphere reserves and other areas under special administration. When any offence under the LPA is committed in national parks, monuments, biosphere reserves, the base penalty is increased by up to one half.

• Illegal mining and offences against mineral resources – including the extraction of minerals without authorisation, the use of mercury and other prohibited substances and the operation of mining activities in violation of environmental obligations. Sentence: 1 to 4 years imprisonment for natural persons; 1,000–4,000 UT fines for legal entities, with aggravated penalties where committed in protected areas or indigenous territories.

• Hazardous waste and substance offences – including the unlawful management, transport and disposal of hazardous waste and chemical substances. General penalty range: 1 to 4 years imprisonment for natural persons; 1,000–4,000 UT fines for legal entities.

• Offences relating to environmental information and impact assessment – including the provision of false information and the omission of environmental impact assessments where required by law. Sentence: 1 to 2 years imprisonment + disqualification from public office for up to 2 years after sentence.

B. Routes for legal action #

The legal routes available to CSOs and indigenous communities to defend against nature crimes fall into four broad categories: constitutional and judicial mechanisms, criminal proceedings, civil and contentious administrative actions, and international mechanisms. In practice these mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and are often used in combination, depending on the objective pursued (e.g. immediate suspension of activities, criminal accountability, or environmental restoration).

1. Judicial Mechanisms #

a. Constitutional Mechanisms #

The acción de amparo constitucional, regulated by the Ley Orgánica de Amparo of 1988, is the principal constitutional remedy against acts or omissions of public authorities or private parties that violate or threaten constitutional rights, including the right to a healthy environment (Article 127), the rights of indigenous peoples (Articles 119–126) and the right to prior consultation (Article 120). The acción de amparo can also be filed jointly with provisional measures of immediate protection.

Citizens and CSOs may also invoke the broad standing for the defence of environmental rights recognised under Article 127 of the Constitution and the legitimación activa for diffuse and collective rights developed in case-law of the Tribunal Supremo de Justicia. These mechanisms have, however, been less effective in recent years, owing to delays, limited judicial independence and the politicisation of constitutional adjudication.

b. Criminal Proceedings #

Criminal complaints (denuncias) for environmental offences may be filed with the Ministerio Público, the CICPC or directly with the specialised environmental prosecutors. Pursuant to the LPA, victims and affected parties – including CSOs and indigenous communities – may participate in the proceedings as víctimas o querellantes and claim civil reparation. Sanctions against legal entities include the dissolution of the entity and the closure or dismantling of facilities, providing a strong formal toolkit, although its application against actors operating in the Arco Minero remains very limited.

c. Civil and Contentious Administrative Litigation #

Civil actions for environmental damages and contentious administrative actions are governed by the Civil Code, the Code of Civil Procedure and the Ley Orgánica de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa of 2010. CSOs and affected parties may seek the nullification of environmental authorisations, mining concessions and other administrative acts; the suspension of activities pending substantive adjudication; and reparation for environmental damages. The contentious administrative jurisdiction includes regional courts and the Sala Político-Administrativa of the TSJ for matters of national scope.

d. Indigenous jurisdiction and authorities #

Indigenous traditional authorities, recognised in the Constitution and the Ley Orgánica de Pueblos y Comunidades Indígenas, play a central role in territorial governance and in the operationalisation of consultation processes derived from Article 120 of the Constitution. While the Special Indigenous Jurisdiction rarely substitutes for ordinary jurisdiction in serious environmental crime, it provides a legitimate forum for community-level governance, dispute resolution and the protection of customary use of natural resources.

2. Administrative Mechanisms #

Administrative actions before MinEC and the Ministry of Ecological Mining Development include complaints, requests for inspection, requests for the initiation of administrative sanctioning procedures and challenges to environmental authorisations and mining titles. The LOA and the LPA, together with the special regulations on protected areas, provide a structured but currently under-implemented framework for administrative oversight, especially in remote Amazonian areas.

Case examples of litigation²²⁰ #

Plataforma Ciudadana and others v. President of Venezuela # (TSJ, Expediente N° 2016-0358, 2016–2019) # On 24 February 2016, President Maduro created the Orinoco Mining Arc through Decree N° 2,248, designating 111,843 km² of Venezuela’s territory for mineral extraction without an environmental impact assessment or prior consultation with indigenous peoples. On 31 May 2016, a civil society coalition filed an annulment claim before the Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (TSJ), arguing that Decree N° 2,248 violated environmental laws, ratified international treaties and the Constitution, and requested precautionary suspension of all activities. The TSJ admitted the claim on 21 June 2016 but never issued a substantive ruling. In February 2019, the case was dismissed on the ground of “desistimiento tácito” — deemed abandonment for failure to comply with a procedural summons requirement. Simultaneously, three NGOs, PROVEA, Laboratorio de Paz and GTAI-ULA, presented a joint report to the IACHR documenting the absence of prior consultation, the lack of an environmental impact assessment, and the militarisation of indigenous territories. The case illustrates how procedural obstruction by domestic courts has redirected civil society engagement towards international mechanisms as the primary accountability forum.

Use of remote sensing evidence in nature crime prosecution #

CSOs play a central role in generating and structuring evidence of environmental harm in Venezuela, particularly through remote sensing technologies such as satellite imagery, geospatial mapping and digital monitoring tools. In the current context, in which official environmental data is increasingly inaccessible and judicial avenues are constrained, remote sensing has become an essential tool for advocacy and for engagement with international mechanisms.

Legal framework. Venezuela does not have a specific statutory provision on the admissibility of remote sensing evidence. In domestic proceedings, admissibility is assessed under the general evidentiary regime of the Código Orgánico Procesal Penal (criminal cases) and the Código de Procedimiento Civil (civil and contentious administrative cases), which admit documentary, expert and inspection evidence. The Ley Penal del Ambiente, with its model of objective criminal responsibility, supports the use of indirect and technical evidence to establish the violation of administrative norms underpinning environmental crimes.

Use in international advocacy. Even where domestic courts are difficult to mobilise, satellite imagery, geospatial analyses and field reports have been used extensively in submissions to the IACHR, the UN Fact-Finding Mission and the UN human rights treaty bodies. Independent providers (such as MAAP, RAISG, the World Resources Institute and Global Forest Watch) and Venezuelan CSOs (notably SOSOrinoco, Wataniba and Provita) play a central role in this work.

Technical standards. In the absence of dedicated domestic protocols, the same general practices observed across the region apply to reduce admissibility risks:

Source identification: clear identification of the platform or provider (state entity, recognised international provider, or accredited CSO), date/time, area of interest and method of acquisition;

Metadata preservation: retaining original files and metadata where available, and documenting each processing step;

Reproducibility: preserving the workflow so an independent expert could reproduce the same outputs from the same source data;

Integrity documentation: an evidence log documenting who handled the digital files, where they were stored, how they were transferred, and what controls were used to prevent tampering.

Case example – use of remote sensing evidence #

SOSOrinoco — Monitoring the Arco Minero del Orinoco (2018–present)221,222 SOSOrinoco is an advocacy group established in 2018 by a group of experts working anonymously inside and outside Venezuela, due to the high risk of this type of research in the country, committed to documenting and creating an in-depth diagnostic of the region south of the Orinoco River. Working with satellite data from the EU Copernicus Sentinel-2 programme and high-resolution imagery provided by Radiant Earth Foundation and Maxar/DigitalGlobe, SOSOrinoco has systematically documented the expansion of illegal mining across the Arco Minero, inside Yapacana, Canaima and Caura National Parks, and along the Cataniapo, Caura, Cuchivero and Cuyuní river basins. In the four years following the creation of the Arco Minero, over 2,821 square kilometres of forest were destroyed, with 50 percent of that destruction occurring within protected territories. In Yapacana National Park alone, two thousand hectares were subjected to gold mining activity, with high-resolution satellite imagery confirming the accelerated pace of devastation and deforestation driven by illegal mining inside the park. SOSOrinoco’s satellite-based reports have been submitted directly to UNESCO, IUCN and inter-governmental organisations, and have informed IACHR hearings, UN Fact-Finding Mission reports and academic and investigative journalism on mercury contamination across at least 30 Venezuelan rivers.

Wataniba – Yanomami Crisis Documentation (2021–2024)223 According to monitoring carried out by Wataniba through satellite imaging and direct sources coordinated with Indigenous organisations in the field, the area of the Venezuelan Amazon directly affected by mining grew from approximately 339 km² in 2019 to 1,337 km² by 2021 – a 294% increase in just two years. The Wataniba Socio-environmental Work Group for the Amazon combined this satellite mapping with field investigations carried out in partnership with Yanomami and Ye’kwana representatives, documenting mining incursions, mercury contamination, disease outbreaks and food insecurity affecting communities in Amazonas state. Wataniba collaborated with the Horonami organisation representing the Yanomami people in southern Venezuela, one of the most recently contacted Indigenous groups severely affected by illegal mining, displacement, violence and massacres, and co-produced Sacred Sites Maps with Indigenous organisations including OIPUS, KUYUNU and ORPIA. This body of work directly underpinned the November 2024 joint statement by the IACHR and its Office of the Special Rapporteur on Economic, Social, Cultural and Environmental Rights (REDESCA). The IACHR and REDESCA expressed deep concern about the impacts of illegal mining on the life, health and survival of the Yanomami people in the Orinoco Mining Arc, calling on Venezuela to take immediate concrete steps to protect Yanomami human rights in the face of increasing violence, infectious disease and environmental degradation. The case illustrates how community-based satellite monitoring, when combined with Indigenous testimony and CSO documentation, can generate sufficient evidentiary weight to trigger formal international human rights responses in contexts where domestic remedies are unavailable.

Challenges in engagement with authorities #

Engagement between CSOs and public authorities in Venezuela is constrained by a particularly demanding combination of legal, institutional, political and security barriers. The result is one of the largest gaps in the region between a formally rich constitutional framework and the operational reality of environmental governance.

Closure of civic space and judicial harassment of defenders. The Anti-NGO Law of November 2024, the Anti-Solidarity Law of August 2024 and the broader pattern of restrictions on civic space – including hundreds of documented attacks on defenders in 2023–2024 – have substantially restricted the operational capacity of environmental CSOs and indigenous federations and increased the risks faced by their leaders.²²⁴

Disengagement from the inter-American human rights system. Venezuela’s denunciation of the American Convention on Human Rights (effective 2013) and its purported withdrawal from the OAS in 2017 have substantially limited the regional remedies available to environmental and human rights defenders. The IACHR continues to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the OAS Charter, but the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court is no longer available for events after 10 September 2013.²²⁵

Politicisation of the judiciary. The independence and effectiveness of the Venezuelan judiciary, including the Tribunal Supremo de Justicia and the contentious administrative courts, have been repeatedly questioned by international human rights mechanisms. This affects the practical value of constitutional and administrative remedies for environmental defence.²²⁶

Expansion of legal and illegal mining and erosion of protected areas. The Arco Minero del Orinoco – encompassing approximately 111,843 km² of territory in Amazonas, Bolívar and Delta Amacuro – has been a key driver of deforestation, mercury contamination, biodiversity loss and violence in the Venezuelan Amazon, including in formally protected areas such as the Yapacana and Canaima National Parks. Illegal mining controlled by armed non-state actors has compounded these dynamics.²²⁷

Severe risks to indigenous defenders and communities. Yanomami, Pemón, Ye’kwana, Sanöma and Kariña leaders face the conjunction of illegal mining, armed-actor violence, mercury contamination and a humanitarian crisis with documented mass mortality patterns. The lack of effective protection by the State and the absence of a dedicated national protection mechanism for defenders increase these risks dramatically.²²⁸

Information opacity. Many environmental datasets that were previously public, including data on protected areas, mining concessions, environmental authorisations and enforcement actions, are no longer accessible. This severely constrains the ability of CSOs to monitor compliance, document violations and engage with public authorities.²²⁹

Conclusion & recommendations #

Venezuela combines one of the most ambitious constitutional frameworks in Latin America for environmental rights, indigenous rights and prior consultation with one of the most demanding operational contexts in the Amazon basin. The expansion of the Arco Minero del Orinoco, the closure of civic space, the partial disengagement from the inter-American human rights system and the deterioration of the institutional architecture have created a situation in which the gap between formal protection and effective enforcement is exceptionally wide. Recommendations are accordingly framed both as essential reforms to be pursued domestically and as priorities for international engagement.

1. Reopen civic space for environmental and human rights defenders. Repeal or substantially reform the Anti-NGO Law of November 2024 and the Anti-Solidarity Law of August 2024 in line with international standards on freedom of association; lift restrictions on international cooperation; and end the harassment and detention of defenders.

2. Sign and ratify the Escazú Agreement. Use the Escazú Agreement as a framework for the consolidation of access to environmental information, public participation, access to justice and the protection of defenders, in line with constitutional commitments and international obligations.

3. Re-engage fully with the inter-American human rights system. Re-accede to the American Convention on Human Rights and to the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and implement IACHR recommendations on the Yanomami people, the Arco Minero del Orinoco and the broader human-rights situation.

4. Suspend and review the Arco Minero del Orinoco. Conduct an independent review of Decreto N° 2.248 and of the Arco Minero with the meaningful participation of affected indigenous peoples, in accordance with Article 120 of the Constitution; suspend mining activities lacking prior consultation and environmental impact assessment; and develop a programme of remediation for ecosystems and communities affected by mercury contamination.

5. Strengthen indigenous land rights. Accelerate the demarcation and titling of indigenous territories in accordance with the constitutional duty under Article 119, with priority for Amazonian territories affected by illegal mining; and reinforce the role of indigenous traditional authorities in environmental governance.

6. Restore the independence and capacity of environmental institutions. Rebuild the operational capacity of MinEC, Inparques and the specialised environmental prosecutorial network; consolidate, in practice, the special environmental criminal jurisdiction outlined in the LOA and LPA; and ensure that environmental authorisations and sanctioning procedures comply with the law.

7. Institutionalise remote sensing and protect community monitoring. Recognise and protect the work of Venezuelan and regional CSOs (SOSOrinoco, Wataniba, Provita, MAAP, RAISG partners and others) in environmental monitoring; develop in-house State capacity to interpret and validate satellite data; and re-establish proactive disclosure of environmental data, in line with the constitutional right of access to public information.

Notes #

1. EU SEE. Bolivia: reporte de enfoque del país. 2025. Available at: https://eusee.hivos.org/document/bolivia-informe-enfoque-pais/.

2. A bill addressing this gap was approved by the Senate in 2024 and is currently pending before the Chamber of Deputies.

3. Alerta Común. Despido y proceso contra guardaparque Uzquiano puede considerarse una vulneración al acuerdo de Escazú. 2025. Available at: https://alertacomun.substack.com/p/despido-y-proceso-contra-guardaparque

4. The criminal penalties are increased by a third if the criminal offence occurs in protected areas or reserve zones. Also, the penalty is increased by one hundred percent if the offence is done in violation of express rules of production and conservation of forests.

5. Bolivia, Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional 1326/2023-S1, December 2023

6. Bolivia, Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional 0250/2023-S3

7. Chiquitania case (2019): https://www.rightsofnaturetribunal.org/cases/ecocide-in-the-amazon-and-chiquitania-case/?lang=es#1590541122764-4235cbab-d351

8. Igarapé/Diálogo Américas (Bolivia, 2024): https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/bolivia-2023-record-deforestation-due-to-environmental-crime/

9. Fundación Tierra/ABT data via InSight Crime (Bolivia, 2024): https://insightcrime.org/investigations/vanishing-trees-lakes-deforestation-bolivias-amazon/

10. Trase/Fundación Tierra fines data (Bolivia, 2023): https://trase.earth/insights/the-hidden-crisis-of-deforestation-in-bolivia

11. Fundación Tierra/Vadillo via InSight Crime (Bolivia, 2024): https://insightcrime.org/investigations/vanishing-trees-lakes-deforestation-bolivias-amazon/

12. CEDIB/Campanini via InSight Crime (Bolivia, 2024): https://insightcrime.org/investigations/gold-mining-state-sanctioned-scourge-bolivia/

13. Global Forest Watch/Diálogo Américas Bolivia 2023 deforestation record: https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/bolivia-2023-record-deforestation-due-to-environmental-crime/

14. Earthsight — perdonazo Bolivia: https://www.earthsight.org.uk/news/idm/fires-rage-bolivia-illegal-deforestation-beef-soy-surge

15. EU SEE. Enabling Environment Snapshot: Brazil. June 2025. Available at: https://eusee.hivos.org/document/brazil-ee-baseline-snapshot/.

16. Global Witness. 2,253 land and environmental defenders were killed or disappeared between 2012 and 2024. 2026. Available at: https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/land-and-environmental-defenders/in-numbers-lethal-attacks-against-defenders-since-2012/.

17. Business and Human Rights Centre. Brazil: The Legal Amazon was the region with the highest number of murders and threats against HRDs between 2019 and 2022, reveals report. 2023. Available at: https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/brazil-the-legal-amazon-was-the-region-with-the-highest-number-of-murders-and-threats-against-hrds-between-2019-and-2022-reveals-report/

18. STJ, Recurso Especial nº 1.857.098/MS, Primeira Seção, Rel. Min. Og Fernandes, julgado em 11.05.2022 (decided under the Incidente de Assunção de Competência nº 13 / IAC 13), DJe 24.05.2022.

19. Resolution 237, CONAMA.

20. Brasil. MMA disponibiliza sistema integrado de informações ambientais na internet. 2006. Available at: https://www.gov.br/mma/pt-br/noticias/mma-disponibiliza-sistema-integrado-de-informacoes-ambientais-na-internet

21. Constituição Federal de 1988, art. 5, inc, LXIX, LXXIII

22. Law No. 9,605 of February 12, 1998

23. Global Justice. The beginning of the end? The worst moment for the Protection Program for Human Rights Defenders, Communicators, and Environmentalists. 2021.

24. Pereira, Jullie. Complex landscape, staffing shortages, and unstable funding undermine the protection program for defenders in the Amazon.

25. Forest Code. Available at: https://www.gov.br/mj/pt-br/acesso-a-informacao/atuacao-internacional/legislacao-traduzida/lei-no-12-651-de-25-de-maio-de-2012-senasp_eng-docx.pdf

26. Forest Code. Available at: https://www.gov.br/mj/pt-br/acesso-a-informacao/atuacao-internacional/legislacao-traduzida/lei-no-12-651-de-25-de-maio-de-2012-senasp_eng-docx.pdf

27. Environmental Crimes Law: https://www.unodc.org/cld/en/legislation/bra/law_no._9.605_regulating_criminal_and_administrative_penalties_relating_to_behavior_and_activities_harmful_to_the_environment/chapter_v/article_29-53/law._no_9.605_1998.html

28. Convictions for illegal deforestation grow, but only 5% result in compensation paid in the Amazon, Imazon, https://imazon.org.br/en/imprensa/convictions-for-illegal-deforestation-grow-but-only-5-result-in-compensation-paid-in-the-amazon/.

29. Ibama vs. Dirceu Kruger. Sabin Center for Climate Change Law. 2023. Information available at: https://www.climatecasechart.com/document/ibama-v-dirceu-kruger-illegal-deforestation-in-the-amazon-and-climate-damage_f629

30. (Special Appeal 1778729/PA, judged on 09/10/2019). See also: Brasil. 2020. Tribunal Superior de Justiça (STJ). Recurso Especial (RESp) n.º 1.905.367 – DF. Rel. Min. Herman Benjamin. Decided on 24/11/2020, Segun-da Turma. DJe 14/12/2020. Available at:

    https://www.stj.jus.br/websecstj/cgi/revista/REJ.cgi/ITA?seq=2006583&tipo=0&nreg=202001021941&SeqCgrmaSessao=&CodOrgaoJgdr=&dt=20201214&formato=PDF&salvar=false.

31. (Habeas Corpus 138.523/RJ, judged on 12/13/2016).

32. Appeal partially granted. Holding: 1. Satellite images obtained through remote sensing constitute valid and sufficient evidence to support the issuance of a notice of violation for illegal deforestation, pursuant to state legislation and consolidated case law. 2. The validity of an environmental notice of violation does not require an on-site inspection when the infraction is proven through appropriate technology and supported by legal provisions. (…) Court of Justice of the State of Mato Grosso (TJMT), Civil Appeal No. 1000301-48.2022.8.11.0107. Reporting Judge: Justice Gabriela Carina Knaul de Albuquerque e Silva. Decided on June 9, 2025c

33. Imazon (February 2025): https://imazon.org.br/en/imprensa/convictions-for-illegal-deforestation-grow-but-only-5-result-in-compensation-paid-in-the-amazon/

34. CPI/PUC-Rio analysis: https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/an-analysis-of-the-new-legal-framework-for-ibamas-administrative-sanctioning-procedure-and-its-effects-on-combating-deforestation-in-the-amazon/

35. PNAS (2017): https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.1604768114

36. Brazil Reports/Global Witness (September 2024): https://brazilreports.com/colombia-brazil-top-list-of-environmental-defender-deaths-globally/6568/

37. The bancada ruralista — a cross-party political caucus of federal deputies and senators promoting agribusiness interests — has actively worked to benefit the agroindustrial sector while undermining environmental protections and indigenous rights, and offering amnesties to land grabbers and illegal deforesters. The ruralistas represent around 40% of deputies and senators. — Amazon Watch/Earthsight: https://www.earthsight.org.uk/news/idm/report-global-markets-sustain-enormous-political-power-gap-agribusiness-brazil-lobby

38. Imazon (February 2025): https://imazon.org.br/en/imprensa/convictions-for-illegal-deforestation-grow-but-only-5-result-in-compensation-paid-in-the-amazon/

39. Transparencia por Colombia. El Artículo 77 del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo genera riesgos para las organizaciones de la sociedad civil. 2023. Available at: https://transparenciacolombia.org.co/riesgos-para-las-organizaciones-sociedad-civil-en-pnd/#:~:text=Comunicado%2004%2D2023-,El%20Art%C3%ADculo%2077%20del%20Plan%20Nacional%20de%20Desarrollo%20genera%20riesgos,Sociedad%20Civil%20%2DOSC%2D%20colombianas.

40. EU SEE. Colombia Baseline. 2025. Available at: https://eusee.hivos.org/country/colombia/

41. Autoridad Nacional de Licencias Ambientales. Available at: https://www.anla.gov.co/?view=category&id=122

42. Decree 1066/2015; Decree 660/2018 Timely Action Route.

43. Global Witness. 2,253 land and environmental defenders were killed or disappeared between 2012 and 2024. Available at: https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/land-and-environmental-defenders/in-numbers-lethal-attacks-against-defenders-since-2012/.

44. Document in Spanish available in the following link: Informe estadistico Delitos Ambientales (2018 https://repositorio.minjusticia.gov.co/politica-criminal/Biblioteca/Informe estadistico Delitos Ambientales (2018-2024).pdf2024).pdf

45. Lucía Cuberos, “How Latin America is using the law to fight environmental crime” (Climate Diplomacy, 24 February 2024) available at: https://climate-diplomacy.org/magazine/environment/how-latin-america-using-law-fight-environmental-crime.

46. Sentencia STC4360-2018

47. Reuters, “Colombia court orders activities at Uchuva-2 gas well be suspended” (14 September 2024) available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/colombia-court-orders-activities-uchuva-2-gas-well-be-suspended-2024-09-13/.

48. Constitutional Court, T-622/16 (10 November 2016): http://files.harmonywithnatureun.org/uploads/upload838.pdf; Climate Litigation Database: https://www.climatecasechart.com/document/atrato-river-decision-t-622-16-of-november-10-2016; ABColombia: https://www.abcolombia.org.uk/constitutional-court-sets-global-precedent/; ABColombia (COP26 satellite monitoring): https://www.abcolombia.org.uk/abcolombia-at-cop26/; University of Portsmouth: https://www.port.ac.uk/news-events-and-blogs/news/helping-in-the-fight-against-illegal-gold-mining-in-colombia

49. Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho and others, “Informe estadístico sobre delitos ambientales en Colombia (2018-2024)” (2025) available at: https://repositorio.minjusticia.gov.co/politica-criminal/Biblioteca/Informe%20estadistico%20Delitos%20Ambientales%20%282018-2024%29.pdf.

50. Dr Caroline Delgado and Tatjana Edle von Peter, “Demilitarizing environmental protection will benefit Colombia’s biodiversity” (SIPRI, 23 October 2024) available at: https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2024/demilitarizing-environmental-protection-will-benefit-colombias-biodiversity.

51. Ejército Nacional de Colombia. National Army deals decisive blow to illegal mining in Curillo and Solita, Caquetá. Available at: https://military-forces-deal-powerful-blow-illegal-mining-curillo-and-solita-caqueta

52. Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador (2008), Arts. 66(13) and 96. Official text: Asamblea Nacional, https://www.asambleanacional.gob.ec/sites/default/files/documents/old/constitucion_de_bolsillo.pdf.

53. Executive Decree No. 16 of 4 June 2013, “Reglamento para el Funcionamiento del Sistema Unificado de Información de las Organizaciones Sociales”. See also Human Rights Watch, “Ecuador: Closure of Rights Group Sets Disturbing Precedent” (12 Dec. 2013), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/12/ecuador-closure-rights-group-sets-disturbing-precedent.

54. Executive Decree No. 193 of 23 October 2017, “Reglamento para el Otorgamiento de Personalidad Jurídica a las Organizaciones Sociales”; Executive Decree No. 648 of 25 January 2023 (reforms). CIVICUS Monitor, Ecuador country page (rating: “Obstructed”), https://monitor.civicus.org/country/ecuador/.

55. Global Witness, “Standing Firm: The Land and Environmental Defenders on the Frontlines of the Climate Crisis” (September 2024): 5 defenders killed in Ecuador in 2023, https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/standing-firm/. See also Global Witness, “Missing Voices” (2023), https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/missing-voices/.

56. Amnesty International, “Ecuador: Killing of indigenous leader must be thoroughly investigated” (12 Dec. 2014), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/12/killing-indigenous-leader-mustbe-thoroughly-investigated/; Amazon Frontlines, “Eduardo Mendúa, Cofán Leader, Assassinated” (Feb. 2023), https://www.amazonfrontlines.org/chronicles/eduardo-mendua-cofan-leader-assassinated/; Front Line Defenders, case of Andrés Durazno (April 2024), https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/killing-andres-durazno.

57. UN Treaty Collection, Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean (Escazú), ratification status, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-18&chapter=27&clang=_en; ECLAC Observatory, https://observatoriop10.cepal.org/en/treaties.

58. Ley Orgánica de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública (LOTAIP), Law 24, Registro Oficial Suplemento 337 (18 May 2004), https://www.dpe.gob.ec/wp-content/dpe/lotaip.pdf.

59. Constitution of Ecuador (2008), Arts. 57(7) and 398; Código Orgánico del Ambiente (CODA), Law 0, Registro Oficial Suplemento 983 (12 April 2017), Arts. 11–13, 184–185, https://www.ambiente.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2018/01/CODIGO_ORGANICO_AMBIENTE.pdf.

60. ECLAC, “First Extraordinary Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Escazú Agreement” (Santiago, April 2024), adoption of the Action Plan on Human Rights Defenders in Environmental Matters, https://www.cepal.org/en/events/first-extraordinary-meeting-conference-parties-regional-agreement-access-information.

61. Amnesty International, “Territorio de defensoras y defensores: Mecanismos, desafíos y recomendaciones” (AMR 28/8198/2024), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr28/8198/2024/en/.

62. MAATE, Ministerio del Ambiente, Agua y Transición Ecológica, https://www.ambiente.gob.ec/; Executive Decree No. 59 (2021) consolidating the former MAE and SENAGUA.

63. Agencia de Regulación y Control de Energía y Recursos Naturales No Renovables (ARCERNNR), https://www.controlrecursosyenergia.gob.ec/; Executive Decree No. 1036 of 6 May 2020.

64. Fiscalía General del Estado, https://www.fiscalia.gob.ec/. Specialised environmental crime fiscalías have been created in Amazonian provinces (Sucumbíos, Orellana, Napo, Morona Santiago).

65. Policía Nacional del Ecuador, Unidad de Protección del Medio Ambiente (UPMA), https://www.policia.gob.ec/unidad-de-proteccion-del-medio-ambiente-upma/.

66. Executive Decree No. 111 of 9 January 2024 declaring an “estado de conflicto armado interno”. Human Rights Watch, “Ecuador: Emergency Measures Must Respect Rights” (30 Jan. 2024), https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/30/ecuador-emergency-measures-must-respect-rights.

67. Defensoría del Pueblo del Ecuador (Constitution Arts. 214–216), https://www.dpe.gob.ec/.

68. Contraloría General del Estado, https://www.contraloria.gob.ec/.

69. Sistema Nacional de Áreas Protegidas (SNAP), regulated by CODA Arts. 37–50, https://www.ambiente.gob.ec/areas-protegidas-3/.

70. Código Orgánico Integral Penal (COIP), Law 0, Registro Oficial Suplemento 180 (10 February 2014), Book II, Title IV, Chapter IV (“Delitos contra el ambiente y la naturaleza o Pacha Mama”), Arts. 245–260, https://www.defensa.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2018/03/COIP_feb2018.pdf.

71. Constitution of Ecuador, Art. 397(2) (reverse burden of proof in environmental matters) and Art. 396 (imprescriptibility of environmental liability).

72. Ley Orgánica de Garantías Jurisdiccionales y Control Constitucional (LOGJCC), Law 0, Registro Oficial Suplemento 52 (22 October 2009), https://www.corteconstitucional.gob.ec/images/contenidos/doc-basicos/ley-organica-garantias-jurisdiccionales.pdf

73. Constitution of Ecuador, Arts. 88 (acción de protección), 91 (access to public information), 92 (hábeas data), 93 (acción por incumplimiento) and 94 (acción extraordinaria de protección); LOGJCC Arts. 26–39 (medidas cautelares).

74. Global Witness, “Standing Firm” (Sept. 2024) and Amnesty International, AMR 28/8198/2024 (2024) — both cited above. Figures on prosecutions for Arts. 245–260 COIP are reported irregularly by the Fiscalía; civil-society estimates suggest conviction rates in the low single digits as a proportion of reported environmental offences.

75. Código Orgánico General de Procesos (COGEP), Law 0, Registro Oficial Suplemento 506 (22 May 2015), Arts. 159–166 (documentary evidence), 193 (expert evidence) and 228 (judicial inspection), https://www.cortenacional.gob.ec/cnj/images/pdf/diferentes_codigos/COGEP_act_agosto_2018.pdf; COIP Arts. 498–511 (evidence in criminal proceedings).

76. Provincial Court of Imbabura, ruling of March 2023 in the Llurimagua / Intag case (Case No. 10332-2022). See Acción Ecológica, “Intag: victoria judicial”, https://www.accionecologica.org/intag-victoria-judicial/.

77. Constitution of Ecuador, Art. 171; Código Orgánico de la Función Judicial, Arts. 343–346. See Corte Constitucional, Sentencia No. 113-14-SEP-CC (La Cocha II, July 2014).

78. CODA, Arts. 301–320 (administrative infractions and sanctions); Reglamento al CODA, Executive Decree 752 (June 2019), https://www.ambiente.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2019/06/Reglamento-al-Codigo-Organico-del-Ambiente.pdf.

79. Ecuador Constitutional Court Case: mining in the Los Cedros Protected Forest. Available at: https://ecojurisprudence.org/initiatives/los-cedros/

80. República del Ecuador. Función Judicial, Juicio No: 16281201900422 . 2019.

81. Código Orgánico General de Procesos (COGEP), Registro Oficial Suplemento 506, 22 May 2015 — https://www.cortenacional.gob.ec/cnj/images/pdf/diferentes_codigos/COGEP_act_agosto_2018.pdf

82. Código Orgánico Integral Penal (COIP), Registro Oficial Suplemento 180, 10 February 2014 — https://www.defensa.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2018/03/COIP_feb2018.pdf

83. Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador (2008), Art. 397(2) — https://www.asambleanacional.gob.ec/sites/default/files/documents/old/constitucion_de_bolsillo.pdf

84. Case No.: 21333201800266 – Sinangoe Case (Judgment Date: November 16, 2018)

85. El País. Daniel Noboa declares an ‘internal armed conflict’ in Ecuador after an armed commando breaks into a television station live on air. 2024. Available at: https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-01-09/daniel-noboa-declares-an-internal-armed-conflict-in-ecuador-after-an-armed-commando-breaks-into-a-television-station-live-on-air.html

86. Amazon underworld. Amazon under attack: mapping crime throughout world’s largest rainforest. 2025. Available at: https://amazonunderworld.org/amazon-under-attack-mapping-crime-throughout-worlds-largest-rainforest/

87. Global witness. Defenders of the Amazon targeted in Ecuador. 2025. Available at: https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/land-and-environmental-defenders/defenders-of-the-amazon-targeted-in-ecuador/

88. CIVICUS. CIVICUS Monitor Watchlist: March 2026. 2026. Available at: https://www.civicus.org/index.php/fr/medias-ressources/112-news/8201-civicus-monitor-watchlist-march-2026

89. MAAP 230. Mining in the Ecuadorian Amazon, Central Sector – Napo Province. 2025. https://www.maapprogram.org/ecuador-mining-napo/

90. Constitution of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana (Cap. 1:01), Arts. 36 (well-being of the nation and the environment) and 149J (right to a healthy environment), together with Arts. 145–147 (freedoms of conscience, expression and association). Available at: https://parliament.gov.gy/documents/constitution.pdf.

91. Companies Act, Cap. 89:01 (and Part X on non-profit companies) and the Friendly Societies Act, Cap. 36:04; civil-society organisations may also operate as common-law associations and trusts under Guyanese law.

92. CIVICUS Monitor, Guyana country page, https://monitor.civicus.org/country/guyana/; Freedom House, “Guyana: Freedom in the World” country report, https://freedomhouse.org/country/guyana/freedom-world/2024.

93. Caribbean Court of Justice, Ramon Gaskin v Minister of Natural Resources & Others, [2024] CCJ 14 (AJ) GY (June 2024) -first detailed interpretation of the Petroleum Act in connection with environmental oversight; the Court expressly referenced the Escazú Agreement and the Rio Declaration. Case summary: https://www.melindajanki.org/work/ramon-gaskin-v-minister-of-natural-resources-exxon-hess-and-cnooc; Guyana Chronicle, “Guyana at the forefront as CCJ tackles landmark environmental case”, https://guyanachronicle.com/2025/07/27/guyana-at-the-forefront-as-ccj-tackles-landmark-environmental-case/.

94. Department of Public Information, Government of Guyana, “Escazú Agreement essential to the development and sustainability of the region – President Ali”, https://dpi.gov.gy/escazu-agreement-essential-to-the-development-and-sustainability-of-the-region-president-ali/; ECLAC, COP1 to the Escazú Agreement (Santiago, April 2022), https://www.cepal.org/en/escazuagreement.

95. Mongabay reporting on threats and SLAPP-like litigation against environmental defenders in Guyana (2023–2024). See also Forest Peoples Programme country page, http://www.forestpeoples.org/en/country/guyana.

96. United Nations Treaty Collection, Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean (Escazú), ratification status, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-18&chapter=27&clang=_en. Guyana deposited its instrument of ratification on 18 April 2019, becoming the first State Party to the Agreement. See also WRI, “12 Governments in Latin America and the Caribbean Ratify Escazú Agreement”, https://www.wri.org/outcomes/12-governments-latin-america-and-caribbean-ratify-escazu-agreement.

97. Environmental Protection Act, Cap. 20:05 (Act No. 11 of 1996), https://www.parliament.gov.gy/publications/acts-of-parliament/environmental-protection-act-1996. EPA Guyana, statutory remit and enforcement powers, https://epaguyana.org/the-environmental-protection-act-cap-2005-bestows-investigative-and-enforcement-powers-upon-officers-of-the-epa/.

98. EPA Guyana, “Programme areas -Environmental Impact Assessment”, https://epaguyana.org/programme-areas/; EPA Public Notices and Environmental Authorisations register, https://epaguyana.org/.

99. Amerindian Act, Cap. 29:01 (Act No. 6 of 2006), https://moaa.gov.gy/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Amerindian-Act-2006.pdf; analysis in Village Voice News, “Examining the shortcomings of Guyana’s Amerindian Act (2006)” (Sept. 2024), https://villagevoicenews.com/2024/09/11/examining-the-shortcomings-of-guyanas-amerindian-act-2006/; Forest Peoples Programme, “Guyana court ruling violates indigenous peoples’ rights”, http://www.forestpeoples.org/topics/rights-land-natural-resources/news/2013/01/press-release-guyana-court-ruling-violates-indigen.

100. Constitution of Guyana, Art. 122A; High Court of the Supreme Court of Judicature, https://judicialgy.com/. Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), apex court of Guyana since 2005, https://ccj.org/.

101. Environmental Protection Act, Cap. 20:05, Part V (offences and penalties) and EPA Guyana enforcement regime, https://epaguyana.org/programme-areas/. See also Guyana Chronicle, “Enforcement Powers of Officers of the Environmental Protection Agency”, https://guyanachronicle.com/2022/07/07/enforcement-powers-of-officers-of-the-environmental-protection-agency/.

102. Mining Act, Cap. 65:01 (Act No. 20 of 1989), and the Mining Regulations of 2005; Guyana Geology and Mines Commission Act, Cap. 65:09 (1979), establishing the GGMC, https://www.ggmc.gov.gy/.

103. Minamata Convention on Mercury, Guyana acceded on 24 September 2014, https://minamataconvention.org/. National Strategic Plan on Reducing Mercury, GGMC and Ministry of Natural Resources, https://nre.gov.gy/. Mercury contamination data: WWF, “Small-Scale Gold Mining Related Mercury Contamination in the Guianas: A Review” (2015), https://wwfeu.awsassets.panda.org/downloads/mercury_contamination_in_the_guianas__2015.pdf; Stabroek News, “Small miners continuing to push back against reducing mercury use – GGMC” (Sept. 2024), https://www.stabroeknews.com/2024/09/08/news/guyana/small-miners-continuing-to-push-back-against-reducing-mercury-use-ggmc/.

104. Forests Act, Cap. 67:01 (Act No. 6 of 2009); Guyana Forestry Commission Act, Cap. 67:02 (1979, with amendments), establishing the Guyana Forestry Commission (GFC), https://forestry.gov.gy/.

105. Guyana Lands and Surveys Commission (GL&SC) and Guyana Forestry Commission, monitoring reporting and verification (MRV) systems and forest monitoring programmes under the Norway–Guyana REDD+ Memorandum of Understanding, https://forestry.gov.gy/.

106. Wildlife Conservation and Management Act, Act No. 14 of 2016, and the Protected Areas Act, Act No. 15 of 2011; Protected Areas Commission, https://protectedareascommission.com/.

107. Hinterland and Amerindian Land Titling Project (ALT), implemented by the Ministry of Amerindian Affairs with UNDP support and Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund (GRIF) financing, https://www.guyanareddfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/ALT-Evaluation-Report-Midterm-2016.pdf.

108. Guyana’s Low Carbon Development Strategy (LCDS 2030), https://lcds.gov.gy/.

109. National Toshaos Council (NTC), https://www.ntcguyana.org/, the national body of village leaders of Indigenous communities in Guyana, established under the Amerindian Act 2006.

110. Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) of Guyana, https://dpp.gov.gy/; Guyana Police Force, https://police.gov.gy/.

111. High Court of Guyana, Quadad de Freitas, Sinikka Henry & Vanda Radzik v Ministry of Natural Resources & Ors (Stabroek Block environmental permit challenge); High Court of Guyana, Frederick Collins & Godfrey Whyte v Environmental Protection Agency & Esso Exploration and Production Guyana Ltd (May 2023), upholding unlimited liability obligations on Esso’s parent guarantees. Commentary: Commonwealth Lawyers Association, “ExxonMobil and liability for an oil spill: Whyte v Environmental Protection Agency and Esso Exploration and Production Guyana Ltd”, https://www.commonwealthlawyers.com/cla/exxonmobil-and-liability-for-an-oil-spill-whyte-v-environmental-protection-agency-and-esso-exploration-and-production-guyana-ltd/; IEEFA, “ExxonMobil loses key case in Guyana oil controversy over insurance”, https://ieefa.org/resources/exxonmobil-loses-key-case-guyana-oil-controversy-over-insurance.

112. Constitution of Guyana, Arts. 191–197 (Office of the Ombudsman); Audit Office of Guyana, https://www.audit.org.gy/; Office of the Auditor General.

113. Criminal Law (Offences) Act, Cap. 8:01; Criminal Procedure Act, Cap. 10:01; Civil Procedure Rules of the High Court of Guyana (2016).

114. Constitutional and Administrative Division. 2020-HC-DEM-CIV-FDA-460. Available at: https://www.climatecasechart.com/document/thomas-v-epa_519a

115. Rainforest Foundation US works with the South Rupununi, North Pakaraimas, Moruca, and Upper Mazaruni District Councils in land titling and mapping, monitoring, and supporting advocacy efforts. — https://rainforestfoundation.org/our-work/where-we-work/guyana/

116. Melinda Janki case page: https://www.melindajanki.org/work/sinikka-henry-sherlina-nageer-and-andriska-thorington-v-environmental-protection-agency-and-esso-exploration-and-production-guyana-ltd;

     Climate Change News (April 2025): https://www.climatechangenews.com/2025/04/15/exxonmobil-petro-state-guyana-disaster-amazon-forest-oil/;

     Kaieteur News (October 2023): https://kaieteurnewsonline.com/2023/10/05/high-court-dismisses-case-against-epa-over-permit-that-allows-exxon-to-flare-gas/

117. Demerara Waves (May 2026): https://demerarawaves.com/2026/05/07/court-of-appeal-overturns-high-courts-ruling-on-exxonmobil-epas-financial-guarantees/

118. Village Voice News (September 2024): https://villagevoicenews.com/2024/09/11/examining-the-shortcomings-of-guyanas-amerindian-act-2006

119. Stabroek News (August 2021): https://www.stabroeknews.com/2021/08/22/news/guyana/complete-eradication-of-mercury-in-mining-not-possible-ggmc-commissioner-says/

120. Oil and Gas Governance Network / Stabroek News (March 2025): https://www.oggn.org/2025/03/07/the-information-blackout-oil-transparency-and-the-failure-of-access-to-information-in-guyana/

121. Civil Code of Peru, Arts. 80 (associations), 99 (foundations), 111 (committees) (16th edition, 2015).

122. Law No. 27692, Law Creating the Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation (APCI), Article 3.

123. Law No. 32301, Art. 21, para. c.2 (enacted April 2025). Article 21 classifies as a “very serious infraction” the use of international technical cooperation funds to advise, assist, or finance any type of administrative, judicial, or other action against the Peruvian State. See also ProÉtica, “Anti-NGO Law: A Threat to Civil Society,” available at: https://www.proetica.org.pe/editorial/ley-anti-ong-una-amenaza-para-la-sociedad-civil/

124. Monitoring of the Andes Amazon Program (MAAP), MAAP #218: Killing of Environmental Defenders in the Peruvian Amazon, available at: https://www.maapprogram.org/maap-218-killing-of-environmental-defenders-in-the-peruvian-amazon/.

125. Law No. 27806, Transparency and Access to Public Information Law.

126. Supreme Decree 004-2021-JUS (risk-based protection for environmental defenders).

127. Global Witness. Escazú Agreement COP4: Why implementation matters for protecting land and environmental defenders. 2026. Available at: https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/land-and-environmental-defenders/escazu-agreement-cop4-why-implementation-matters-for-protecting-land-and-environmental-defenders/

128. Law No. 29325, Law on the National Environmental Assessment and Oversight System, Article 11.

129. University of Sheffield / OSINFOR (2023): OSINFOR’s remote sensing detected over 41,000 m³ of illegal timber valued at US$19 million. Available at: https://sheffield.ac.uk/research/new-technology-turns-tide-against-illegal-logging-peru.

130. Law No. 29763, Forestry and Wildlife Law, Articles 3 and 13.

131. Law No. 17824, Law on the Creation of Captaincies and Forest Rangers, Article 5.

132. Legislative Decree No. 1013, Law on the Creation, Organization, and Functions of the Ministry of the Environment, Article 6.

133. Resolution of the Board of Supreme Prosecutors No. 038-2008-MP-FN-JFS of March 14, 2008, amended by Resolution No. 054-2008-MP-FN-JFS, Section 5.17. Currently 32 FEMA offices and 15 Crime Prevention Prosecutors’ Offices with environmental jurisdiction operate nationwide.

134. Andina, ‘Environmental Crime Convictions in Peru, 2024–2025,’ available at: https://andina.pe/Ingles/noticia-public-ministry-recent-laws-hinder-fight-against-illegal-mining-and-environmental-crimes-1036881.aspx.

135. Law No. 29763, Forestry and Wildlife Law (2011, as amended).

136. Legislative Decree No. 1319 (2017); Legislative Decree No. 1517 (2021).

137. Law No. 31973 (2024). Although the Constitutional Court struck down some aspects, it upheld the retroactive validation of land-use changes.

138. Peru’s Penal Code (Legislative Decree No. 635), Title XIII, Arts. 304–314C.

139. Political Constitution of Peru, Art. 2, para. 22.

140. New Constitutional Procedural Code (Law No. 31307), Art. 44: “Amparo is applicable in defense of the following rights: […] To enjoy a balanced environment suitable for the development of life. To drinking water. […] 28) Others recognized by the Constitution.”

141. New CPConst., Art. 39: “The affected party is the person with standing to file the amparo proceeding.”

142. In repeated case law, the Constitutional Court has accepted constitutional appeals arising from lawsuits filed under the New CPConst., even though it does not explicitly refer to the protection of diffuse interests from a constitutional procedural perspective. See, e.g., Constitutional Court, Case No. 01469-2023-PA/TC.

143. Federación Huaynakana Kamatahuara Kana v. Petroperú SA, Ministry of the Environment, and others (Case No. 00010-2022-0-1901-JM-CI-01). See also The Guardian, “Marañón River Granted Legal Personhood,” available at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2025/apr/21/mari-luz-canaquiri-murayari-indigenous-river-campaigner-peru-wins-goldman-prize.

144. CPConst., Art. 67: “In the case of the defense of rights with diffuse or collective interests, standing shall correspond to any person. Likewise, the Ombudsman’s Office may initiate compliance proceedings.”

145. Decreto Legislativo, CÓDIGO CIVIL PERU.

146. CPC, Art. 82 (patrocinio de intereses difusos): compensation established in the judgment shall be delivered to the district or provincial municipalities that participated in the proceedings.

147. Recently, the Code underwent an amendment with the publication of Law 32377, on April 11, 2025.

148. Criminal Code – Legislative Decree No. 635 (1991). Title XIII of the Penal Code, “Offenses Against Natural Resources,” covers environmental crimes against forests under Articles 308, 308B, 308C, 309, 310, 310A, 310B, and 310C.
     Forestry and Wildlife Law – Law No. 29763 (2011), amended by Legislative Decree No. 1517, and more recently by Law No. 31973 (2024), which modifies Articles 29 and 33 on permanent production forests and forest zoning.

149. Supreme Decree No. 004-2021-JUS (April 22, 2021)

150. Ministerio Público del Perú – Fiscalías Especializadas en Materia Ambiental (FEMA), press conference, 11 July 2025 (1,091 convictions in 2024 + 232 in January–May 2025 = >1,300). Reported in ProActivo, “Fiscalía advierte que nuevas leyes complican combate a la minería ilegal”: Available at: https://proactivo.com.pe/fiscalia-advierte-que-nuevas-leyes-complican-combate-a-la-mineria-ilegal

151. Mongabay, ‘Sentencing of Indigenous Defenders’ Killers,’ available at: https://news.mongabay.com/2025/09/peru-court-upholds-28-years-in-prison-for-loggers-in-indigenous-murders/. See also Rainforest Foundation US, ‘Saweto Sentences Confirmed Against the Killers of Asheninka Leaders,’ available at: https://rainforestfoundation.org/saweto-sentences-confirmed-against-the-killers-of-asheninka-leaders/.

152. General Environmental Law, Art. 143: “Any natural or legal person is entitled to bring the action referred to in this Law against those who cause or contribute to causing environmental damage.”

153. Congreso de la República. Comisión Investigadora facultada para investigar por un plazo de 90 días hábiles de las acciones de los funcionarios públicos y privados que ocasionaron el derrame de petróleo de la empresa multinacional Repsol YPF S.A. en el Distrito de Ventanilla y sus consecuencias en el medio ambiente y la ecología. Informe final, entregado mediante Oficio 293-2002-CPAAAE-CI/CR. [Internet] Lima; 16 de junio de 2022. Available at: https://leyes.congreso.gob.pe/Documentos/2021_2026/Informes/Comision_Ordinaria_con_Facultades_de_Co mision_Investigadora/OFICIO-293-2022-CPAAAAE-CI-CR.pdf.

154. Expediente No. 2437-2014, Superior Court of Justice of Ucayali (Caso Saweto — Asesinato de Líderes Indígenas). The primary source is the Peruvian Judiciary’s own sentencing document, available at: https://www.pj.gob.pe/wps/wcm/connect/8647ea004aae04dc968bf69026c349a4/EXP+2437-2014-SENTENCIA-ASESINATO+LIDERES+INDIGENAS-UCAYALI-CASO+SAWETO.pdf

155. Global Witness. The Saweto trials cannot lead to another missed opportunity for justice in the murder of four Peruvian Indigenous leaders. 2023. Available at: https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/land-and-environmental-defenders/saweto-trials-cannot-lead-another-missed-opportunity-justice-murder-four-peruvian-indigenous-leaders/

156. Silva, Carlos Fabricio A. da.; et al. Insights from remote sensing for the study of deforestation drivers in savannas. Journal for Nature Conservation (2025), available at: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1617138125000950.

157. Texto Único Ordenado Ley del Procedimiento Administrativo General (TUO-LPAG), section 173.224 of Article 173.

158. Research Project for Environmental Control (2021), Organismo de Evaluación y Fiscalización Ambiental (OEFA). Available at: https://www.gob.pe/institucion/oefa/informes-publicaciones/4877924-estudio-de-percepcion-en-zonas-de-conflictividad-ambiental-2021

159. University of Sheffield. New technology helping fight against illegal logging of Peru’s valuable rainforest. 2025. Available at: https://sheffield.ac.uk/news/new-technology-helping-fight-against-illegal-logging-perus-valuable-rainforest

160. Actualidade Ambiental. FALLO HISTÓRICO: Poder Judicial sentencia a Cacao del Perú Norte a pagar 15 millones de soles por deforestar bosques en Loreto. Available at: https://www.actualidadambiental.pe/loreto-hoy-dictan-sentencia-a-empresa-que-deforesto-cerca-de-2-mil-hectareas-de-bosques-en-tamshiyacu/

161. Peru’s Constitutional Court upheld the amendment after a constitutional challenge was filed. Although the court struck down some parts of the amendment, it left intact the law’s final provision, which validates past illegal land-use changes. ABC News/AP (April 2025): https://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/amendment-peru-law-raises-fears-amazon-rainforest-destruction-120822608
     The law could result in the abandonment of about 1,300 cases currently in the courts for crimes involving deforestation. Peru Support Group: https://perusupportgroup.org.uk/2024/04/moves-afoot-to-annul-law-promoting-deforestation/

162. Nearly half of all attacks on environmental defenders and Indigenous leaders from 2020 to 2023 were linked to illegal mining, the Ombudsperson’s Office reported. — Human Rights Watch (July 2025): https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/07/08/peru-congress-undermines-fight-against-organized-crime

163. Human Rights Watch reviewed 34 laws, bills, and other decisions passed by Peru’s Congress between 2023 and April 2025, and 54 presidential decrees, documenting how Congress is undermining the independence and capacity of judges and prosecutors to fight organised crime. Human Rights Watch (July 2025): https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/07/08/congress-in-cahoots/how-perus-legislature-is-allowing-organized-crime-to-thrive

164. Over the past decade, at least 33 Indigenous leaders have been murdered in the Peruvian Amazon. Rainforest Foundation US: https://rainforestfoundation.org/our-work/where-we-work/peru/

165. On April 14, 2025, the National Government enacted Law No. 32301, which amends the Law of the Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation (APCI). The IACHR expressed concern that these requirements could constitute an obstacle to the functioning of human rights defender organisations and affect freedom of association and expression. IACHR/OAS (2025): https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2025/098.asp

166. Constitution of the Republic of Suriname (1987, revised 1992), Chapter V (“Basic Rights, Duties and Individual Freedoms”), including Arts. 8 (equality), 16 (freedom of religion), 19 (freedom of expression), 20 and 53 (freedom of association, assembly and political organisation). Text: https://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Suriname/english.html and https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Surinam_1992.

167. Burgerlijk Wetboek van Suriname (Civil Code of Suriname), Book 2, regulating associations (verenigingen) and foundations (stichtingen). See also Freedom House, “Suriname: Freedom in the World 2024 Country Report”, https://freedomhouse.org/country/suriname/freedom-world/2024.

168. CIVICUS Monitor, Suriname country page (rating: “Narrowed”), https://monitor.civicus.org/country/suriname/.

169. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment of 28 November 2007 (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs), https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_172_ing.pdf; Interpretation Judgment of 12 August 2008.

170. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname, Judgment of 25 November 2015 (Merits, Reparations and Costs), https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_309_ing.pdf.

171. Association of Saamaka Authorities (VSG) and VIDS, public hearing on the implementation of the IACtHR judgments in the Saramaka and Moiwana cases held during the 188th session of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (November 2023), https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/sessions/. See also Cultural Survival, “Saramaka People v Suriname: A Human Rights Victory and Its Messy Aftermath”, https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/saramaka-people-v-suriname-human-rights-victory-and-its-messy-aftermath.

172. International Land Coalition, “Stand with the Saamaka People from Suriname”, https://www.landrightsnow.org/get-involved/stand-with-the-saamaka/; Rights and Resources Initiative, “Saamaka Toko” (2024), https://rightsandresources.org/blog/saamaka-toko-a-battle-to-secure-and-protect-the-land-rights-of-the-saamaka-people-in-suriname/; Mongabay, “As logging booms in Suriname, forest communities race to win land rights” (July 2024), https://news.mongabay.com/2024/07/as-logging-booms-in-suriname-forest-communities-race-to-win-land-rights/.

173. Goldman Environmental Prize 2009 -Wanze Eduards and Hugo Jabini (Suriname), https://www.goldmanprize.org/recipient/wanze-eduards-and-hugo-jabini/.

174. Goejaba Declaration of the Saamaka people (June 2024), reported in Rights and Resources Initiative, https://rightsandresources.org/.

175. United Nations Treaty Collection, Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean (Escazú), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-18&chapter=27&clang=_en; ECLAC Observatory on Principle 10, https://observatoriop10.cepal.org/en/maps/escazu-agreement-signature-and-ratification-status. Suriname has neither signed nor ratified the Agreement.

176. Environmental Framework Act, Act No. 97 of 2020 (7 May 2020), available via NIMOS / National Environmental Authority, https://nimos.org/en/portfolio/env-frmwk-act/ and AMP EID, https://ampeid.org/documents/suriname/environmental-framework-act-(no-97-of-2020)/.

177. Environmental Framework Act, Act No. 97 of 2020, Article 11 (penalties); Article 6 et seq. (environmental and social impact assessment); Article 9 (public participation in environmental decision-making).

178. Ministry of Spatial Planning and Environment (Ministerie van Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu -ROM), established in 2020 under the Government of Suriname, https://gov.sr/ministerie-rom/. National Environmental Authority (NMA), successor to the National Institute for Environment and Development (NIMOS), established under the Environmental Framework Act and operational from July 2024.

179. Land rights now. Protect the Saamaka Land and Fores. Available at: https://www.landrightsnow.org/get-involved/stand-with-the-saamaka/

180. National Environmental Authority. Suriname. Available at: https://www.nmasuriname.org/

181. Mongabay (June 2024) — injunction granted, 535,000 ha, twelve groups, FPIC ruling, court language on burial grounds: https://news.mongabay.com/2024/06/landmark-ruling-grants-protections-to-local-and-indigenous-communities-for-now/

182. Negentien personen gecertificeerd in georuimtelijke analyse. Available at: https://gov.sr/negentien-personen-gecertificeerd-in-georuimtelijke-analyse/

183. ILC (October 2024): https://www.landcoalition.org/en/latest/alarming-evidence-shows-massive-deforestation-continues-in-saamaka-territories/.

184. IACtHR: https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_172_ing.pdf

185. Mongabay (June 2024): https://news.mongabay.com/2024/06/landmark-ruling-grants-protections-to-local-and-indigenous-communities-for-now/

186. At the request of the Association of Saamaka Authorities (VSG) and VIDS, a public hearing was held on the implementation of the Saramaka case (2007) and the Kaliña & Lokono case during the 188th session of the IACHR in November 2023. Representatives conveyed their deep concern at the lack of implementation of the judgments of the Inter-American Court and brought up the continued issuing of land titles and permits for extractive concessions in their territories. IWGIA Indigenous World 2024: https://iwgia.org/en/suriname/5389-iw-2024-suriname.html

187. Land Rights Now: https://www.landrightsnow.org/get-involved/stand-with-the-saamaka/

188. NCEA/Netherlands Commission for Environmental Assessment: https://www.eia.nl/en/countries/suriname/legislation-at-project-level/ ;

189. More than 14 years after the Inter-American Court of Human Rights mandated the government to stop logging and mining, demarcate Saamaka territory and legally recognise their collective rights, new concessions continue to be granted without free, prior and informed consent, causing over 60,000 hectares of damaged or degraded forest. ILC/CIRAD (June 2024): https://www.landcoalition.org/en/latest/new-data-reveals-illegal-logging-is-devastating-surinames-forests/

190. MAAP #203: https://www.maapprogram.org/maap-203-massive-planned-deforestation-in-amazon-of-suriname/

191. Suriname does not have laws to facilitate access to public information, and access is limited in practice. Freedom House Freedom in the World 2021: https://freedomhouse.org/country/suriname/freedom-world/2021

192. Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela (1999, reformada en 2009), Arts. 52 (freedom of association), 53 (freedom of assembly), 57–58 (freedom of expression) and 67 (political organisations). Text: https://www.asambleanacional.gob.ve/storage/documentos/leyes/constitu-20211029161336.pdf.

193. Ley de Fiscalización, Regularización, Actuación y Financiamiento de las Organizaciones No Gubernamentales y Afines no Lucrativas (Ley Anti-ONG / Anti-NGO Law), enacted on 15 November 2024. See Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), “Venezuela’s New NGO Law and U.S. Funding Freeze Are a Death Blow to the Country’s Civil Society”, https://www.wola.org/analysis/venezuelas-new-ngo-law-and-u-s-funding-freeze-are-a-death-blow-to-the-countrys-civil-society/; OHCHR, “Venezuela: Draft NGO law, reaching a point of no return in the closure of civic space” (January 2023), https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/01/venezuela-draft-ngo-law-reaching-point-no-return-closure-civic-space;

194. Anti-Solidarity Law (Ley contra el Fascismo, el Neofascismo y Expresiones Similares), enacted in August 2024, and the Anti-NGO Law of November 2024 – both criticised by international human rights mechanisms for their impact on civil society space.

195. CIVICUS Monitor, Venezuela country page (rating: “Closed”), https://monitor.civicus.org/country/venezuela/.

196. Centro de Defensores. Situación de las Personas Defensoras de Derechos Humanos en Venezuela – 2024. Available at: https://centrodefensores.org.ve/?p=668

197. Provea (Programa Venezolano de Educación-Acción en Derechos Humanos), 2024 Annual Report, https://provea.org/2024-annual-report/; Amnesty International, “Venezuela: Cease detentions and attacks on defenders” (Urgent Action, 2025), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr53/9026/2025/en/; FIDH–OMCT Observatory, “Venezuela: criminalización y represión de personas defensoras”, https://www.fidh.org/en/region/americas/venezuela/venezuela-the-observatory-omct-fidh-report-denounces-systematic; US Department of State, “2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Venezuela”, https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/venezuela.

198. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, established by UN Human Rights Council Resolution 42/25 (2019) and successive renewals; reports available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/ffmv/index.

199. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and REDESCA, joint statement “Venezuela Must Protect the Yanomami People from the Advance of Illegal Mining and other Illicit Activities” (Press Release 257/24, November 2024), https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2024/257.asp.

200. IACHR and REDESCA, Press Release 257/24 (cited above); see also UN Human Rights Council Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, periodic reports, https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/ffmv/index.

201. United Nations Treaty Collection, Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean (Escazú), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-18&chapter=27&clang=_en. As of 2025 Venezuela has neither signed nor ratified the Escazú Agreement.

202. CSIS, “Illegal Mining in Venezuela: Death and Devastation in the Amazonas and Orinoco Regions”, https://www.csis.org/analysis/illegal-mining-venezuela-death-and-devastation-amazonas-and-orinoco-regions; International Crisis Group, “A Curse of Gold: Mining and Violence in Venezuela’s South” (Briefing N° 53), https://www.crisisgroup.org/brf/latin-america-caribbean/andes/venezuela/b53-curse-gold-mining-and-violence-venezuelas-south; AIDA, “Mining Arc threatens majestic lands of Southern Venezuela”, https://aida-americas.org/en/blog/mining-arc-threatens-majestic-lands-southern-venezuela; SOSOrinoco, https://sosorinoco.org/.

203. Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela (1999), Art. 120 (prior consultation with Indigenous communities for the exploitation by the State of natural resources located in their habitats); Ley Orgánica de Pueblos y Comunidades Indígenas (LOPCI, 2005), Gaceta Oficial N° 38.344 (27 December 2005).

204. Decreto N° 2.248 of 24 February 2016, “Creación de la Zona de Desarrollo Estratégico Nacional Arco Minero del Orinoco”, Gaceta Oficial N° 40.855 (24 February 2016). The decree designates approximately 111,843 km² (around 12 per cent of Venezuela’s national territory) as a strategic mining development zone covering parts of the states of Amazonas, Bolívar and Delta Amacuro.

205. Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (TSJ), https://www.tsj.gob.ve/; Sala Constitucional, Sala Político-Administrativa and Sala Casación Penal.

206. Ley Orgánica de Amparo sobre Derechos y Garantías Constitucionales (1988), Gaceta Oficial N° 34.060 (27 September 1988); Ley Orgánica de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa (2010), Gaceta Oficial N° 39.451 (22 June 2010); Código Procesal Civil and Código Civil.

207. WOLA (April 2025): https://www.wola.org/analysis/venezuelas-new-ngo-law-and-u-s-funding-freeze-are-a-death-blow-to-the-countrys-civil-society/

208. Human Rights Watch World Report 2026: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/venezuela

209. Ministerio del Poder Popular para el Ecosocialismo (MinEC), https://www.minec.gob.ve/; Decreto N° 1.378 of 21 October 2014, on the structure and competences of MinEC.

210. Ley Orgánica del Ambiente (LOA), Gaceta Oficial Extraordinaria N° 5.833 (22 December 2006), https://www.asambleanacional.gob.ve/storage/documentos/leyes/ley-organi-20220210161106.pdf. The LOA establishes the general environmental framework and creates the conditions for a special environmental criminal jurisdiction.

211. Ministerio del Poder Popular de Desarrollo Minero Ecológico (Ministry of Ecological Mining Development), https://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/; created by Decreto N° 2.231 of 2016 in conjunction with the establishment of the Arco Minero del Orinoco.

212. Ministerio del Poder Popular para los Pueblos Indígenas (Ministry of Indigenous Peoples), https://www.minpi.gob.ve/.

213. Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela (1999), Arts. 127–129 (environmental rights) and Arts. 119–126 (indigenous rights, including the duty of the State to demarcate and guarantee collective property over the lands ancestrally and traditionally occupied by Indigenous communities).

214. Instituto Nacional de Parques (Inparques), https://www.inparques.gob.ve/; Ley del Instituto Nacional de Parques and Reglamento Parcial de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente sobre las Áreas Bajo Régimen de Administración Especial.

215. Ministerio Público (Fiscalía General de la República), https://www.mp.gob.ve/. Pursuant to the LPA, environmental crimes are prosecuted by specialised environmental prosecutors. The Tribunal Supremo de Justicia has discussed the creation of a Jurisdicción Especial Penal Ambiental, but has not yet implemented a fully autonomous specialised environmental jurisdiction in practice. See CIMAS, “¿Y la Jurisdicción Especial Penal Ambiental en Venezuela?”, https://cimasorg.com/2025/04/20/y-la-jurisdiccion-especial-penal-ambiental-en-venezuela/.

216. Decreto N° 1.378 of 2014; CIMAS, “¿Y la Jurisdicción Especial Penal Ambiental en Venezuela?” (April 2025), https://cimasorg.com/2025/04/20/y-la-jurisdiccion-especial-penal-ambiental-en-venezuela/.

217. Cuerpo de Investigaciones Científicas, Penales y Criminalísticas (CICPC), https://www.cicpc.gob.ve/; Guardia Nacional Bolivariana, Comando Nacional Antidrogas y de Recursos Naturales; Fuerzas de Acciones Especiales de la Policía Nacional Bolivariana (FAES).

218. Defensoría del Pueblo de Venezuela, https://www.defensoria.gob.ve/. The Defensoría is a constitutionally autonomous body (Arts. 280–283 of the Constitution); its independence has, however, been the subject of recurrent criticism by international human rights bodies.

219. Ley Penal del Ambiente (LPA), Gaceta Oficial N° 39.913 (2 May 2012), https://www.asambleanacional.gob.ve/storage/documentos/leyes/ley-penal–20211109143642.pdf. The LPA introduces objective criminal responsibility for environmental crimes (criminal liability arising from the violation of administrative norms, without need to demonstrate culpa or dolo) and a broad catalogue of sanctions, including the dissolution of legal entities and the closure of facilities.

220. Venezuela does not offer a case example of successful domestic CSO litigation on nature crimes. The country represents the most acute example in the Amazon region of a jurisdiction where domestic legal remedies are structurally unavailable, making international mechanisms, the IACHR, the UN Fact-Finding Mission, and the ICC, the only realistic accountability forums. This finding is itself a significant analytical point about the enabling conditions for civil society engagement with nature crimes in Venezuela.

221. CSIS Briefs. Illegal Mining in Venezuela: Death and Devastation in the Amazonas and Orinoco Regions. 2020. Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/illegal-mining-venezuela-death-and-devastation-amazonas-and-orinoco-regions

222. SOS Orinoco: https://www.csis.org/analysis/illegal-mining-venezuela-death-and-devastation-amazonas-and-orinoco-regions

223. IWGIA Indigenous World 2024 (Wataniba satellite data): https://iwgia.org/en/venezuela/5390-iw-2024-venezuela.html; Debates Indígenas (Wataniba/Horonami collaboration): https://debatesindigenas.org/en/2025/02/01/gold-or-life-the-struggle-of-venezuelan-indigenous-peoples-against-illegal-mining/; IACHR–REDESCA statement, November 2024: https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2024/257.asp; Survival International (Yanomami health crisis): https://www.survivalinternational.org/news/14300

224. The Anti-NGO Law was passed by the National Assembly in August 2024 and mirrors restrictive NGO laws applied in Russia, Georgia and Nicaragua. It undermines the constitutional right to freedom of association and threatens the closure of many organisations. — WOLA (April 2025): https://www.wola.org/analysis/venezuelas-new-ngo-law-and-u-s-funding-freeze-are-a-death-blow-to-the-countrys-civil-society/

225. On 6 September 2012, Venezuela gave notice of its denunciation of the American Convention on Human Rights, with the denunciation taking effect on 6 September 2013. Venezuela expressly manifested its intention to withdraw from both the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. — ASIL Insights: https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/1/venezuelas-denunciation-american-convention-human-rights

226. The TSJ has issued numerous decisions that favoured the Maduro regime in recent years, and UN experts have repeatedly criticised the judiciary’s lack of independence. A 2021 UN report noted that prosecutors and judiciary members have effectively aided the regime’s human rights abuses. — Freedom House Freedom in the World 2024: https://freedomhouse.org/country/venezuela/freedom-world/2024

227. MAAP Program: https://www.maapprogram.org/ftr_country/venezuela/

228. According to data compiled by Yanomami health agents in just one region, the Sierra Parima, more than 500 Yanomami in Venezuela died between 2022 and 2024 from malaria and other treatable diseases. — Survival International (July 2025): https://www.survivalinternational.org/news/14300

229. From roughly 2011 onward, as Venezuela spiralled into economic and social crisis, statistics began disappearing from the web and became unavailable to the public, scientific researchers and activists. Many important government environmental indices have been hidden from public view, including updated data on deforestation, ecosystem and wildlife endangerment, mining, water and air quality, and pollution. Mongabay (October 2019): https://news.mongabay.com/2019/10/venezuelan-crisis-government-censors-environmental-and-scientific-data/